

Concealing Company Assets in Turkey: Criminal Liability and Foreign Shareholder Guide 2026
Are company assets being hidden from a foreign shareholder in Turkey? Learn when concealed bank accounts, diverted receivables, hidden inventory, related-company transfers and asset sales may create criminal liability, how to preserve evidence and what foreign shareholders should do in 2026.
Foreign shareholders in Turkish companies sometimes discover that valuable company assets appear to have disappeared shortly before or during a shareholder dispute. Bank balances may suddenly fall, receivables may be redirected, vehicles or machinery may be transferred to related companies, inventory may disappear, or company money may move into personal accounts.
The expression “concealing company assets” is not itself a single criminal offence under Turkish law. Criminal liability depends on what was actually done with the asset, who owned it, how the suspected person obtained control over it, whether documents or deception were used, and whether the asset was diverted for an unauthorized benefit.
Depending on the facts, the investigation may involve breach of trust, fraud, theft, document-related offences or other criminal allegations. Corporate, accounting, tax and civil consequences may also arise.
For foreign shareholders, the most effective approach is usually:
Identify the asset → Establish company ownership → Determine who controlled it → Reconstruct the transfer → Trace the ultimate beneficiary → Preserve evidence → Determine the appropriate criminal characterization → Consider recovery and protective measures.
In corporate disputes, asset concealment can take many forms.
Examples include:
The legal analysis should focus on the underlying conduct rather than the general description “asset concealment.”
No.
A shareholder’s inability to see an asset does not automatically prove criminal conduct.
For example, company money may legitimately have been:
The issue becomes more serious where evidence indicates that a person deliberately diverted company property for an unauthorized personal or third-party benefit.
Foreign investors should begin with this fundamental distinction.
Owning shares in a company does not ordinarily mean personally owning the company’s individual bank accounts, vehicles, machinery, receivables or inventory.
A 50% shareholder cannot necessarily say:
“I own half the company, therefore I can personally take half the money.”
Likewise, the other 50% shareholder cannot necessarily characterize every disputed payment as theft merely because they were not consulted.
Corporate ownership, management authority and entitlement to particular payments must be examined separately.
Article 155 of the Turkish Criminal Code can become particularly relevant where a person was lawfully entrusted with another person’s property or given authority over it but allegedly used that property contrary to the entrusted purpose for their own or another person’s benefit.
This can be especially important in corporate investigations involving directors, managers or other individuals entrusted with control of company assets.
The Criminal Procedure Code’s asset-seizure framework also specifically lists breach of trust under Article 155 among the catalogue offences to which Article 128 may apply.
Assume a Turkish company has two foreign shareholders.
One shareholder is also the managing director.
The company holds TRY 25 million.
The managing director transfers:
TRY 8 million → Personal account
and:
TRY 5 million → Another company controlled by the director.
The accounting records describe the transactions as “management services” and “loan repayment.”
The other shareholder should not stop at those descriptions.
The investigation should ask:
Was there really a loan?
Were management services actually provided?
Who authorized the payments?
Were the amounts commercially justified?
Where did the money go afterward?
A managing director may legitimately possess unrestricted internet banking authority.
That authority might exist so the director can:
It does not necessarily follow that the director may transfer company money for personal use.
The distinction between access to the asset and entitlement to the asset is crucial.
One common pattern is:
Company → Director → Personal account → Third party
The third party may be:
The investigation should follow the complete financial chain.
Stopping at the first recipient may provide an incomplete picture.
Company assets can also be concealed before money ever reaches the company’s bank account.
Example:
A director tells customers:
“Use this new account for future payments.”
The account actually belongs to the director personally.
The company’s accounting system continues showing the invoices as unpaid.
Important evidence may include:
The financial trail should establish who ultimately received and controlled the money.
Foreign shareholders sometimes discover previously unknown company accounts.
The existence of another company account is not itself criminal.
The relevant questions include:
The transactions matter more than the mere existence of the account.
Cash-heavy businesses create particular risks.
Suppose customers pay the company in cash but the collections never appear in:
The investigation should reconstruct:
Customer → Payment → Employee/director receiving cash → Corporate records → Ultimate use.
Witness statements, receipts, invoices, POS records and security footage may become important.
Asset concealment is not limited to money.
It may involve:
Compare:
Accounting inventory
with
physical inventory.
Then review:
Suppose machinery belonging to Company A disappears.
The foreign shareholder later discovers that it is being used by Company B, which is controlled by the other shareholder.
Ask:
Was it sold?
Was it leased?
Was it transferred temporarily?
Was consideration paid?
Who approved the transaction?
How was it recorded?
Related ownership alone does not establish criminal conduct, but unexplained transfers should be investigated.
Asset concealment can sometimes be disguised as a formal sale.
Example:
Company property worth approximately TRY 20 million is transferred to a related person for TRY 3 million.
Relevant evidence may include:
An unfavorable business transaction is not automatically criminal. Evidence of deliberate diversion for an unauthorized benefit would require a different analysis.
Another possible method is creating an artificial liability.
Example:
A director claims:
“The company owes my other business TRY 12 million.”
Company funds are then transferred to that business.
Foreign shareholders should examine:
A document created after the shareholder dispute began deserves particularly careful examination.
Consultancy invoices can be difficult to verify because no physical goods are delivered.
Ask for:
An invoice alone does not necessarily establish that a service was genuinely performed.
A company may have valuable receivables even if its bank balance is low.
For example, a director might:
Foreign shareholders should therefore examine accounts receivable as carefully as bank balances.
Money transferred abroad should be reconstructed from the Turkish side immediately.
Preserve:
An international transfer is not inherently suspicious. Its commercial basis and ultimate beneficiary matter.
Corporate funds may also be converted into crypto-assets.
Where that occurs, preserve available:
A blockchain transaction can establish movement between addresses, but a wallet address does not by itself prove which human controlled it.
Timing can be important.
Suppose substantial assets are transferred shortly before:
The timing does not prove criminal intent, but it can form part of the evidentiary chronology.
A common pattern is:
Dispute begins → Foreign shareholder requests records → Access is terminated → Assets begin moving.
Preserve evidence of:
Chronology can be highly important.
A manager’s refusal to provide company documents can create serious corporate-law issues.
But refusal alone does not prove that assets have been stolen or criminally concealed.
The investigation still needs to identify the underlying assets and transactions.
Bank records should be compared directly with accounting records.
For every significant transaction, determine:
Bank description
versus
Accounting description
versus
Commercial reality.
Example:
Bank: TRY 4 million to director
Accounting: Loan repayment
Underlying evidence: No identifiable historical loan
That discrepancy may require investigation.
A payment that is completely absent from the books can be particularly important.
But the absence of an accounting entry should not automatically determine criminal liability.
Determine:
Personal responsibility must be individualized.
Sometimes an allegedly unauthorized asset transfer is supported by a corporate resolution that another shareholder says never existed.
Preserve and examine:
Do not assume authenticity merely because a document looks formal.
A contract created after the transfer may become relevant.
Digital metadata, email history, accounting records and prior communications may help determine when the document actually came into existence.
Never create or backdate documents to strengthen either a complaint or a defense.
A foreign shareholder should not assume that every director or shareholder is criminally responsible merely because assets disappeared during their management period.
The investigation should identify:
Who controlled the asset?
Who ordered the transaction?
Who approved it?
Who executed it?
Who created the accounting record?
Who benefited?
The person’s corporate title is relevant but is not a substitute for proof of individual conduct.
A 70% shareholder does not automatically become criminally responsible for every transaction performed by the company.
Conversely, majority ownership does not create immunity where evidence shows personal involvement in unauthorized asset diversion.
Control and conduct should be proven separately.
The same principle applies to minority shareholders.
A 10% shareholder who has no management authority presents a different factual situation from a 10% shareholder who controls banking and procurement.
Share percentage alone is not enough.
Foreign investors sometimes appoint a local director to manage daily operations.
If company assets later disappear, reconstruct the actual management structure.
Preserve:
This evidence can establish who actually controlled the relevant transactions.
Potentially.
Where deception was used to obtain or divert company property, fraud provisions may need to be considered.
For example, the suspected person may allegedly have used:
The facts determine the appropriate criminal characterization.
Potentially, depending on how the person obtained the property.
Secretly removing company inventory may present a different legal situation from a director who already had lawful management authority over the asset and allegedly misused that authority.
This distinction can affect whether theft, breach of trust or another offence is legally relevant.
A bad investment is not necessarily asset concealment.
Suppose a director invests TRY 20 million in a legitimate project and the project fails.
The company may suffer a serious loss.
That does not itself prove criminal appropriation.
The investigation should distinguish:
commercial loss
from
unauthorized diversion for personal or third-party benefit.
Turkish criminal procedure provides mechanisms for seizure of specified property, rights and receivables where the statutory requirements are satisfied.
Article 128 covers categories including real estate, vehicles, bank and financial accounts, rights and receivables, securities, company shares, safe-deposit contents and other assets. The statutory framework requires the relevant connection between the alleged offence and the property.
Importantly for company-asset cases, breach of trust under Article 155 appears among the catalogue offences covered by Article 128.
The existence of a criminal investigation does not permit indiscriminate seizure of everything a suspect owns.
Constitutional Court materials addressing Article 128 emphasize the importance of establishing a connection between the asset and the alleged criminal conduct.
Accordingly, a foreign shareholder seeking urgent protection should identify the financial trail as precisely as possible.
Article 128 expressly includes a suspect’s shares in a company among the categories potentially subject to seizure when statutory requirements are satisfied, and it provides procedural rules for implementing a seizure concerning company shares.
This is a protective criminal-procedure measure and should not be confused with a final determination of guilt or permanent confiscation.
This distinction is important for foreign investors.
Seizure during an investigation or prosecution is generally a protective procedural measure.
Confiscation is a separate substantive consequence governed by its own legal requirements.
A temporary restriction on an asset therefore does not itself establish criminal liability.
Suppose company money allegedly passes through:
Company → Director → Spouse → Property purchase.
The fact that an asset is registered to another person does not automatically end the inquiry.
But third-party ownership cannot simply be disregarded either.
The prosecution must establish the legally relevant connection between the property and alleged offence before applying the applicable measures.
Immediately preserve available copies of:
Do not wait until access to company systems is removed.
Do not simply collect dozens of cropped screenshots.
Where possible, preserve:
Context may become crucial.
Suspicion of asset concealment does not authorize:
Evidence should be obtained lawfully.
Investigators can be asked to obtain evidence that a shareholder cannot legally access personally.
Where there is a genuine risk that evidence or assets will disappear, preservation should be considered before confronting the suspected individual.
Potentially vulnerable evidence includes:
Do not, however, obstruct the company’s ordinary operations or alter records.
A useful complaint should be transaction-specific.
Instead of:
“The directors are hiding everything.”
write:
“On 4 February 2026, TRY 3.2 million was transferred from the company’s account to the personal account of Director A. The accounting ledger describes the transaction as repayment of a shareholder loan. The available historical bank and accounting records do not identify a corresponding loan.”
That gives investigators a concrete allegation to verify.
| Asset/Transaction | Corporate Record | Destination | Claimed Reason | Evidence Concern |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TRY 3.2m transfer | Loan repayment | Director | Shareholder loan | No original loan located |
| Machinery | Asset sale | Affiliate | Sale | Price allegedly far below market |
| Customer payment | Receivable | Personal IBAN | Unknown | Company books show unpaid |
| Inventory | Warehouse exit | Unknown | Transfer | No invoice located |
This can make a complex corporate investigation much easier to understand.
Where supported by the facts, the complaint should identify records that may clarify:
Company account → Recipient → Subsequent recipient → Ultimate asset or beneficiary.
Do not simply request every possible investigative measure.
Explain why the particular evidence is relevant.
This distinction should be examined carefully.
If TRY 10 million belonging to the company is diverted, the immediate reduction occurs in the company’s assets.
The shareholder may suffer indirectly through reduced company value.
Corporate representation, complainant status and recovery strategy should therefore be assessed separately.
This is a common problem.
The foreign shareholder may lack access to:
Criminal proceedings may therefore need to be coordinated with appropriate company-law remedies designed to obtain information, protect corporate assets or address management disputes.
Where two shareholders each hold 50%, the company may become practically unmanageable.
One partner may accuse the other of asset diversion while the other alleges obstruction.
A criminal complaint should focus on identifiable transactions rather than the overall breakdown of the relationship.
Corporate deadlock and criminal liability are separate issues.
Foreign shareholders should be cautious about terminology.
For 2026 purposes, the key point is that Turkish criminal law does not need a standalone offence titled “concealing company assets” for potentially criminal conduct involving company property to be investigated.
Instead, prosecutors analyze the underlying conduct under the applicable offence provisions.
Where the allegation concerns misuse of entrusted corporate property, Article 155 can be particularly relevant. Where deception, unauthorized taking or false documentation is involved, different or additional provisions may require consideration.
The criminal classification should follow the facts.
Not necessarily under that specific title. Criminal liability depends on the underlying conduct. Breach of trust, fraud, theft or other offences may become relevant depending on how the assets were controlled, transferred or concealed.
Potentially. Where a person has lawful authority over entrusted property but allegedly uses it contrary to the entrusted purpose for unauthorized benefit, Article 155 may become relevant.
Share ownership does not ordinarily mean direct personal ownership of the same percentage of every corporate asset. A transfer from the company to the shareholder should have an appropriate legal and corporate basis.
The underlying transaction must be investigated. A genuine purchase, loan or service can be legitimate. A fictitious transaction designed to divert company assets presents a different issue.
Potentially, where Article 128’s statutory conditions are met. Bank and financial accounts are among the asset categories addressed by the provision, and breach of trust under Article 155 is among the listed catalogue offences.
No. Constitutional Court materials concerning Article 128 emphasize that the measure depends on the legally required connection between the property and the alleged offence; the mere existence of an investigation does not justify indiscriminate seizure of unrelated assets.
Preserve the Turkish-side banking evidence immediately. Cross-border evidence gathering and recovery can be more complex, but the foreign destination does not by itself prevent investigation.
Reconstruct the alleged loan. Original transfers, agreements, accounting records and the shareholder current account can establish whether the debt genuinely existed.
Evidence preservation should be considered first, particularly where records or assets may disappear. Evidence must always be obtained lawfully.
No. A criminal investigation may assist with evidence gathering, tracing and legally available protective measures, but corporate and civil recovery options may also need to be pursued.
A successful analysis of suspected concealed company assets should reconstruct four separate chains:
Ownership Chain:
Who legally owned the money, vehicle, machinery, receivable or inventory?
Authority Chain:
Who was authorized to control, transfer or dispose of it?
Transaction Chain:
Where did the asset move and through which accounts or entities?
Benefit Chain:
Who ultimately obtained the economic benefit?
The evidence can then be compared with:
Banking records → Accounting records → Corporate resolutions → Contracts → Communications → Commercial reality.
This method is useful both for foreign shareholders alleging asset diversion and for foreign directors wrongly accused after legitimate corporate transactions.
Where criminal asset-seizure measures are considered, the distinction between suspicion and proof remains important. Article 128 is a protective procedural mechanism subject to statutory conditions, not an automatic determination that the affected assets are criminal proceeds.
When company money, receivables, machinery, vehicles, inventory or other assets appear to be disappearing, delays can make both evidence preservation and asset tracing significantly more difficult.
At the same time, a foreign shareholder should avoid treating every unexplained accounting transaction or unsuccessful business decision as a criminal offence.
Fırat Fesih Kaya Law Office provides legal assistance to foreign shareholders, investors, directors and foreign-owned companies dealing with suspected concealment, diversion or unauthorized transfer of company assets in Turkey.
Lawyer Fırat Fesih Kaya assists foreign clients with criminal complaints, criminal defense, bank-transfer analysis, evidence preservation, breach-of-trust allegations, unauthorized related-party transactions, company asset tracing, shareholder disputes and coordinated criminal and corporate recovery strategies.
Early review is particularly important where company assets are being moved through personal bank accounts, related companies, foreign accounts, cash transactions or crypto-assets.
Phone: +90 312 434 22 22
Mobile: +90 532 769 22 22
Email: info@firatfesihkaya.av.tr
Address: Mevlana Boulevard No:221, Yıldırım Tower No:148, 06520 Balgat, Çankaya, Ankara, Turkey
This publication is provided for general informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice. Whether concealment or transfer of company assets creates criminal liability depends on ownership, authority, the manner of transfer, the purpose of the transaction, individual intent, the financial trail and the evidence in the particular case.