

Foreign Company Accused of Sanctions Evasion in Turkey: Search, Seizure and Criminal Defense 2026
Foreign company facing a sanctions-evasion investigation in Turkey? Learn the 2026 rules on company searches, seizure of goods and digital records, dual-use exports, intermediaries, end users, customs investigations and criminal defense.
A foreign-owned company operating in Turkey may suddenly face a serious investigation after customs authorities stop a shipment, a prosecutor questions the real destination of exported goods, an intermediary becomes suspicious, an end-user document is challenged or investigators allege that a third-country transaction was designed to circumvent an applicable restriction.
The investigation can quickly move beyond the shipment itself. Company premises may be searched, goods and documents may be seized, computers may become subject to forensic examination, managers may be questioned and earlier transactions may be reviewed.
For foreign companies, however, the expression “sanctions evasion” should not be treated as a complete criminal charge by itself.
The defense must first identify the precise Turkish legal rule allegedly violated. Turkey’s Ministry of Trade states that exports are generally free subject to prohibitions and restrictions imposed by applicable legislation and international or bilateral arrangements. Accordingly, the legality of a particular transaction depends on the goods, destination, end user, applicable restriction, authorization requirements and the conduct attributed to the persons involved.
The correct starting point is therefore:
Transaction → Goods → Buyer → End user → Destination → Applicable restriction → Authorization → Customs declaration → Alleged circumvention → Individual conduct.
In practice, authorities may use different legal frameworks depending on the facts. An investigation may concern allegations such as deliberately exporting restricted goods, concealing the actual destination, using an intermediary to disguise the real buyer, providing inaccurate customs information, using false documents or unlawfully moving controlled goods.
This distinction matters because there is no substitute for identifying the exact statutory allegation.
A foreign company should immediately ask:
Which shipment is being investigated?
What restriction allegedly applied?
Which document is allegedly false?
Who supposedly knew about the real transaction?
What criminal provision is being investigated?
Without those answers, the company may respond to a broad allegation instead of the actual case.
Not every sanctions or export-control problem proves intentional evasion.
For example, the company may have:
These situations can create serious regulatory problems. They do not automatically establish deliberate criminal conduct by the company or its executives.
The factual and mental elements of the particular alleged offence must still be established.
An investigation may begin when:
The investigation may then expand into company records and management decisions.
A company-office search is a formal criminal-procedure measure, not an ordinary request for corporate cooperation.
Under Article 116 of the Turkish Criminal Procedure Code, a suspect’s workplace and other relevant places may be searched where the statutory reasonable-suspicion requirement concerning apprehension or obtaining evidence is satisfied. For workplaces and non-public enclosed areas, Article 119 requires a judicial decision or, in urgent circumstances, a written order of the public prosecutor. Current Court of Cassation material reiterates these safeguards.
The company should immediately determine:
Company personnel should not attempt to physically prevent authorities from executing a lawful search.
At the same time, the company should document what occurs.
Where legally possible, counsel should examine the search decision, monitor the process, identify the materials taken and preserve copies of relevant records.
The objective is not confrontation. It is accurate procedural documentation.
Suppose investigators are examining a specific export of industrial equipment in June 2026.
During the search, authorities request records concerning every foreign transaction made by the company over several years.
The legal team should examine the scope and basis of the measure rather than automatically assuming that every company record falls within the same evidentiary justification.
The search decision and resulting inventory can later become important when challenging procedural irregularities or the continued retention of property.
Search and seizure formalities are substantive safeguards.
In a recent Court of Cassation decision available through the Ministry of Justice’s official case-law system, the court discussed Articles 116, 119 and 127 of the Criminal Procedure Code and emphasized that searches of workplaces and other non-public enclosed spaces require the authorization specified by law. The same decision also reiterated that unlawfully obtained evidence cannot form the basis of a conviction under the relevant evidentiary rules.
Accordingly, the defense should preserve every search-related document.
The company should maintain a contemporaneous record of:
The official search and seizure records should also be reviewed carefully.
Investigators may seize goods suspected of being connected with an alleged offence.
For a foreign company, the shipment may consist of expensive machinery, electronics, chemicals, industrial components or dual-use equipment.
Immediately identify:
Product → Quantity → Model → Serial number → Ownership → Storage location → Legal basis of seizure.
Do not rely on a generic statement that “the shipment was confiscated.”
This distinction is fundamental.
A seizure during an investigation is a protective criminal-procedure measure. It does not by itself establish that the company committed an offence or that ownership has permanently transferred to the state.
The Constitutional Court’s property-rights jurisprudence emphasizes that seizure and confiscation measures must maintain a fair balance and should not be arbitrary or unpredictable. It also recognizes the significance of the connection between the owner’s conduct and the alleged violation and the position of good-faith owners.
Therefore:
Seizure ≠ conviction.
Seizure ≠ final confiscation.
Seizure ≠ proof of sanctions evasion.
Article 127 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides procedural safeguards for seizure. Current official case-law material states that where seizure occurs without a prior judicial decision in the circumstances permitted by law, it must be submitted for judicial approval within 24 hours, and the judge must decide within 48 hours from the seizure; otherwise the measure automatically lapses.
The company should therefore determine precisely:
Even where the initial seizure was lawful, continued retention can raise separate issues.
The company should consider whether authorities still need the physical goods after:
The proportionality of continued interference with property rights can become important, particularly for innocent third-party owners and high-value commercial assets.
The Constitutional Court specifically notes that available objections against seizure measures and applicable compensation remedies must be properly exhausted when later alleging that a seizure was unlawful or disproportionate.
Foreign companies should therefore not wait until the criminal case is over before determining whether an immediate procedural remedy exists.
Sanctions-evasion investigations are often document-intensive.
Investigators may be interested in:
Digital search and seizure are governed by specific criminal-procedure rules.
A significant 2026 development concerns Article 134 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
On February 12, 2026, the Constitutional Court ruled that specified parts of Article 134 governing searches of computers and seizure of digital devices were unconstitutional. The Court provided that the annulment would take effect nine months after publication of the judgment in the Official Gazette.
This is particularly relevant to sanctions, customs and corporate investigations because such cases frequently depend heavily on corporate digital evidence.
The exact law in force on the date of a search must therefore be checked carefully during the transition period rather than relying on outdated descriptions of Article 134.
The currently published text of Article 134 provides a special framework for searching computers, copying digital records and, under specified circumstances, seizing devices. It also requires backup of data during computer seizure and provides for a copy of that backup to be given to the suspect or counsel.
Given the Constitutional Court’s 2026 annulment decision and delayed effective date, counsel should verify the operative text on the exact date of any digital search.
Corporate information may be distributed across:
A company should not assume that every data source is governed identically.
The location of the data, user, device, search decision and method used to obtain evidence can matter.
After learning that authorities are conducting a search, foreign headquarters should never instruct IT personnel to:
Preserve potentially relevant evidence.
A sanctions investigation may expose a weak compliance file.
The temptation may be to create a document stating:
“Customer cleared by compliance before shipment.”
If that review did not actually occur, creating a retrospective document is dangerous.
Instead, determine what review actually occurred and preserve the genuine evidence.
The investigation may focus on five evidence chains.
What exactly was exported?
Preserve:
Who bought the goods?
Preserve:
Who ultimately intended to use the product?
Preserve:
Who actually paid?
Preserve:
Where did the goods physically travel?
Preserve:
Consider:
Turkish exporter → Distributor in Country A → Customer in Country B.
That can be a legitimate commercial structure.
The criminal issue is not simply the existence of Country A.
Investigators may examine whether the intermediary had a genuine commercial role or whether it was allegedly inserted to disguise the actual transaction.
Useful evidence can include:
The commercial substance of the relationship can matter.
Authorities may take a different view if the intermediary:
These facts still require contextual analysis, but they can increase investigative scrutiny.
The prosecution may focus on communications such as:
“Do not put the real customer’s name on the paperwork.”
If authentic and properly obtained, such a communication may become highly significant.
But isolated messages should be interpreted within the complete conversation and transaction chronology.
International businesses often use shorthand such as:
“Use distributor route.”
That phrase does not automatically mean:
“Circumvent sanctions.”
The surrounding evidence should establish what the participants actually meant.
A disputed end-user certificate can become central.
Determine:
A foreign company deceived by a customer may have a materially different factual position from a company alleged to have fabricated the certificate itself.
Suppose the customer represents that equipment is for its own factory.
After seizure, authorities discover that the customer intended to transfer it elsewhere.
The defense should preserve evidence showing what information the exporter actually possessed before shipment.
Customer fraud should not automatically be converted into exporter knowledge.
At the same time, investigators may ask whether obvious warning signs were ignored.
Examples include:
A red flag is not itself proof of criminal intent, but it may explain why investigators examine the transaction more closely.
Sanctions-evasion allegations frequently overlap with dual-use export controls.
Industrial machinery, electronics, chemicals and other civilian products may be subject to strategic trade controls depending on their technical characteristics and intended use.
The company should preserve the technical classification performed before shipment.
Suppose the company classified machinery as an ordinary civilian product.
Authorities later claim it fell within a controlled category.
The defense should determine:
A technical classification dispute should not automatically be described as deliberate evasion.
Authorities may also allege that the customs declaration concealed the transaction.
Potential issues include:
Identify who provided each disputed piece of information.
The customs broker may have prepared the declaration.
Reconstruct:
Company data → Broker instructions → Draft declaration → Corrections → Approval → Final declaration.
Do not simply argue:
“The broker did everything.”
Equally, do not automatically attribute a broker’s independent mistake to foreign management.
A foreign CEO is not automatically responsible merely because investigators believe a Turkish subsidiary circumvented a trade restriction.
The relevant questions include:
Individual conduct should be distinguished from corporate position.
Ownership alone should not establish personal participation.
This becomes particularly important where a foreign investor acquired the Turkish company after the investigated exports occurred.
Preserve the transaction chronology.
Investigators may receive conflicting explanations.
Local manager: Foreign headquarters ordered the transaction.
Foreign headquarters: Local management concealed it.
Resolve this with documents rather than assumptions.
Relevant evidence can include:
The company may argue that an employee bypassed compliance.
The employee may argue that management instructed them to proceed.
Foreign executives may have separate defenses.
Potential conflicts of interest should therefore be identified early.
In serious criminal investigations, questions may also arise regarding seizure of property, rights, receivables or company interests under the applicable criminal-procedure provisions.
Such measures have specific statutory requirements and should not be treated as automatic consequences of an investigation.
The Constitutional Court has repeatedly analyzed asset seizure and related measures through legality, necessity and proportionality principles.
Turkish criminal procedure also contains a specific mechanism concerning appointment of a trustee to manage a company in qualifying circumstances. Official Constitutional Court materials quote Article 133 as requiring strong reasons for suspicion that an offence is being committed within company activity and that the measure be necessary for revealing the material truth; the decision belongs to a judge or court.
A criminal investigation against a company therefore does not itself mean that a trustee will be appointed.
Search-and-seizure defense should examine not only what the evidence says but also how it was obtained.
Current Court of Cassation material reiterates the Criminal Procedure Code principle that criminal allegations may be proven through lawfully obtained evidence and that unlawfully obtained evidence cannot simply be used as ordinary proof.
This makes the procedural record particularly important.
Companies sometimes preserve only documents requested by authorities.
The defense should independently preserve evidence that may explain the transaction, including:
Exculpatory evidence can disappear just as easily as incriminating evidence.
One disputed shipment can expand into a broader investigation.
In July 2026, the Ministry of Trade reported continuing intensive secondary-control and post-clearance review of historical customs and foreign-trade transactions, with TRY 28.7 billion in additional assessments and penalty decisions reported over the preceding two-and-a-half-year period.
A company should therefore consider whether the same product, customer, intermediary or routing method appeared in earlier transactions.
A strong defense should separate five issues:
1. Was the transaction actually prohibited or restricted under Turkish law?
2. Were the goods actually controlled?
3. Was the true customer, end user or destination concealed?
4. Was any incorrect document a deliberate falsification or a compliance mistake?
5. Which individuals personally participated in the alleged conduct?
These questions prevent a broad corporate allegation from becoming an assumption of guilt against every employee and executive.
Yes, where the statutory conditions for a criminal-procedure search are satisfied. Workplace searches are subject to the authorization requirements in the Criminal Procedure Code.
Potentially, where the statutory conditions for seizure are satisfied. Seizure does not itself establish criminal guilt or final confiscation.
Article 127 contains judicial-review requirements for qualifying non-judicial seizures, including submission for judicial approval within the statutory period.
Potentially, but digital searches are governed by specific rules. Article 134 is especially important, and the Constitutional Court issued a significant annulment decision concerning parts of that provision in 2026 with delayed effect. The law effective on the actual search date must therefore be checked.
The legal basis, scope, necessity and proportionality of the measure should be examined. The published Article 134 framework also addresses copying, backups and circumstances in which devices may be seized.
No. Legitimate distribution structures frequently involve intermediaries. The investigation must examine whether the intermediary had genuine commercial substance and what the company knew about the final transaction.
Potentially where evidence supports personal participation in the alleged offence. Being CEO or director does not by itself establish knowledge or criminal responsibility.
Depending on the facts and applicable procedure, ownership and good faith can be highly relevant. Constitutional Court jurisprudence emphasizes proportionality and the position of good-faith property owners in seizure and confiscation cases.
The company should comply with legally binding measures while carefully identifying their scope and obtaining case-specific legal advice. Voluntary disclosure beyond the legal measure should not be improvised during a high-risk criminal investigation.
Secure the search and seizure records, preserve all relevant evidence, prohibit deletion or alteration of data, identify the exact Turkish legal allegation and reconstruct the disputed transaction from product classification through final delivery.
A sanctions-evasion allegation can rapidly develop into a complex investigation involving customs authorities, prosecutors, company searches, seizure of goods, forensic examination of digital records, questioning of executives and review of historical international transactions.
Fırat Fesih Kaya Law Office provides legal assistance to foreign companies, multinational groups, foreign investors, exporters and executives facing sanctions-related, customs and export-control investigations in Turkey.
Lawyer Fırat Fesih Kaya assists foreign clients with company searches, seizure of goods and corporate records, digital evidence issues, dual-use goods investigations, end-user disputes, third-country routing allegations, customs declaration investigations and individual criminal-liability issues affecting foreign directors and executives.
Early intervention can be especially important when investigators have searched company premises, seized computers or goods, challenged an end-user certificate, alleged that an intermediary concealed the final destination or begun examining several years of earlier transactions.
Phone: +90 312 434 22 22
Mobile: +90 532 769 22 22
Email: info@firatfesihkaya.av.tr
Address: Mevlana Boulevard No:221, Yıldırım Tower No:148, 06520 Balgat, Çankaya, Ankara, Turkey
This publication is provided for general informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice. Search, seizure, export-control and criminal consequences depend on the exact legal measure, transaction date, goods, destination, end user, authorization requirements, evidence and individual conduct involved.