Learn the key Turkish competition law risks affecting energy companies and foreign investors. This 2026 guide explains merger control, joint ventures, information exchange, price coordination, dominance, exclusive contracts, dawn raids, fines, compliance programs, and legal remedies.

Turkey’s energy sector presents major opportunities for foreign utilities, infrastructure funds, renewable energy developers, private equity investors, electricity traders, technology companies, and multinational industrial groups. At the same time, energy companies operate in a concentrated, heavily regulated, and commercially interconnected market in which competition law risks can arise at almost every stage of an investment.

Competition law concerns may affect:

• Acquisitions of power plants.
• Renewable energy joint ventures.
• Share purchases in licensed energy companies.
• Electricity trading arrangements.
• Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs).
• EPC procurement.
• Electricity distribution and supply activities.
• Battery energy storage projects.
• EV charging networks.
• Equipment supply and maintenance agreements.
• Industry associations and consortiums.

Compliance with EMRA regulations does not replace compliance with Turkish competition law. A transaction, pricing practice, information-sharing arrangement, or exclusive agreement may satisfy energy-sector regulations while still creating liability under the Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition.

The principal purpose of Law No. 4054 is to prevent agreements, decisions, and practices that restrict competition, prevent abuse of dominant position, and regulate mergers and acquisitions capable of substantially reducing effective competition.

Foreign investors should therefore include competition-law analysis in transaction due diligence, contract negotiations, corporate governance, and ongoing energy-market compliance.

This 2026 Updated Legal Guide explains the most important Turkish competition law risks facing energy companies and international investors.

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Why Competition Law Is Important in the Turkish Energy Sector

Electricity and renewable energy markets create particular competition risks because they involve:

• Limited grid capacity.
• Regional market concentration.
• Long-term infrastructure investments.
• Regulatory licensing.
• High barriers to entry.
• Vertical relationships between producers, traders, suppliers, and consumers.
• Detailed production and pricing information.
• Joint infrastructure projects.
• Long-term supply arrangements.
• Large-scale mergers and acquisitions.

Conduct that appears commercially normal may attract scrutiny where it affects electricity prices, capacity access, customer choice, equipment procurement, or market entry.

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Which Authorities Regulate Competition in Turkey?

The primary competition authority is the Turkish Competition Authority, whose decision-making body is the Competition Board.

The Competition Authority may:

• Review mergers and acquisitions.
• Investigate restrictive agreements.
• Examine abuse of dominance.
• Conduct on-site inspections.
• Request documents and electronic communications.
• Impose administrative fines.
• Accept commitments where legally available.
• Apply settlement procedures.
• Order the termination of infringing conduct.

Energy-sector investigations may also involve information or market structures regulated by EMRA, but the Competition Authority conducts its own assessment under competition law.

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1. Merger Control in Energy Acquisitions

Foreign investors acquiring:

• Solar power plants.
• Wind farms.
• Hydroelectric facilities.
• Electricity suppliers.
• Energy trading companies.
• Battery storage businesses.
• Charging network operators.
• EPC or equipment businesses.

must determine whether the transaction requires Competition Board approval.

A transaction may constitute a notifiable acquisition where it results in a lasting change of control and satisfies the applicable turnover thresholds.

Turkey amended its merger-control rules in February 2026. Under the updated framework, the former TRY 250 million individual threshold was increased to TRY 1 billion, the relevant Turkish turnover threshold was increased from TRY 750 million to TRY 3 billion, and the worldwide turnover threshold was increased from TRY 3 billion to TRY 9 billion. The complete notification analysis must still apply the alternative threshold tests, turnover attribution rules, and control principles contained in the legislation and guidance.

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2. Closing Before Competition Approval

A notifiable transaction should not be implemented before the required Competition Board approval is obtained.

Premature implementation may include:

• Transferring shares before approval.
• Exercising control over the target.
• Appointing or directing management.
• Integrating commercial activities.
• Coordinating prices.
• Combining customer portfolios.
• Sharing competitively sensitive information without safeguards.
• Giving the purchaser decisive influence before clearance.

This conduct is commonly described as gun jumping.

The sale agreement should therefore contain:

• A clear condition precedent.
• Cooperation duties for the filing.
• A long-stop date.
• Risk allocation for potential remedies.
• Interim operating covenants.
• Clean-team procedures.
• Restrictions on pre-closing integration.

The Competition Authority states that notified transactions are generally considered approved if no action is taken within 30 days from the filing, although incomplete filings, information requests, or a detailed review may affect the process.

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3. Direct and Indirect Changes of Control

Competition approval may be relevant even where the immediate shares of the Turkish energy company are not directly transferred.

Examples include:

• Acquisition of the foreign parent company.
• Creation of joint control.
• Changes to veto rights.
• Amendments to shareholders’ agreements.
• Acquisition of decisive influence through financing.
• Conversion of debt into equity.
• Long-term management arrangements.
• Appointment rights over strategic directors.

The Competition Authority’s updated 2026 merger guidance addresses matters including control, joint ventures, transaction parties, turnover attribution, and the aggregation of related transactions.

Foreign investors should therefore assess both the formal share transfer and the practical governance structure.

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4. Renewable Energy Joint Ventures

Joint ventures are common in Turkish renewable energy projects.

Typical structures include:

• Foreign investor and Turkish developer.
• Infrastructure fund and project sponsor.
• Technology supplier and electricity producer.
• Industrial consumer and renewable generator.
• Charging network and real estate partner.
• Battery operator and generation company.

A full-function joint venture may fall within merger-control rules if it performs the functions of an autonomous economic entity on a lasting basis.

Competition concerns may also arise where parent companies remain competitors and use the joint venture to:

• Coordinate prices.
• Divide customers.
• Exchange strategic information.
• Restrict independent investment.
• Allocate projects or regions.
• Coordinate tenders.

Joint venture agreements should therefore regulate information barriers, independent decision-making, and permitted cooperation.

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5. Acquisition of Minority Shareholdings

A minority acquisition does not automatically fall outside merger control.

Competition-law risk may arise where the investor receives:

• Veto rights over the annual budget.
• Approval rights over the business plan.
• Senior management appointment rights.
• Control over strategic investments.
• Rights affecting market conduct.
• Joint decision-making authority.

Rights protecting only the financial value of a minority investment may not create control, but strategic veto rights can lead to joint control.

The substance of the governance rights is more important than the percentage of shares acquired.

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6. Competition Due Diligence Before an Energy Acquisition

Competition due diligence should examine:

• Previous Competition Authority investigations.
• Ongoing information requests.
• Exclusivity arrangements.
• Pricing practices.
• Market-sharing allegations.
• Trade association participation.
• Distributor and dealer restrictions.
• Tender conduct.
• Customer allocation.
• Information exchanges.
• Dominance risks.
• Merger-control history.
• Commitments given in previous transactions.

Historical competition violations remain a target-company risk in share acquisitions.

The buyer should seek warranties and specific indemnities where potential infringements are identified.

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7. Market Definition in Energy Transactions

Competition assessment depends heavily on the relevant product and geographic market.

Potential energy markets may include:

• Electricity generation.
• Electricity wholesale trading.
• Electricity retail supply.
• Distribution.
• Balancing services.
• Renewable energy certificates.
• Charging services.
• Battery storage services.
• Equipment supply.
• Transformer markets.
• EPC services.
• O&M services.

The Competition Board may distinguish between technologies, customer groups, regions, voltage levels, or commercial channels depending on the transaction.

A 2025 acquisition decision examined whether a transaction would create competitive concerns in electricity generation and wholesale electricity sales markets.

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8. Horizontal Agreements Between Competitors

Article 4 of Law No. 4054 prohibits agreements and coordinated practices that restrict competition.

High-risk conduct includes agreements between competing energy companies regarding:

• Electricity prices.
• Bidding strategies.
• Production levels.
• Customer allocation.
• Regional allocation.
• Tender participation.
• Project pipelines.
• Supply capacity.
• Commercial margins.

An unlawful agreement does not need to be written. Emails, messaging applications, meetings, or coordinated conduct may be sufficient evidence.

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9. Price Fixing

Competitors must independently determine:

• Electricity prices.
• Trading margins.
• PPA pricing.
• Equipment prices.
• EPC bids.
• Service fees.
• Charging tariffs.

Discussions among competitors about future prices or pricing strategies create serious competition-law risk.

Even informal conversations between senior managers at conferences, association meetings, or social events may become relevant evidence in an investigation.

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10. Market and Customer Allocation

Energy companies should not agree to divide:

• Regions.
• Industrial customers.
• Electricity consumers.
• Renewable projects.
• EPC opportunities.
• Grid connection areas.
• Equipment customers.
• Charging locations.

Arrangements where competitors agree not to approach one another’s customers are particularly dangerous.

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11. Bid Rigging in Energy Tenders

Competition risks arise in tenders concerning:

• EPC contracts.
• Equipment procurement.
• Public energy projects.
• Grid infrastructure.
• Maintenance agreements.
• Renewable energy zones.
• Municipal charging projects.
• Privatization tenders.

Prohibited conduct may include:

• Cover bids.
• Bid rotation.
• Agreement not to bid.
• Customer allocation.
• Sharing tender prices.
• Compensating unsuccessful bidders.

Energy companies should implement strict tender-compliance procedures.

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12. Exchange of Competitively Sensitive Information

Energy-sector companies frequently possess detailed information regarding:

• Generation forecasts.
• Maintenance schedules.
• Future capacity.
• PPA prices.
• Customer consumption.
• Trading positions.
• Planned investments.
• Project pipelines.
• Tender pricing.
• Market strategies.

Exchanging current or future strategic information with competitors may reduce competitive uncertainty and violate competition law.

Information exchanges should be carefully assessed in:

• Joint ventures.
• Due diligence.
• Industry associations.
• Common service platforms.
• Balancing arrangements.
• Consortium negotiations.
• Shared infrastructure projects.

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13. Clean Teams During M&A Transactions

Due diligence often requires access to sensitive commercial information.

Before competition clearance, the buyer and target may still be competitors. Direct access to detailed pricing, customer, production, or strategic information can therefore create competition concerns.

A clean-team protocol may restrict access to:

• External advisers.
• Designated independent personnel.
• Aggregated data.
• Historical information.
• Redacted customer data.

The protocol should define permitted use, retention, disclosure, and destruction of data.

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14. Trade Association Meetings

Energy companies frequently participate in industry associations.

Competition risks arise where association meetings include discussions about:

• Future pricing.
• Production restrictions.
• Customer strategies.
• Commercial margins.
• Tender participation.
• Capacity allocation.
• Coordinated lobbying that affects market exclusion.

Meeting agendas and minutes should be reviewed, and company representatives should receive competition-law training.

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15. Exclusive Power Purchase Agreements

Long-term PPAs may contain exclusivity provisions.

Exclusivity is not automatically unlawful, but risk increases where the agreement:

• Forecloses competing suppliers.
• Covers a substantial part of customer demand.
• Has an excessive duration.
• Contains restrictive renewal provisions.
• Prevents switching.
• Is entered into by a dominant undertaking.
• Restricts resale or third-party supply.

PPA exclusivity should be assessed in light of market share, duration, commercial justification, and the buyer’s access to alternatives.

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16. Take-or-Pay and Minimum Purchase Obligations

Take-or-pay clauses can provide revenue certainty and improve project bankability.

Competition concerns may arise where minimum purchase commitments:

• Tie up a substantial portion of customer demand.
• Prevent access by competing producers.
• Continue for an excessive period.
• Are combined with exclusivity.
• Are imposed by a dominant supplier.

The commercial need for project financing should be documented and balanced against foreclosure risk.

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17. Non-Compete Clauses

Energy acquisitions and joint ventures commonly contain non-compete obligations.

A non-compete clause should generally be:

• Directly related to the transaction.
• Necessary to protect transferred goodwill or know-how.
• Limited in duration.
• Limited geographically.
• Limited to the relevant business.

An excessively broad clause may be treated as a restrictive agreement rather than a legitimate transaction protection.

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18. Restrictions in EPC and Equipment Agreements

Competition-law concerns may arise from clauses that:

• Fix resale prices.
• Restrict passive sales.
• Prohibit sourcing competing products.
• Divide territories.
• Limit customer groups.
• Restrict independent maintenance providers.
• Tie unrelated products together.
• Prevent spare-part sourcing.

International suppliers should adapt global distribution and service agreements to Turkish competition rules.

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19. Resale Price Maintenance

A manufacturer or supplier should not generally dictate the minimum resale price charged by an independent distributor.

Risky practices include:

• Minimum resale prices.
• Fixed dealer margins.
• Pressure to increase resale prices.
• Threats for discounting.
• Monitoring and punishing low-priced sales.
• Incentives conditional on maintaining set prices.

Recommended or maximum prices may still create risk if implemented through pressure or enforcement.

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20. Exclusive Distribution and Supply Agreements

Exclusive agreements may be lawful where they improve distribution or protect investment.

Risk depends on:

• Market shares.
• Duration.
• Territorial restrictions.
• Customer restrictions.
• Access to alternative suppliers.
• Barriers to market entry.
• Cumulative effects of similar agreements.

Contracts involving transformers, solar components, batteries, charging equipment, or maintenance networks should be reviewed individually.

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21. Most-Favoured-Customer Clauses

A most-favoured-customer clause may require a supplier to offer the contracting party terms at least as favorable as those offered to others.

Such clauses may:

• Reduce discounting incentives.
• Increase price transparency.
• Limit negotiation flexibility.
• Raise barriers for smaller competitors.

Their competitive effect depends on market power and contract structure.

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22. Abuse of Dominant Position

Holding a dominant position is not unlawful. Abuse of that position is prohibited.

Potential abuses in the energy sector include:

• Refusal to supply.
• Discriminatory pricing.
• Excessive pricing.
• Predatory pricing.
• Tying and bundling.
• Margin squeeze.
• Exclusionary exclusivity.
• Unjustified access restrictions.
• Favoring affiliated companies.
• Limiting access to essential infrastructure.

Dominance is assessed by considering market share, barriers to entry, buyer power, infrastructure control, and market structure.

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23. Refusal to Supply or Provide Access

A dominant energy company may face risk where it unjustifiably refuses access to:

• Essential infrastructure.
• Charging networks.
• Technical data.
• Spare parts.
• Maintenance services.
• Connection-related services.
• Commercial platforms.

Not every refusal is unlawful. Capacity limits, credit risk, safety concerns, or regulatory obligations may provide objective justification.

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24. Discriminatory Treatment

Companies with market power should avoid unjustified differences between similarly situated customers regarding:

• Price.
• Payment terms.
• Access.
• Technical conditions.
• Service quality.
• Delivery priority.
• Discounts.

Different treatment may be lawful where supported by objective commercial reasons such as volume, cost, creditworthiness, or contractual risk.

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25. Predatory and Excessive Pricing

Competition concerns may arise where a dominant undertaking:

• Prices below cost to exclude competitors.
• Imposes unfairly high prices.
• Uses temporary losses to eliminate rivals.
• Raises prices after foreclosure.

Energy-price regulation does not necessarily eliminate competition-law exposure in unregulated or partially regulated market segments.

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26. Vertical Integration Risks

Energy groups may operate simultaneously in:

• Generation.
• Trading.
• Supply.
• Distribution-related businesses.
• Equipment.
• EPC.
• O&M.
• Charging services.

Vertical integration can create efficiencies but may also lead to:

• Foreclosure of competitors.
• Discriminatory access.
• Margin squeeze.
• Preferential treatment of affiliates.
• Misuse of commercially sensitive data.

Internal compliance controls should separate regulated, commercial, and competitive activities where appropriate.

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27. Joint Purchasing and Procurement Cooperation

Energy companies may cooperate to purchase:

• Solar modules.
• Turbines.
• Transformers.
• Batteries.
• Insurance.
• Maintenance services.

Joint procurement may reduce costs, but risk arises where participants:

• Possess significant purchasing power.
• Coordinate downstream prices.
• Exchange excessive commercial information.
• Exclude suppliers.
• Standardize strategic purchasing behavior.

The arrangement should be limited to what is necessary to obtain procurement efficiencies.

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28. Renewable Energy Consortiums

Consortiums may be required for large projects that one company cannot perform alone.

A legitimate consortium should be distinguished from an arrangement between companies that could independently submit competing bids.

The consortium agreement should document:

• Technical necessity.
• Capacity limitations.
• Risk sharing.
• Complementary resources.
• Independent pricing rationale.
• Restricted information exchange.

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29. Competition Risks in EV Charging Networks

Charging network markets may generate competition issues involving:

• Exclusive location agreements.
• Roaming access.
• Platform interoperability.
• Charging tariffs.
• Customer data.
• Access to shopping centers or highways.
• Exclusive payment systems.
• Tying charging services to other products.

Long-term exclusivity for premium locations may foreclose competing charging operators.

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30. Competition Risks in Battery Storage

Battery projects may raise concerns involving:

• Capacity reservation.
• Balancing services.
• Grid access.
• Joint bidding.
• Algorithmic trading.
• Market-sensitive operational information.
• Vertical integration with generation and trading.

Storage agreements should preserve independent market conduct unless coordination is objectively necessary and legally permitted.

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31. Algorithmic Pricing and Energy Trading Systems

Energy traders increasingly use software and automated pricing tools.

Competition risks may arise where algorithms:

• Use competitor-sensitive information.
• Facilitate coordinated pricing.
• Respond predictably to competitor behavior.
• Are supplied by a common pricing provider.
• Produce parallel strategies based on shared confidential data.

Companies remain responsible for ensuring that automated systems comply with competition law.

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32. Competition Authority Investigations

An investigation may begin following:

• A complaint.
• A leniency application.
• Market monitoring.
• Regulatory information.
• Evidence discovered in another investigation.
• Transaction review.
• Public tender concerns.

The Authority may request:

• Contracts.
• Emails.
• Messaging records.
• Internal reports.
• Pricing data.
• Board documents.
• Electronic files.

Companies should maintain an investigation-response protocol.

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33. On-Site Inspections and Dawn Raids

The Competition Authority may conduct on-site inspections at company premises.

During an inspection, officials may review:

• Computers.
• Emails.
• Mobile devices.
• Messaging applications.
• Printed documents.
• Shared drives.
• Corporate communication systems.

Employees should cooperate while protecting legally recognized procedural rights. Deleting, concealing, or altering documents may create additional exposure.

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34. Administrative Fines

Competition violations may lead to significant turnover-based administrative fines.

Financial exposure may extend beyond the original conduct because an investigation can also result in:

• Contract invalidity.
• Damages claims.
• Reputational harm.
• Transaction delays.
• Financing concerns.
• Management liability issues.
• Compliance-monitoring costs.

Foreign parent companies may also be affected depending on the economic-unit analysis and corporate structure.

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35. Settlement and Commitment Procedures

Depending on the type and stage of the investigation, companies may consider:

• Commitments to address competition concerns.
• Settlement.
• Cooperation with the Authority.
• Leniency in cartel cases.

Turkish competition law provides for settlement procedures, and settlement may result in a reduction of the administrative fine within the applicable legal framework.

These mechanisms should be evaluated strategically and with specialist legal advice.

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36. Private Compensation Claims

A company harmed by anti-competitive conduct may pursue civil remedies under Turkish law.

Potential claims may concern:

• Cartel overcharges.
• Exclusion from the market.
• Discriminatory treatment.
• Unlawful refusal to supply.
• Bid-rigging losses.
• Lost commercial opportunities.

Competition Authority findings may become important evidence in subsequent compensation litigation.

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37. Effect of Competition Violations on Contracts

Contractual provisions violating competition law may become unenforceable or legally vulnerable.

Risk may affect:

• Exclusivity clauses.
• Price restrictions.
• Territorial restrictions.
• Non-compete obligations.
• Customer allocation.
• Supply restrictions.
• Joint bidding arrangements.

Foreign investors should not assume that a signed contract will be fully enforceable if its provisions violate mandatory competition rules.

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38. Competition Compliance in Energy M&A Agreements

A Share Purchase Agreement should address:

• Merger-control filing responsibility.
• Regulatory cooperation.
• Competition warranties.
• Disclosure of investigations.
• Gun-jumping restrictions.
• Clean-team procedures.
• Remedy obligations.
• Long-stop date.
• Termination rights.
• Allocation of filing risks.

The buyer should also examine whether the target has implemented an effective compliance program.

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39. 2026 Merger-Control Developments

The 2026 changes are particularly important for international investors because higher thresholds may exclude some smaller transactions from mandatory filing.

However, the threshold increase does not mean that energy acquisitions are automatically exempt. Turnover must be calculated at the economic-group level under the relevant rules, and control analysis must include indirect acquisitions, joint control, and connected transactions.

The Competition Authority reviewed 416 merger, acquisition, and privatization transactions in 2025, compared with 311 transactions reported for 2024. This demonstrates the continuing significance of Turkish merger control for both domestic and international transactions.

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40. Competition Compliance Program for Energy Companies

An effective compliance program should include:

• Written competition policy.
• Board-level oversight.
• Employee training.
• Tender protocols.
• Trade association rules.
• M&A clean-team procedures.
• Contract review.
• Dawn-raid response plan.
• Whistleblowing mechanism.
• Periodic audits.
• Monitoring of algorithms.
• Record-retention rules.

High-risk staff include employees working in sales, trading, pricing, procurement, business development, tenders, and industry associations.

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Practical Competition-Law Checklist for Foreign Investors

Before investing in or operating an energy company in Turkey, foreign investors should:

1. Determine whether Competition Board approval is required.
2. Analyze direct and indirect control.
3. Calculate group turnover under the current rules.
4. Avoid implementation before clearance.
5. Establish clean-team procedures.
6. Review the target’s competition history.
7. Examine exclusivity clauses.
8. Review PPAs and long-term supply agreements.
9. Analyze dominant-position risks.
10. Review distributor and dealer restrictions.
11. Examine tender participation.
12. Review information-sharing arrangements.
13. Assess joint ventures and consortiums.
14. Review trade association conduct.
15. Implement a dawn-raid protocol.
16. Train commercial personnel.
17. Audit algorithmic pricing tools.
18. Preserve independent commercial decision-making.
19. Obtain Turkish competition-law advice.
20. Coordinate competition compliance with EMRA obligations.

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Common Mistakes Made by Foreign Energy Investors

Foreign investors frequently:

• Assume EMRA approval replaces competition approval.
• Focus only on the direct share percentage.
• Ignore joint-control rights.
• Close before Competition Board approval.
• Share sensitive information during due diligence.
• Use generic clean-team protocols.
• Overlook exclusive PPA risks.
• Accept broad non-compete clauses.
• Exchange pricing information in joint ventures.
• Ignore trade association conduct.
• Fail to review target-company competition exposure.
• Treat minority acquisitions as automatically exempt.
• Neglect competition training.
• Delay legal advice until an investigation begins.

These mistakes may expose both the Turkish target and its international parent group to substantial liability.

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Frequently Asked Questions

1. Does every energy acquisition require Competition Board approval?

No. A filing is required only where the transaction constitutes a merger or acquisition producing a lasting change of control and satisfies the applicable turnover thresholds. Turkey increased the relevant thresholds in 2026.

2. Can a minority investment require competition approval?

Yes. A minority investment may be notifiable where the investor obtains sole or joint control through strategic veto, governance, or appointment rights.

3. Can parties exchange information before an acquisition closes?

Only with caution. Competitively sensitive information should be protected through clean teams, aggregation, redaction, and use restrictions, especially where the parties are competitors.

4. Does EMRA approval eliminate the need for competition approval?

No. EMRA and the Competition Authority apply different legal regimes. A transaction may require approval or compliance under both frameworks.

5. Are long-term PPAs unlawful under Turkish competition law?

No. Long-term PPAs are not inherently unlawful. Risk depends on market power, exclusivity, duration, purchase obligations, foreclosure effects, and commercial justification.

6. Can a dominant energy company refuse to supply a customer?

Possibly, if there is an objective and proportionate commercial justification. An unjustified refusal by a dominant undertaking may constitute abuse where it excludes competition or harms the market.

7. What happens if a notifiable acquisition closes before approval?

Premature implementation may result in administrative fines and other legal consequences. Transaction documents should make Competition Board clearance a condition precedent where required.

8. Can competition violations lead to compensation claims?

Yes. Businesses harmed by anti-competitive conduct may pursue private damages claims in addition to any administrative investigation or fine.

9. Why are joint ventures risky from a competition-law perspective?

Joint ventures may facilitate legitimate investment but can also enable competing parent companies to exchange strategic information or coordinate market conduct. Governance and information barriers should therefore be carefully designed.

10. Why should foreign investors hire a Turkish competition and energy lawyer?

A Turkish competition lawyer can assess notification obligations, structure joint ventures, implement clean-team procedures, review PPAs and distribution contracts, conduct competition due diligence, prepare compliance programs, manage Competition Authority investigations, and coordinate competition requirements with Turkish energy regulation.

Legal Support – Contact Our Energy and Competition Lawyers

Competition-law violations can delay acquisitions, invalidate contractual provisions, expose businesses to substantial administrative fines, and damage the long-term value of an energy investment. Foreign investors should incorporate competition compliance into transaction planning, contract drafting, corporate governance, and daily commercial operations.

Fırat Fesih Kaya and our legal team advise foreign investors, infrastructure funds, renewable energy developers, electricity producers, traders, EPC contractors, charging network operators, equipment suppliers, lenders, and multinational energy groups on Turkish merger control, competition due diligence, energy-sector joint ventures, PPAs, dominance issues, restrictive agreements, Competition Authority investigations, regulatory compliance, international arbitration, and commercial litigation.

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