

Fake Bank Call Fraud in Turkey: Criminal Remedies for Foreign Victims — 2026 Guide
Did a fake bank employee steal money from your Turkish bank account? Learn what foreign victims should do after bank impersonation fraud, how to preserve evidence, trace transfers, freeze suspicious accounts, file a criminal complaint and seek recovery in Turkey in 2026.
A foreign national living, working, studying, investing or doing business in Turkey may receive a telephone call that appears to come from a bank.
The caller may know the victim’s name, bank, telephone number or other personal information and may say:
“There is a suspicious transaction on your account.”
“Someone is trying to take out a loan in your name.”
“Your account has been compromised.”
“Read the verification code so we can cancel the transaction.”
The victim believes the caller is a bank employee and provides an SMS verification code, follows instructions in a mobile application, clicks a link or transfers money to a supposedly “secure account.”
Minutes later, money disappears.
Fake bank call fraud can lead to substantial losses because modern schemes may combine social engineering, internet-based calling systems, SMS verification codes, mobile banking, money-mule accounts and rapid transfers through several banks.
This is not merely hypothetical. On March 18, 2026, a Turkish Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office publicly described an investigation in which suspects allegedly impersonated bank personnel, told victims that suspicious transactions were occurring, obtained SMS verification codes, accessed victims’ accounts and transferred the money through different accounts. The prosecution stated that victim statements, bank-account movements, communications records and digital evidence were evaluated together, and an indictment was prepared for aggravated fraud.
For foreign victims, the first hours after discovering the fraud can be critical.
Although each scheme is different, a typical sequence may be:
Fake bank call → Fear or urgency → Verification code obtained → Account accessed → Money transferred → Funds moved through intermediary accounts
Fraudsters may impersonate:
The objective is usually to persuade the victim to provide information or take an action that enables the fraudster to control or move money.
The March 18, 2026 prosecutorial announcement provides a useful example of how sophisticated these cases can become.
According to the prosecutor’s public statement, suspects allegedly contacted victims while presenting themselves as bank personnel. Victims were falsely told that suspicious activity existed on their accounts, creating fear and panic. The suspects allegedly obtained SMS verification codes, gained access to bank accounts and transferred money to accounts under their control. Investigators also found that internet-based calling systems and various software tools were allegedly being used.
The same announcement states that authorities examined bank movements, communications records and digital evidence together.
This illustrates why a foreign victim should preserve much more than a screenshot of the incoming telephone call.
The first objective is to stop additional financial loss and preserve evidence.
Contact the bank through its official banking channel, not by calling back the telephone number that contacted you.
Tell the bank that you believe you are the victim of fraud and ask it to take appropriate security measures concerning:
Obtain a reference number for the report where possible.
After the fraud, the caller may contact the victim again.
The fraudster may say:
“We can return your money.”
“You must pay a security deposit.”
“Send another amount to unlock the first transfer.”
Do not follow new payment instructions.
A second transfer can create additional losses.
SMS messages can help reconstruct:
Do not delete them.
Take screenshots where useful, but preserve the original messages on the device as well.
Record:
A displayed number should not automatically be assumed to prove the caller’s true identity because internet-based calling technology and other techniques may complicate attribution.
The 2026 prosecution announcement specifically referred to internet-based calling systems being used in the investigated scheme.
Victims frequently remember details immediately after the event that become difficult to recall weeks later.
Record:
This chronology may later assist investigators.
The bank should be informed as quickly as possible.
Ask the bank to identify:
The victim should preserve written evidence of the notification.
Fraud proceeds can move through several accounts extremely quickly.
A significant change introduced at the end of 2025 is now particularly relevant.
Article 128/A of the Turkish Criminal Procedure Code allows banks, payment-service providers and crypto-asset service providers, under the statutory conditions, to suspend accounts involved in transactions connected with specified technology-related offences for up to 48 hours. The provision specifically includes certain aggravated-fraud offences.
The financial institution must immediately notify the relevant Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office and provide information and documents concerning the suspension and account movements.
This mechanism can be important where suspected fraud proceeds are still moving through identifiable accounts.
Potentially, depending on the evidence and procedural circumstances.
Where investigators identify the account that received alleged fraud proceeds, account-suspension or seizure mechanisms may become relevant.
The objective is often to prevent the money from being transferred through further accounts before investigators can trace it.
However, whether funds can actually be recovered depends on factors including:
Potentially.
Suppose the victim loses 300,000 TRY.
The trail may be:
Victim → Account A → Account B → Account C → Cash withdrawal
or:
Victim → Account A → Cryptocurrency exchange → Wallet
Investigators may examine the transaction chain.
The March 2026 prosecution announcement specifically described alleged fraud proceeds being transferred through different accounts in an attempt to conceal the trail.
The person whose account receives the victim’s money may not necessarily be the caller.
Organized fraud can involve:
Turkish prosecutorial authorities have issued 2026 warnings about fraudsters obtaining or renting other people’s bank accounts and IBAN numbers to receive criminal proceeds.
Therefore, identifying the first receiving account is important but may not identify the entire fraud organization.
Potentially.
A receiving account may belong to a person who claims that another individual used the account without explaining the criminal purpose.
That person’s criminal liability must be investigated separately.
For the victim, the practical objective is to preserve and trace the complete financial chain rather than assume that the registered owner of the first receiving account is necessarily the person who made the fake bank call.
Bank movements are frequently important evidence in fraud investigations.
The March 2026 official prosecution announcement expressly states that investigators evaluated bank-account movements together with victim statements, communications records and digital evidence.
Relevant banking evidence may help establish:
ATM evidence may become important.
Investigators may seek to determine:
CCTV may potentially help identify the person who physically withdrew the money.
Because CCTV recordings may eventually be overwritten, relevant footage should be identified promptly.
Preserve all information concerning the transfer.
Relevant evidence may include:
Blockchain movement may help trace transactions, although a wallet address by itself does not automatically establish the identity of the person controlling it.
An international transfer does not automatically end the investigation.
Turkish authorities may trace the domestic banking trail and, where necessary, seek foreign evidence through applicable international judicial cooperation procedures.
The speed and effectiveness of recovery may depend on the country, bank, procedural stage and whether the funds remain identifiable.
A criminal complaint can be an important part of the response.
The complaint should be fact-specific rather than simply stating:
“I was defrauded.”
A useful chronology should explain:
Who called → What was said → What information was requested → What the victim did → What transactions occurred → Where the money went → What evidence exists.
Depending on the case:
Preserve originals where possible.
Potentially, depending on the facts and statutory elements.
The March 18, 2026 prosecution announcement states that the suspects in the bank-impersonation scheme described there were indicted under Article 158/1-l for aggravated fraud.
The precise legal classification in another case depends on how the fraud was committed and the evidence available.
Do not assume that this automatically eliminates criminal remedies.
The central fraud allegation may be that the victim was deceived into disclosing the code because the caller falsely presented themselves as a bank employee.
Preserve evidence showing exactly what representations caused the disclosure.
This can also occur.
The fraudster may say:
“Your account is compromised. Move your money to our secure account immediately.”
The victim then personally authorizes the transfer.
A voluntary banking action does not necessarily mean there was no fraud if the allegation is that the action was induced by intentional deception.
The complete communication becomes crucial.
Preserve exactly what the caller knew.
For example:
Do not speculate immediately about how the information was obtained.
Potential data-security issues can be investigated separately.
Contact the bank through an official channel and follow its security procedures concerning compromised credentials.
Depending on what was disclosed, the bank may recommend changes concerning:
Also consider the security of any email account or telephone number linked to banking access.
This can be particularly important.
Fraudsters may attempt to persuade victims to install applications or grant permissions.
Do not immediately factory-reset the device before considering evidence preservation.
The phone may contain information relevant to:
Secure the financial accounts promptly, but preserve potentially relevant digital evidence.
Preserve:
Do not continue entering information into the suspicious website.
Yes, but screenshots should not be the only evidence preserved where original data remains available.
A screenshot can document what appeared on the screen.
But the original:
may provide additional technical information.
Potentially, but recovery is highly fact-dependent.
The prospects may depend on:
No responsible legal assessment should promise recovery merely because a criminal complaint is filed.
Article 128/A is particularly relevant because it creates a rapid response mechanism for suspicious accounts connected to specified technology-related offences.
Under the current provision, qualifying accounts can be suspended for up to 48 hours, with the financial institution required to notify the prosecutor and provide relevant account information.
For a victim, this makes immediate reporting particularly important.
Waiting several days may allow funds to move through additional layers.
Where authorities successfully identify and secure proceeds belonging to the victim, criminal-procedure mechanisms may potentially support their return depending on the circumstances and procedural status.
The victim should therefore document ownership of the money clearly through:
This may indicate a broader scheme.
The prosecution may compare:
The March 2026 prosecution announcement demonstrates the use of multiple categories of evidence in an alleged organized bank-impersonation fraud scheme involving numerous victims.
Criminal proceedings and financial recovery should be distinguished.
Depending on the circumstances, the victim may need to consider multiple legal routes concerning:
The appropriate route depends on how the unauthorized or fraud-induced transaction occurred.
Bank liability should not be assumed automatically, but it may require separate analysis.
Important questions can include:
The bank dispute and the criminal case may therefore proceed on different legal grounds.
This distinction can materially affect the case.
The victim says:
“I never authorized this transaction.”
The victim says:
“I made the transfer myself because a fake bank employee deceived me.”
The evidence and potential banking-law arguments can differ significantly.
The criminal investigation should clearly establish which situation occurred.
That statement should not automatically end the legal analysis.
Determine:
A separate review of the bank’s legal responsibility may be necessary.
Foreign nationality does not prevent a victim from reporting an alleged crime in Turkey.
A foreign victim should preserve identification documents and provide a clear chronology and supporting evidence.
If the victim does not adequately understand Turkish criminal proceedings, interpretation can be important.
A foreign victim should not allow language problems to distort the complaint.
Names, account numbers, transaction amounts and technical details must be recorded accurately.
Where interpretation is needed, the victim should ensure that the statement correctly reflects what happened before signing it.
The investigation does not necessarily end merely because the victim later leaves Turkey.
Before departure, it can be useful to preserve:
The procedural strategy should be determined according to the individual case.
Preserve evidence showing why the stolen funds were held in Turkey.
This may include:
This can assist in proving the victim’s ownership and amount of loss.
Being the victim of fraud is fundamentally different from being investigated as a suspect.
A fraud complaint by a foreign victim does not itself create an automatic removal consequence.
If immigration proceedings arise for some independent reason, they are governed separately by Law No. 6458. Current Migration Management guidance confirms that removal requires a separate administrative decision based on the statutory grounds under Article 54 and remains subject to the protections contained in the law.
Fraud victims can become targets a second time.
After the initial fraud, someone may claim:
“We found your stolen money.”
“Pay us a recovery fee.”
“We work with the police.”
“Send cryptocurrency and we will unlock your funds.”
Treat unsolicited recovery offers with extreme caution.
A foreign victim should consider the following immediate steps:
A useful fraud file should contain:
Banking evidence: statements, transfers, beneficiary accounts and transaction references.
Telephone evidence: call history, numbers, dates and times.
Authentication evidence: SMS codes, security alerts and device notifications.
Digital evidence: messages, emails, links, websites and applications.
Financial tracing evidence: subsequent account information or cryptocurrency details where known.
Procedural evidence: bank report reference, police complaint and prosecutor investigation information.
Organizing this material chronologically can make the investigation significantly easier to understand.
Fake bank call fraud remains a significant criminal-enforcement issue in Turkey in 2026.
The March 18, 2026 official prosecution announcement is particularly relevant: suspects allegedly impersonated bank personnel, created fear by claiming suspicious account activity, obtained SMS verification codes and transferred victims’ funds through different accounts. Authorities stated that victim statements, banking movements, communications records and digital evidence were evaluated together, and aggravated-fraud charges were pursued.
At the same time, the new Article 128/A mechanism, added at the end of 2025, provides an important rapid-response tool for accounts involved in specified technology-related offences. It allows qualifying accounts to be suspended for up to 48 hours and requires immediate notification to the prosecutor.
For a foreign victim, the practical strategy in 2026 is therefore:
Secure the bank account → preserve digital evidence → document every transaction → report promptly → identify receiving accounts → seek rapid financial tracing → pursue the criminal investigation → evaluate recovery and compensation routes separately.
The most damaging mistake is often waiting while the money continues moving through additional accounts.
Yes. The investigation can examine whether the code was disclosed because the caller intentionally deceived you by impersonating bank personnel. A 2026 Turkish prosecution announcement describes precisely this type of alleged scheme.
Potentially, yes. Bank movements are routinely relevant financial evidence, and recent official fraud investigations have evaluated them together with communications and digital evidence.
Potentially. Article 128/A permits qualifying suspicious accounts connected with specified technology-related offences to be suspended for up to 48 hours under its statutory conditions.
The investigation may attempt to trace the subsequent transfer chain. Multiple accounts do not automatically make the funds untraceable.
Bank-to-exchange transactions, exchange records and blockchain transaction information may become relevant. Recovery can become more complicated, but cryptocurrency does not automatically eliminate every evidentiary trail.
The fact that you physically authorized the transfer does not by itself answer whether you were fraudulently induced to do so. Preserve the complete communication showing what caused the transfer.
Secure your financial accounts promptly, but consider preservation of digital evidence before deleting applications or factory-resetting the device. The device may contain evidence useful to investigators.
Recovery depends on where the money is, how quickly the fraud is reported, whether accounts or assets can be secured, and the evidence available. Recovery cannot be guaranteed.
Depending on how the transaction occurred, separate banking or civil-law issues may need to be examined. Unauthorized transactions and transactions personally authorized because of deception can raise different legal questions.
Contact your bank through an official channel immediately, secure banking access, preserve all digital and financial evidence, document the complete transaction chain and consider prompt criminal-law action aimed at identifying and securing the recipient accounts.
Fake bank call fraud can result in substantial losses within minutes.
For foreign victims, the case may involve bank impersonation, stolen verification codes, unauthorized mobile banking access, fraud-induced transfers, money-mule accounts, frozen recipient accounts, ATM withdrawals, cryptocurrency transactions and international transfers.
The central questions should be investigated immediately:
Who called the victim? What deception was used? How was banking access obtained? Which accounts received the money? Where was the money transferred next? Can the funds still be secured? What digital evidence identifies the perpetrators?
Fırat Fesih Kaya Law Office provides criminal-law assistance to foreign nationals, foreign employees, students, investors, executives, tourists and foreign business owners who become victims of bank impersonation and online fraud in Turkey.
Lawyer Fırat Fesih Kaya assists foreign victims with criminal complaints, prosecutor proceedings, urgent financial tracing, recipient-account evidence, bank-transfer analysis, digital evidence, fake bank calls, SMS verification fraud, cryptocurrency transactions and cross-border fraud investigations.
Early intervention can be particularly important because suspected fraud proceeds may be moved through multiple accounts rapidly, while call records, banking information and other digital evidence should be identified and preserved as early as possible.
Phone: +90 312 434 22 22
Mobile: +90 532 769 22 22
Email: info@firatfesihkaya.av.tr
Address: Mevlana Boulevard No:221, Yıldırım Tower No:148, 06520 Balgat, Çankaya, Ankara, Turkey
This publication is provided for general informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice. Criminal remedies, financial recovery and any potential claim concerning banking security depend on the specific transaction, how access or authorization was obtained, the location of the funds and the evidence available.