Sanctions Violation Investigation in Turkey: Criminal Risks for Foreign Executives 2026

Foreign executive facing a sanctions-related investigation in Turkey? Learn the 2026 risks involving restricted exports, dual-use goods, end users, customs declarations, asset restrictions, intermediaries, criminal investigations and executive liability.

A sanctions-related investigation in Turkey can create immediate personal risk for foreign executives when authorities suspect that a Turkish company exported restricted goods, concealed an end user, routed a transaction through an intermediary, supplied controlled technology without the required authorization or used inaccurate customs documentation.

The first legal mistake is to treat “sanctions violation” as if it were a single criminal offence with one universal definition.

Turkey’s cross-border trade-control framework consists of multiple layers. Export rules can arise from customs legislation, the Export Regime, product-specific restrictions, strategic trade controls, military and dual-use licensing rules and other domestic measures implementing applicable international obligations. The Ministry of Trade confirms that exports are generally free only subject to prohibitions and restrictions arising from legislation and international or bilateral arrangements.

Therefore, when a foreign CEO, director, regional manager or compliance officer learns that a transaction is being investigated as a “sanctions violation,” the first questions should be:

Which transaction? Which goods? Which restriction? Which destination? Which end user? Which authorization was allegedly required? What did the executive personally know and do?

Those questions usually determine the direction of the criminal defense.

What Can Trigger a Sanctions-Related Investigation in Turkey?

Investigations may arise from transactions involving:

• Restricted exports
• Military equipment
• Dual-use goods
• Sensitive technology
• Prohibited destinations
• Restricted end users
• False end-user information
• Misleading customs declarations
• Undisclosed intermediaries
• Diversion through third countries
• False invoices
• Incorrect product descriptions
• Missing export authorizations
• Attempts to circumvent applicable restrictions

A transaction may initially appear to involve only customs compliance and later expand into a criminal investigation if authorities suspect deliberate concealment or circumvention.

Not Every Sanctions Problem Is Automatically a Criminal Case

This distinction is critical.

A company might have:

Misclassified a product.

That does not automatically establish deliberate criminal conduct.

An export licence might have expired.

That does not automatically establish that the CEO intentionally circumvented the law.

A distributor might redirect goods after export.

That does not automatically establish that the Turkish exporter or its foreign executives participated in diversion.

Criminal responsibility must be analyzed according to the applicable offence and the individual’s conduct.

Foreign Executives Are Not Automatically Liable for Company Conduct

A foreign executive should not assume that being CEO, director, shareholder or regional manager automatically makes that person criminally responsible for every transaction completed by a Turkish subsidiary.

The investigation should determine:

• Who negotiated the transaction
• Who classified the goods
• Who screened the customer
• Who identified the end user
• Who reviewed the destination
• Who applied for authorization
• Who instructed the customs broker
• Who approved shipment
• What the foreign executive knew

Corporate hierarchy is relevant evidence, but it should not replace transaction-specific proof of personal involvement.

Foreign CEO Liability

Suppose a Turkish subsidiary exports specialized machinery.

The shipment later becomes the subject of an investigation because authorities believe the equipment should have been subject to strategic export controls.

The foreign CEO is based outside Turkey and approved the annual sales budget but did not participate in the shipment.

The relevant questions should include:

Did the CEO know the product was controlled?

Did the CEO know authorization was missing?

Did the CEO approve the specific customer?

Did the CEO instruct employees to bypass compliance?

Did the CEO receive internal warnings?

The fact that the person was CEO should not be treated as a substitute for answering these questions.

Foreign Director Who Approved the Transaction

The analysis can change where a foreign executive personally approves the disputed transaction.

Approval itself still does not necessarily establish criminal intent.

Investigators may examine what information was available when approval was given.

For example, did the approval package state:

“All export-control requirements completed”

or did it state:

“Compliance advises that shipment cannot proceed without authorization”?

Those are materially different factual situations.

Compliance Warning Ignored by Management

Internal compliance communications can become central evidence.

Consider:

Compliance: Shipment requires further end-user verification.

Sales: Customer demands immediate delivery.

Executive: Ship anyway and resolve documentation later.

If the transaction later becomes subject to an investigation, the communication may be highly significant.

Companies should preserve the complete communication chain rather than isolated messages.

A Warning Is Not Automatically Proof of Guilt

Context matters.

The warning may have been preliminary.

Additional technical information may subsequently have shown that no authorization was required.

Another competent team may have resolved the issue.

The final decision should therefore be reconstructed chronologically.

Dual-Use Goods Create Particular Risk

Foreign executives should understand that export controls are not limited to weapons.

Official Turkish guidance states that civilian transactions involving dual-use materials fall within the Ministry of Trade’s dual-use and sensitive-goods framework. The Ministry of National Defence separately confirms that civilian dual-use export and import procedures are handled within the Ministry of Trade framework.

Products requiring careful analysis can include advanced machinery, electronics, materials, chemicals and specialized technology.

An executive may therefore encounter an export-control investigation even where the company has never sold weapons.

Military-Controlled Products

Different considerations apply to controlled defense products.

Official Ministry of National Defence guidance requires relevant export applications to identify the material, quantity, buyer, destination country and applicable controlled-list category. For relevant permanent exports, end-user documentation is also an important component of the authorization process.

A criminal investigation can therefore focus heavily on whether those details accurately reflected the real transaction.

End User Can Become the Central Issue

A common structure is:

Turkish company → Foreign distributor → Trading company → Final user

The immediate customer may be legitimate.

The real concern may arise further down the chain.

Authorities may investigate whether the exporter knew that the distributor intended to redirect the goods.

End-User Certificate Investigation

For relevant controlled transactions, authorities may examine whether an end-user document was:

• Genuine
• Properly signed
• Complete
• Consistent with the shipment
• Consistent with the actual destination
• Consistent with the ultimate use

The Ministry of National Defence specifically emphasizes original, properly signed and authenticated end-user documentation for relevant controlled exports.

Foreign Executive Accused of Approving a Fake End-User Certificate

The defense should reconstruct:

Who obtained the certificate?

Who verified it?

Who communicated with the customer?

Did the executive see the document?

Were authenticity concerns raised?

Was the document later altered?

A senior executive should not automatically be attributed knowledge of a document merely because it existed somewhere within the corporate system.

Never Create a Certificate Retrospectively

Once an investigation begins, do not:

• Backdate an end-user certificate
• Alter an existing certificate
• Create false customer confirmations
• Delete inconsistent documents
• Modify internal compliance records

Preserve the historical file exactly as it existed.

Third-Country Routing

Third-country routing can be commercially legitimate.

For example:

Manufacturer in Turkey → European distributor → Customer elsewhere

That structure does not by itself establish sanctions circumvention.

However, authorities may scrutinize routing where it appears inconsistent with the commercial purpose of the transaction.

Diversion Through an Intermediary

A higher-risk allegation may involve claims that the intermediary was inserted specifically to conceal the real destination or end user.

Investigators may examine:

• Contractual buyer
• Shipping destination
• Final delivery instructions
• Payment origin
• Customer communications
• Freight documents
• End-user documents
• Internal approval records

The commercial explanation should be supported by contemporaneous records.

Payment From an Unrelated Third Party

Suppose:

Customer: Company A
Invoice recipient: Company A
Payment: Company B
Shipping destination: Company C

There may be a legitimate explanation.

But the transaction requires reconciliation.

The company should preserve:

• Financing agreement
• Group-company relationship
• Customer instructions
• Banking records
• Contract amendments
• Shipping documents

Do not invent an explanation after authorities ask questions.

Destination Changes After Approval

Destination changes can be especially significant for controlled goods.

For relevant military-controlled exports, Ministry of National Defence guidance states that separate applications are required where the same product will be exported to different countries.

Therefore, a change in destination should not automatically be treated as a routine logistics amendment.

Customer Changes After Authorization

The same caution applies where the original buyer or end user changes.

The company should assess whether the existing authorization remains valid for the revised transaction before shipment.

Temporary Exports Can Also Matter

A company may send controlled products abroad temporarily for:

• Demonstration
• Exhibition
• Testing
• Repair
• Maintenance

The Ministry of National Defence maintains a temporary export-authorization process for relevant controlled goods, including goods sent abroad for fairs and repair.

Therefore, “there was no sale” does not necessarily end the regulatory analysis.

Export Restrictions Are Product-Specific

The Ministry of Trade’s current export framework incorporates the Customs Law, customs regulations, Export Regime rules, export communiqués and other applicable measures.

Foreign executives should avoid treating sanctions compliance as a simple country blacklist.

The legal analysis may depend on:

Product + Destination + Customer + End user + End use + Authorization + Transaction date.

Sanctions Screening Is Not the Same as Export-Control Classification

These compliance processes overlap but are not identical.

Sanctions screening asks whether the parties or transaction are affected by applicable restrictive measures.

Export-control classification asks whether the product or technology itself is controlled.

A company can therefore pass customer screening but still require an export licence because of the product.

Likewise, an apparently uncontrolled product may require additional review because of destination, end use or another applicable restriction.

Foreign Parent Company Instructions

Suppose the foreign parent tells its Turkish subsidiary:

“Do not sell directly to this customer. Sell through Distributor B.”

That instruction can be entirely lawful.

But if authorities suspect the distributor was inserted to conceal a restricted end user, the parent-company communication will likely become relevant.

The complete context should be preserved.

Foreign Parent Is Not Automatically Responsible

A foreign parent company and its Turkish subsidiary are separate corporate actors.

Investigators should identify:

• Which entity signed the contract
• Which entity owned the goods
• Which entity received payment
• Which entity controlled shipment
• Which individuals made the relevant decisions

Group affiliation alone should not establish criminal participation.

Foreign Shareholders

The same applies to shareholders.

A foreign investor should not automatically face criminal responsibility merely because the company in which it owns shares becomes involved in a sanctions-related investigation.

Actual conduct and knowledge matter.

Acquisition After the Disputed Transaction

Chronology can be decisive.

Suppose a foreign investor acquired the Turkish company in 2026.

Authorities investigate exports made in 2024.

Preserve:

• Acquisition agreement
• Closing date
• Historical management records
• Due-diligence reports
• Management changes
• Export records

Current ownership should not be confused with historical conduct.

Customs Declaration Allegations

Sanctions investigations can overlap with allegations that customs declarations were inaccurate.

Potential issues include:

• Incorrect product description
• Incorrect tariff classification
• Wrong destination
• Wrong consignee
• Missing authorization
• Incorrect quantity
• Misleading supporting document

Not every inaccurate declaration establishes deliberate criminal conduct.

Who Supplied the Information to the Customs Broker?

Reconstruct:

Engineering → Compliance → Logistics → Customs broker → Final declaration.

Determine where the disputed information originated.

A foreign executive who never participated in this chain may have a materially different defense from the employee who deliberately changed the description.

Law No. 5607 and Criminal Exposure

Depending on the facts, alleged unlawful movement of restricted goods or deceptive customs conduct can lead authorities to examine offences under Turkey’s anti-smuggling framework.

The exact statutory allegation matters.

Do not defend against the vague statement:

“The company violated sanctions.”

Determine whether authorities allege:

• Illegal export of restricted goods
• False customs declaration
• Concealment
• False documentation
• Circumvention of an authorization requirement
• Another specific criminal offence

Only then can individual criminal exposure be properly evaluated.

Regulatory Violation Does Not Automatically Equal Smuggling

This distinction should remain clear.

A licensing dispute can exist without proving deliberate smuggling.

A technical classification dispute can exist without proving fraudulent concealment.

An administrative customs consequence can exist without proving an executive’s criminal intent.

Each legal layer should be analyzed separately.

Goods May Be Seized

Where authorities suspect that goods are connected with criminal conduct, the physical shipment may become subject to seizure.

The company should immediately obtain:

• Seizure record
• Inventory
• Customs inspection report
• Investigation number
• Storage information
• Product serial numbers

Seizure does not itself establish guilt or final confiscation.

Company Records May Also Become Important

A sanctions-related investigation can extend to:

• Corporate emails
• Messaging platforms
• Customer due diligence
• Technical files
• Compliance reports
• Export licences
• Customs declarations
• Accounting records
• Banking records

Preserve data immediately once litigation or investigation is reasonably anticipated.

Foreign Executive’s Phone and Emails

Where an executive becomes personally involved in the investigation, communications concerning the disputed transactions may become important evidence.

Do not delete:

• Emails
• Messages
• Customer communications
• Internal warnings
• Calendar records
• Attachments

Deletion after learning of an investigation can create serious evidentiary problems.

Internal Investigation Before Interviews

A foreign executive should understand the transaction chronology before giving detailed factual explanations.

The chronology should identify:

Product → Customer → End user → Destination → Compliance review → Authorization → Contract → Payment → Customs declaration → Shipment.

Avoid guessing where records can provide the answer.

Foreign-Language Documents

International transactions frequently involve documents in English, German, French, Russian, Arabic, Chinese or other languages.

Preserve originals.

Translations should accompany rather than replace the source material.

Employee Blames Foreign Management

A Turkish employee may state:

“The foreign CEO told us to ship.”

That statement should be tested against:

• Emails
• Messages
• Meeting records
• Approval logs
• Witnesses
• Compliance documents
• Shipment dates

A co-participant’s allegation is evidence to investigate, not automatically a complete factual account.

Foreign Executive Blames Local Management

The reverse also requires evidence.

Saying:

“The Turkish team handled everything”

is not enough where the executive personally approved transactions or received repeated compliance warnings.

The defense should reconstruct actual authority and conduct.

Company and Executive May Have Different Interests

A corporation may argue:

The employee violated company policy.

The employee may argue:

Management ordered the transaction.

A foreign executive may argue:

The local team concealed the real destination.

These positions can create conflicts.

Separate legal representation may need to be considered where interests materially diverge.

Compliance Program Evidence

A functioning compliance program can help reconstruct what the company expected employees to do.

Relevant evidence includes:

• Export-control policy
• Customer screening procedure
• End-user verification
• Approval matrix
• Escalation procedure
• Employee training
• Internal audits
• Shipment-blocking mechanisms

But having a written policy alone does not answer what occurred in the disputed transaction.

“Paper Compliance” Can Be Problematic

Authorities may look beyond policies to actual practice.

For example:

Policy: High-risk customers require compliance approval.

Reality: Sales employees routinely ship before approval.

That difference can become relevant to both corporate governance and individual responsibility.

Red Flags That Should Trigger Enhanced Review

Examples include:

• Customer refuses to identify end user
• Unusual intermediary
• Product inconsistent with customer’s business
• Unexplained third-country route
• Last-minute destination change
• Third-party payment
• Request to remove product description
• Request to alter shipping documents
• Inconsistent end-user certificate
• Customer refuses compliance questions

A red flag is not proof of criminal conduct.

It is a reason to investigate before shipment.

Can a Foreign Executive Be Detained in Turkey?

A criminal investigation does not automatically mean detention or pretrial arrest.

The applicable criminal procedure rules and the circumstances of the individual case determine whether coercive measures are considered.

Foreign nationality alone should not be treated as proof of guilt.

Executives traveling to Turkey after learning of a criminal investigation should obtain case-specific advice regarding the procedural status of the file.

Travel Restrictions Are Not Automatic

Likewise, the existence of an investigation does not by itself establish that a foreign executive is subject to a travel restriction.

The actual procedural record should be checked rather than relying on speculation.

International Sanctions and Turkish Law Must Be Distinguished

A multinational company may maintain internal compliance policies based on several legal regimes.

For example, its global policy may reflect:

• Turkish law
• European restrictions
• United States restrictions
• United Nations measures
• Parent-company risk policies
• Bank compliance requirements

These are not automatically interchangeable.

An internal corporate prohibition can be broader than a criminal prohibition under Turkish law.

Therefore:

Violation of company sanctions policy ≠ automatically a Turkish criminal offence.

The applicable Turkish legal basis must be separately identified.

Foreign Law Does Not Automatically Create Turkish Criminal Liability

The fact that another jurisdiction restricts a transaction does not, by itself, establish a Turkish criminal offence.

A Turkish investigation requires analysis of the legal rules applicable in Turkey and the conduct within the relevant jurisdictional framework.

At the same time, foreign-law exposure may exist separately and should be coordinated where the transaction is multinational.

Banking Restrictions and Criminal Seizure Are Different

A bank may suspend or refuse a transaction because of:

• Internal compliance rules
• Correspondent-bank requirements
• Risk policy
• Sanctions screening
• Regulatory concerns

That is not automatically the same as a criminal asset-seizure order.

The legal basis of any account restriction should be identified.

Review Historical Transactions

A sanctions-related investigation may expand beyond one shipment.

Authorities or internal investigators may examine transactions involving the same:

• Customer
• Distributor
• Product
• Destination
• Executive
• Customs broker

A systematic review can identify whether the disputed transaction was isolated or part of a repeated pattern.

2026 Current Compliance Environment

Turkey’s Ministry of Trade continues in 2026 to maintain an export regime in which export activity is subject to customs rules, export legislation, international arrangements and product- or destination-specific restrictions. The Ministry’s export legislation portal was updated in 2026 and continues to identify the Export Regime, export regulations and related measures as part of the operative framework.

The Ministry of National Defence also continues to operate authorization procedures for controlled defense exports and confirms the separate Ministry of Trade framework applicable to civilian dual-use transactions.

Accordingly, foreign companies should treat sanctions and strategic-trade compliance in Turkey as a transaction-specific legal exercise rather than relying solely on global screening software.

30 Immediate Steps for a Foreign Executive Facing a Sanctions Investigation

1. Identify the exact investigated transaction.
2. Identify the alleged Turkish legal restriction.
3. Determine the executive’s procedural status.
4. Preserve the customs declaration.
5. Preserve the commercial invoice.
6. Preserve the contract.
7. Preserve purchase orders.
8. Preserve shipping records.
9. Identify the product classification.
10. Preserve technical specifications.
11. Identify the contractual buyer.
12. Identify the actual end user.
13. Confirm the destination.
14. Preserve end-user certificates.
15. Preserve export authorizations.
16. Check authorization validity.
17. Preserve compliance-screening records.
18. Preserve customer due diligence.
19. Preserve internal warnings.
20. Preserve management approvals.
21. Preserve customs-broker instructions.
22. Preserve bank-payment records.
23. Investigate third-party payments.
24. Investigate destination changes.
25. Do not alter historical records.
26. Do not delete messages or emails.
27. Identify each employee’s role.
28. Review related historical transactions.
29. Separate Turkish-law exposure from foreign-law and internal-policy issues.
30. Coordinate criminal, customs, export-control and corporate defense strategy.

Frequently Asked Questions

1. Is a sanctions violation automatically a criminal offence in Turkey?

No. “Sanctions violation” can describe several different legal problems. The applicable restriction and the specific Turkish criminal or regulatory provision must be identified before criminal liability can be assessed.

2. Can a foreign CEO be prosecuted because the Turkish subsidiary made a restricted export?

Potentially, if evidence establishes the executive’s personal participation in conduct constituting an offence. Corporate title alone does not determine criminal responsibility.

3. Can dual-use goods create sanctions-related criminal risk?

Yes. Civilian dual-use transactions remain subject to Turkey’s strategic trade-control framework where the applicable requirements are met.

4. Does using a distributor in another country constitute sanctions circumvention?

Not automatically. Third-country distributors are common in international commerce. The key issue is whether the intermediary had a genuine commercial role or was allegedly used to conceal a restricted transaction.

5. What if the distributor secretly redirects the goods?

The distributor’s independent conduct does not automatically establish the exporter’s or executive’s criminal liability. Knowledge, participation and the available warning signs should be examined.

6. Can an incorrect end-user certificate create criminal risk?

Potentially. The investigation should determine whether the document was inaccurate or false, who created it, who knew of the problem and how it was used.

7. Does a foreign sanctions list automatically create criminal liability in Turkey?

Not necessarily. The applicable Turkish legal basis must be separately established. A multinational company may also face independent foreign-law or contractual compliance consequences.

8. Does a bank’s sanctions block mean that a criminal case has started?

No. A bank’s compliance restriction and a criminal seizure are different measures. The legal basis of the restriction should be identified.

9. Should the company delete sensitive internal communications once an investigation begins?

No. Relevant evidence should be preserved. Deleting, altering, backdating or fabricating records can seriously damage the defense and may create additional legal problems.

10. What is the most important first step for a foreign executive?

Identify the specific transaction, applicable Turkish restriction, goods, end user, destination, authorization requirement and the executive’s actual personal role. A defense should be built around documented conduct rather than the broad label “sanctions violation.”

Legal Assistance for Foreign Executives Facing Sanctions Investigations in Turkey

A sanctions-related investigation can rapidly expand from a customs question into scrutiny of company emails, export licences, end-user documentation, third-country distributors, payment flows and individual management decisions. Foreign executives may also face allegations concerning transactions that were operationally handled by employees or subsidiaries.

Fırat Fesih Kaya Law Office provides legal assistance to foreign executives, multinational companies, foreign investors, exporters and corporate groups facing sanctions-related, export-control and customs investigations in Turkey.

Lawyer Fırat Fesih Kaya assists foreign clients with restricted-export investigations, dual-use goods, end-user and destination disputes, customs seizures, allegations involving intermediaries and third-country routing, false declaration allegations and individual criminal-liability issues affecting foreign directors and executives.

Early intervention can be particularly important where authorities have seized goods, a foreign executive has been identified as a suspect, internal compliance warnings exist, the end user is disputed, a third-country intermediary is under scrutiny or investigators begin reviewing earlier transactions involving the same customer or product.

Phone: +90 312 434 22 22
Mobile: +90 532 769 22 22
Email: info@firatfesihkaya.av.tr
Address: Mevlana Boulevard No:221, Yıldırım Tower No:148, 06520 Balgat, Çankaya, Ankara, Turkey

This publication is provided for general informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice. Sanctions, export-control and criminal exposure depends on the specific Turkish legal measure, transaction date, goods, destination, end user, authorization requirements, corporate structure and individual conduct involved.