Export Control Investigation in Turkey: Criminal Risks for Foreign Companies 2026

Foreign company facing an export control investigation in Turkey? Learn the 2026 rules on dual-use goods, military products, end-user certificates, catch-all controls, customs declarations, export licences, seizures and potential criminal liability.

An export control investigation in Turkey can begin with what appears to be an ordinary customs problem: customs refuses to release a shipment, questions the technical classification of equipment, asks for an export licence, challenges an end-user certificate or discovers that the actual destination differs from the declared destination.

For a foreign company, however, the consequences can extend far beyond a delayed shipment.

Depending on the goods and alleged conduct, the matter can develop into a customs investigation, administrative enforcement action, seizure of goods or a criminal investigation involving company managers, employees, exporters, customs brokers and intermediaries.

Turkey’s export-control framework is not limited to obvious weapons. Official Ministry of Trade guidance identifies strategic goods as including conventional weapons and military material, delivery systems and dual-use goods capable of both civilian and military applications. Examples of dual-use goods include industrial machinery, electronics, testing equipment, chemicals, explosives, nuclear or radioactive materials, metals and alloys.

The central question is therefore not simply:

“Does our company export weapons?”

A more useful question is:

“Could this product, technology, customer, destination or intended end use fall within Turkey’s strategic trade-control framework?”

Are All Goods Free to Export from Turkey?

No.

The Ministry of Trade states that exports are generally free subject to prohibitions and restrictions arising from international or bilateral agreements and domestic legislation. Restrictions can apply for reasons including public security, health, protection of national treasures and intellectual-property rights.

Strategic goods are subject to additional controls.

Official guidance explains that military goods, dual-use items and nuclear or nuclear dual-use goods may be subject to authorization by the competent authority depending on the product.

What Are Dual-Use Goods?

Dual-use goods are products, equipment, materials or technologies capable of legitimate civilian use while also potentially having military or proliferation-related applications.

Examples can include:

• Advanced machine tools
• Electronic components
• Measuring equipment
• Testing equipment
• Carbon-fiber materials
• Specialized chemicals
• Certain metals and alloys
• Nuclear-related materials
• Certain industrial technologies

The Ministry of Trade’s strategic-trade-control guidance expressly identifies industrial machinery, electronics, measuring and testing equipment, chemicals and various materials as potential dual-use categories.

This means a company manufacturing ordinary industrial products should not assume export controls are irrelevant merely because it does not operate in the defense sector.

Civilian Product Does Not Automatically Mean Uncontrolled Product

A machine tool may manufacture ordinary industrial components.

The same technology might potentially manufacture sensitive components.

A chemical may have a legitimate industrial application while also presenting proliferation concerns.

Carbon fiber may be used commercially while also having sensitive applications.

Therefore:

Civilian use ≠ automatic exclusion from export controls.

The technical characteristics of the product can be decisive.

Military Goods Require Special Attention

The Ministry of National Defence states that the Controlled List includes military equipment, weapons, ammunition, spare parts, military explosives and associated technologies whose production, import and export require authorization under the relevant defense-industry security framework.

Companies dealing with defense-related goods should therefore classify the product before shipment rather than waiting for customs to identify a possible control issue.

Export Licence for Military Products

Official Ministry of National Defence guidance states that an applicant seeking permanent or temporary export authorization must provide information concerning the material, quantity, buyer, destination country and applicable controlled-list classification.

For qualifying permanent exports, end-user documentation is also an important part of the process.

An investigation can therefore arise from discrepancies concerning:

• Product classification
• Quantity
• Buyer
• Destination
• End user
• Licence scope
• Licence validity
• End-user certificate

Dual-Use Goods and the Ministry of Trade

The Ministry of National Defence explains that civilian exports of dual-use materials are handled under the dual-use and sensitive-goods export framework administered by the Ministry of Trade.

Foreign companies should therefore identify the competent authority rather than assuming every strategic product is handled through the same licensing procedure.

What Is a Catch-All Export Control?

This is one of the most important risks for foreign exporters.

A product may not appear to be controlled based solely on an initial list review, yet authorization may still become relevant because of the proposed destination, buyer or intended use.

The Ministry of Trade expressly describes a “catch-all” approach under which authorization may be required even for goods outside the control lists where concerns arise that they may be used in connection with weapons of mass destruction.

Accordingly:

“Our product is not on the list” is not always the end of the analysis.

End Use Matters

Suppose a foreign-owned Turkish company exports precision industrial equipment.

The buyer is nominally a civilian engineering business.

However, information later suggests that the equipment was intended for a sensitive military or proliferation-related program.

The authorities may investigate:

• What the exporter knew
• What due diligence was performed
• Who the actual end user was
• Whether warning signs existed
• Whether the declared end use was accurate
• Whether an authorization should have been obtained

End User and Buyer Are Not Always the Same

An export transaction may involve:

Turkish exporter → Foreign distributor → Local reseller → Final user.

The distributor may therefore not be the true end user.

For controlled transactions, companies should understand the complete chain rather than stopping at the immediate contractual customer.

End-User Certificates Can Become Central Evidence

For sensitive transactions, end-user documentation can become one of the most important pieces of evidence.

Official Ministry of National Defence guidance emphasizes properly executed end-user certificates in the export-permit process for relevant controlled defense products.

An investigation may therefore focus on whether:

• Certificate is authentic
• Signatory was authorized
• End user actually exists
• Destination is accurate
• Product description is accurate
• Quantity matches shipment
• Final use is genuine

Fake End-User Certificate Allegations

A particularly serious investigation can arise where authorities suspect that the end-user certificate was fabricated or manipulated.

The company should immediately preserve:

• Original certificate
• Emails transmitting it
• Customer communications
• Verification correspondence
• Corporate-registration records
• Contract
• Purchase order
• Payment records

Do not attempt to obtain a retrospectively created certificate and present it as if it existed before shipment.

End User Changes After Licence Approval

Suppose authorization was obtained for:

Buyer A / Country A / End User A

but the transaction later changes to:

Buyer B / Country B / End User B.

Do not assume the original authorization automatically covers the revised transaction.

The Ministry of National Defence states that separate applications are required where the same controlled product is exported to different countries.

Material changes should therefore be reviewed before shipment.

Export Licence Expired

Licence validity should also be checked.

Official Ministry of National Defence guidance indicates that qualifying export authorizations can be extended where an application is made before expiration, subject to the applicable framework.

Shipping after expiry without confirming the legal position can create avoidable risk.

Temporary Exports Can Also Be Controlled

Foreign companies sometimes assume that goods sent abroad temporarily are outside export controls because they will return to Turkey.

That assumption can be dangerous.

Controlled equipment may be temporarily exported for:

• Trade fairs
• Demonstrations
• Testing
• Repair
• Maintenance
• Exhibitions

The Ministry of National Defence expressly provides for temporary export authorization for relevant controlled materials and distinguishes such transactions from permanent exports.

Trade Fair Shipment

Suppose a defense-industry company sends controlled equipment to an international exhibition.

There is no sale.

That does not necessarily eliminate authorization requirements.

The company should analyze the temporary export before the goods leave Turkey.

Repair Abroad

The same principle can apply where controlled equipment is sent abroad solely for repair.

Commercial purpose is not the only relevant factor.

The physical transfer of controlled material across the border can itself require the appropriate procedure.

Technical Data and Technology

Export-control compliance should not be reduced to physical cargo.

Sensitive transactions may also involve:

• Technical drawings
• Manufacturing specifications
• Software
• Engineering data
• Controlled technology

Where technology connected with controlled products is transferred internationally, specialized analysis may be required.

Incorrect Product Classification

One common investigation begins with disagreement over whether an industrial product is controlled.

The company may classify equipment as an ordinary commercial machine.

Authorities may believe its technical specifications bring it within a controlled category.

The defense should preserve:

• Technical specifications
• Engineering drawings
• Product catalogue
• Manufacturer statements
• Test results
• Classification analysis
• Historical classifications

A technical disagreement should not automatically be treated as deliberate criminal conduct.

Ask the Competent Authority Before Export

The Ministry of Trade specifically states that companies uncertain whether a product is strategic may seek information from the competent authority and should be prepared to provide technical specifications and information concerning the buyer.

For high-risk products, resolving classification before shipment can be substantially safer than arguing about it after customs intervention.

Incorrect Customs Declaration

An export-control investigation can also begin with an allegedly false customs declaration.

Potential discrepancies include:

• Wrong product description
• Wrong quantity
• Wrong tariff classification
• Wrong destination
• Wrong buyer
• Incorrect licence information
• Incorrect end-use statement

The existence of an error does not automatically establish criminal intent.

The investigation should determine who supplied the information and why the declaration was incorrect.

Customs Broker Prepared the Declaration

A customs broker may prepare and submit the export declaration based on information supplied by the exporter.

The company should determine:

• What information was given to the broker
• Whether the broker requested a licence
• Whether technical specifications were supplied
• Whether the broker changed the product description
• Who approved the declaration

Broker involvement does not automatically absolve the exporter, but neither does it automatically prove criminal participation by company management.

Foreign Parent Company and Turkish Subsidiary

A multinational group may have:

Foreign parent → Turkish manufacturing subsidiary → Foreign customer.

If Turkish authorities investigate the export, responsibility should be analyzed at the level of actual conduct.

Questions include:

• Who accepted the order?
• Who classified the product?
• Who performed customer screening?
• Who applied for the licence?
• Who prepared the end-user documentation?
• Who approved shipment?
• Did the foreign parent give instructions?

Corporate affiliation alone should not replace evidence.

Foreign CEO Is Not Automatically Criminally Responsible

A foreign executive may have overall responsibility for a Turkish subsidiary without personally handling export-control classification or customs declarations.

Investigators should determine what the executive actually:

• Knew
• Approved
• Directed
• Communicated
• Participated in

A title such as CEO, director or shareholder does not by itself establish participation in a criminal offence.

Export Manager Responsibility

An export manager may be more directly involved in:

• Product classification
• Licence applications
• Customer communications
• End-user documents
• Shipping instructions

But job title alone is still insufficient.

The actual transaction and evidence should be reconstructed.

Employee Conceals the True Destination

Suppose an employee knows that a controlled product is ultimately destined for Country B but records Country A in the internal system.

The company should investigate:

• Who knew the true destination
• Whether management approved it
• Whether the customer requested concealment
• Whether documents were manipulated
• Whether similar transactions occurred

The company’s interests and the employee’s individual defense may diverge.

Distributor Diversion

A more difficult situation arises where the Turkish exporter lawfully sells goods to a foreign distributor, but the distributor later redirects them.

The key questions include:

• Did the exporter know?
• Were there warning signs?
• Was diversion prohibited contractually?
• Was end-user information obtained?
• Did communications reveal the true destination?
• Did the exporter continue shipments after learning of diversion?

The distributor’s independent misconduct does not automatically establish that the exporter deliberately participated.

Red Flags in Export-Control Transactions

Potential warning signs can include:

• Customer refuses to disclose end user
• Product has no obvious use for customer’s business
• Unusual routing
• Sudden destination change
• Multiple intermediaries
• Inconsistent corporate names
• Payment by unrelated third party
• Customer requests removal of product description
• Customer asks exporter not to mention final destination
• End-user certificate contains unexplained inconsistencies

A red flag is not itself proof of a crime.

It is a reason for additional review.

Payment Through a Third Country

Suppose the buyer is in Country A, but payment arrives from Company B in Country C.

That structure may be legitimate.

But it should be understood and documented.

Preserve:

• Payment instructions
• Financing arrangements
• Corporate relationships
• Customer explanation
• Banking records

Do not invent a commercial explanation after an investigation starts.

What Can Turn an Export-Control Problem Into a Criminal Case?

Criminal exposure becomes more serious where authorities suspect deliberate conduct such as:

• Exporting controlled goods without required authorization
• Concealing the true nature of goods
• Using false documents
• Falsifying end-user information
• Making a false customs declaration
• Concealing the true destination
• Circumventing a restriction
• Participating in conduct satisfying an offence under Law No. 5607 or another applicable criminal statute

The exact alleged offence must be identified.

Do not defend against the vague expression:

“Export-control violation.”

Law No. 5607 and Export Transactions

Export-related misconduct can, depending on the facts, enter the criminal framework of Law No. 5607 on Combating Smuggling.

But not every licence mistake, classification disagreement or customs error automatically constitutes smuggling.

The defense should identify:

Exact shipment → exact declaration → exact alleged false information → exact controlled requirement → individual who acted → evidence of knowledge and participation.

Administrative Violation Versus Criminal Allegation

These should not be merged.

A transaction may involve:

Licensing issue

Customs irregularity

Administrative penalty

Goods seizure

Criminal investigation

They are not automatically equivalent.

The existence of an administrative compliance failure does not, without more, answer the criminal-liability question.

Goods Can Be Stopped or Seized

If customs believes an export involves controlled goods without the required authorization, the shipment may be prevented from leaving Turkey and, depending on the applicable legal basis, the goods may become subject to seizure.

The company should immediately obtain:

• Customs report
• Seizure record
• Product inventory
• Investigation number
• Licence-related correspondence

Seizure is not itself proof of criminal guilt.

Preserve Serial Numbers and Technical Characteristics

For export-control cases, product identity is especially important.

Record:

• Model
• Serial number
• Technical specification
• Software version
• Manufacturing date
• Controlled-list analysis

Two products with similar commercial names may have materially different technical characteristics.

Search and Seizure of Company Records

A serious criminal investigation may expand beyond the shipment itself.

Authorities may seek records concerning:

• Emails
• Customer files
• Technical data
• Licence applications
• End-user certificates
• Customs declarations
• Accounting records

Companies should preserve records and avoid deletion or alteration after learning of an investigation.

Do Not “Fix” the File Retrospectively

Never respond to an export-control investigation by:

• Backdating a licence application
• Fabricating an end-user certificate
• Altering customer emails
• Changing the destination in historical records
• Deleting internal warnings
• Modifying technical specifications
• Creating a false compliance review

Such conduct can severely damage the defense and potentially create additional legal problems.

Preserve Foreign-Language Communications

International export transactions frequently involve communications in multiple languages.

Preserve:

Original communication + reliable translation where necessary.

A translation should not replace the original.

Internal Investigation

The company should reconstruct the entire transaction:

Product → Classification → Customer → End user → Destination → Licence analysis → Contract → Payment → Customs declaration → Shipment.

Then determine where the alleged failure occurred.

Build an Export-Control Responsibility Matrix

Issue	Responsible Function	Evidence to Preserve
Product classification	Engineering / Compliance	Technical specifications
Customer review	Sales / Compliance	Due diligence file
End-user review	Compliance	End-user certificate
Licence	Legal / Compliance	Application and approval
Customs declaration	Logistics / Broker	Declaration and instructions
Shipment approval	Management / Logistics	Approval records

This helps separate corporate process failures from individual criminal conduct.

Review Historical Exports

A single problematic shipment can lead authorities or the company itself to examine earlier transactions involving:

• Same customer
• Same product
• Same destination
• Same distributor
• Same employee
• Same customs broker

Turkey’s customs authorities actively use secondary controls and post-clearance audits. In July 2026, the Ministry of Trade reported substantial additional assessments and penalties resulting from historical declaration reviews and company audits.

Therefore, companies should not assume an investigation will necessarily remain limited to one shipment.

2026 Strategic Trade Control Environment

Turkey continues to maintain a strategic-trade-control framework covering military and dual-use products. Current Ministry guidance identifies Turkey’s international non-proliferation obligations and participation in multilateral export-control arrangements as important foundations of these controls.

The current framework also retains separate procedures for military controlled goods and civilian dual-use exports.

For foreign companies, this means export-control compliance in 2026 should be integrated into customs, logistics, sales and corporate compliance systems rather than treated as a last-minute shipping formality.

Compliance Program for Foreign Companies

A practical export-control program should include:

1. Product classification.
2. Controlled-list review.
3. Customer identification.
4. End-user identification.
5. Destination review.
6. End-use assessment.
7. Catch-all analysis where relevant.
8. Licence determination.
9. End-user document verification.
10. Customs declaration review.
11. Shipment approval.
12. Record retention.

The program should also define who has authority to stop a shipment when a red flag appears.

25 Immediate Steps After an Export-Control Investigation Begins

1. Stop uncontrolled movement of the disputed shipment.
2. Obtain the customs report.
3. Determine whether goods were seized.
4. Identify the exact alleged violation.
5. Preserve the export declaration.
6. Preserve the commercial invoice.
7. Preserve the sales contract.
8. Preserve the purchase order.
9. Preserve technical specifications.
10. Identify the controlled-list classification.
11. Preserve licence applications.
12. Preserve issued licences.
13. Check licence validity.
14. Preserve end-user certificates.
15. Verify the actual end user.
16. Verify the actual destination.
17. Preserve customer due diligence.
18. Preserve customs-broker communications.
19. Preserve payment records.
20. Preserve foreign-language originals.
21. Do not alter historical records.
22. Identify each employee’s role.
23. Review related historical shipments.
24. Separate administrative and criminal issues.
25. Coordinate customs, criminal and corporate compliance strategy.

Frequently Asked Questions

1. Are all exports from Turkey freely permitted?

No. Although exports are generally free, Turkish law recognizes prohibitions, restrictions and licensing requirements for specified categories of goods and circumstances.

2. What are dual-use goods?

They are goods capable of both civilian and military or proliferation-sensitive uses. Official Turkish guidance gives examples including industrial machinery, electronics, measuring equipment, chemicals and certain materials.

3. Can an ordinary industrial machine require export-control review?

Yes. Technical characteristics and potential end use can matter even where the product has a normal civilian application.

4. What if the product is not on a control list?

A catch-all control may still become relevant in specified circumstances involving concerns about weapons-of-mass-destruction use. The Ministry of Trade expressly recognizes this possibility.

5. Do military goods require export authorization?

Relevant controlled military products are subject to authorization under the Ministry of National Defence framework.

6. Can a temporary shipment to a trade fair require permission?

Yes. Official Ministry of National Defence guidance expressly provides procedures for temporary exports of relevant controlled materials, including trade-fair and demonstration scenarios.

7. Can a foreign CEO be criminally liable because the Turkish subsidiary exported controlled goods?

Not automatically. Individual liability requires analysis of the executive’s actual conduct, knowledge, instructions and participation. Corporate title alone does not resolve criminal responsibility.

8. What if the distributor secretly changes the final destination?

The distributor’s conduct does not automatically prove the exporter participated. The investigation should examine what the exporter knew, whether warning signs existed and what due diligence was performed.

9. Can goods be seized during an export-control investigation?

Potentially, depending on the statutory basis and circumstances. Seizure does not itself establish criminal guilt or final confiscation.

10. What is the most important first step?

Identify the exact product, technical classification, customer, end user, destination, licensing requirement and alleged statutory violation. An export-control defense should be built around the specific transaction rather than the general label of an “illegal export.”

Legal Assistance for Foreign Companies Facing Export Control Investigations in Turkey

An export-control investigation can affect far more than one shipment. It can expose a foreign-owned company to delayed exports, seized goods, customs investigations, scrutiny of end-user documents, review of historical transactions and potential criminal proceedings against managers or employees.

Fırat Fesih Kaya Law Office provides legal assistance to foreign companies, multinational groups, manufacturers, exporters, investors and executives facing export-control and customs investigations in Turkey.

Lawyer Fırat Fesih Kaya assists foreign clients with dual-use goods investigations, controlled-product classification disputes, military export issues, end-user certificate problems, catch-all controls, export licence disputes, customs seizures, false declaration allegations and criminal investigations connected with cross-border trade.

Early legal intervention can be particularly important where customs has stopped a high-value shipment, authorities dispute whether industrial equipment is dual-use, an end-user certificate is questioned, the ultimate destination differs from the contractual buyer’s country, or an investigation begins to expand into earlier exports and individual management responsibility.

Phone: +90 312 434 22 22
Mobile: +90 532 769 22 22
Email: info@firatfesihkaya.av.tr
Address: Mevlana Boulevard No:221, Yıldırım Tower No:148, 06520 Balgat, Çankaya, Ankara, Turkey

This publication is provided for general informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice. Export-control requirements depend on the technical characteristics of the product, applicable control list, destination, end user, intended use, licensing framework and facts of the individual transaction.