

What can foreign investors do when a Turkish company manager refuses to provide bank statements, accounts or financial records? Learn about shareholder information rights, court remedies, evidence preservation, manager removal and financial misconduct risks in Turkey.
A foreign investor who owns shares in a Turkish company should take a manager’s refusal to provide financial records seriously.
Repeated refusal to disclose bank statements, accounting records, contracts, invoices, tax information or related-party transactions may indicate anything from an ordinary shareholder-management disagreement to a much more serious corporate governance problem.
The investor should not immediately assume fraud. However, the situation should be investigated quickly and systematically.
Under Turkish company law, shareholders and members of management have statutory information and inspection rights, although the precise procedure differs according to whether the business is a limited liability company or a joint stock company. Turkish law also provides potential liability for directors and managers who breach duties arising from legislation or the company’s constitutional documents.
The investor should first determine whether the company is:
This matters because shareholder information rights and management structures are different.
The investor should obtain:
For a foreign investor holding shares in a Turkish limited liability company, the Turkish Commercial Code provides important information and inspection mechanisms.
A shareholder may seek information concerning company business and may request examination of relevant records within the statutory framework.
The manager should therefore not assume that company financial information belongs personally to management and can simply be withheld from shareholders indefinitely.
Foreign shareholders in joint stock companies also have statutory information and inspection rights, but the exercise of those rights follows the rules applicable to joint stock companies.
Additionally, a foreign investor who is itself represented on the board should distinguish between:
shareholder information rights
and
board-member information rights.
Under Article 392 of the Turkish Commercial Code, each board member may request information concerning all company business and transactions, ask questions and conduct examinations. The statutory framework provides strong protection for access to corporate books, records, contracts and correspondence by board members.
If repeated telephone calls and messages have produced no result, the foreign shareholder should move to a documented process.
Prepare a written request identifying exactly what is required.
For example:
Avoid vague demands such as:
“Send me everything.”
Specific requests create a much clearer evidentiary record.
The request should specify the relevant dates.
For example:
January 1, 2025 – September 30, 2026
This prevents arguments that the request was unclear or unreasonably broad.
Bank statements are often the most important records in a shareholder dispute.
The investor should determine:
A manager who provides accounting summaries but refuses access to underlying banking records may create a significant transparency problem.
Once documents are obtained, do not examine them separately.
Compare:
Bank payment → Accounting entry → Invoice → Contract → Commercial purpose
For example:
Bank transfer: TRY 3 million
Accounting description: Consultancy
Invoice: TRY 3 million
Recipient: Company owned by manager’s relative
That transaction requires substantially more investigation than merely confirming that an invoice exists.
Foreign investors should identify payments involving:
Related-party transactions are not automatically unlawful.
The important questions are:
This requires immediate attention.
If company funds were transferred into a manager’s personal account, identify:
Legitimate explanations may exist, such as properly documented expense reimbursement.
But unexplained company-to-manager transfers should not be ignored.
Repeated large cash withdrawals can make financial reconstruction more difficult.
For each significant withdrawal, determine:
A pattern of unexplained cash withdrawals may justify broader financial review.
In closely held Turkish companies, shareholder-company financial movements can become a major source of disputes.
Review:
A shareholder current account should not become a hidden mechanism for transferring company assets.
Request:
Look for potentially personal expenses involving:
Personal expenditure and legitimate business expenditure should be separated.
A manager may establish or use another company to provide services to the original business.
That is not automatically unlawful.
But the foreign investor should determine:
Request records concerning sales of:
Compare sale price with market value.
A significant asset transferred to a related party at an unusually low price may require urgent action.
A manager may have created liabilities without keeping the foreign shareholder adequately informed.
Request:
The investor should understand both assets and liabilities.
This can create significant hidden exposure.
Determine whether the company has issued:
for debts belonging to shareholders, managers or related companies.
Do not rely only on printed documents.
Preserve lawful copies of:
Do not unlawfully access personal accounts or private devices.
Where voluntary cooperation has failed, the shareholder should consider making a formal request based on the applicable corporate-law framework.
The request should identify:
This can establish evidence of persistent refusal.
Confidentiality does not automatically eliminate statutory shareholder rights.
However, Turkish company law can balance information rights against legitimate company interests and risks concerning misuse of information.
The analysis therefore depends on:
The manager should not simply use the word “confidential” as a universal justification for withholding every financial record.
That is not a satisfactory final answer.
The company’s legal records remain corporate records regardless of whether they are physically or electronically maintained by:
The investor should identify the custodian and seek access through lawful corporate procedures.
Determine who engaged the accountant and what authorization exists.
Do not pressure the accountant to disclose information contrary to professional or legal obligations.
Instead, establish the company’s lawful authority and use appropriate corporate or judicial procedures where necessary.
Potentially, yes.
Where statutory information or inspection rights are unlawfully refused, judicial remedies may be available depending on company type and the particular right being exercised.
The investor should preserve evidence showing:
A documented refusal is far stronger than an oral disagreement.
Depending on the applicable corporate-law procedure and circumstances, judicial intervention may be sought to enforce information or inspection rights.
The precise request should be tailored to the records genuinely required.
Potentially, particularly if the refusal forms part of serious management misconduct.
In a limited liability company, the Turkish Commercial Code provides mechanisms concerning removal of a manager or restriction of management and representation authority where statutory conditions, including just cause in the judicial mechanism, are satisfied.
Persistent financial secrecy combined with other conduct may become important evidence.
Examples may include:
A single disagreement about one document should be distinguished from systematic obstruction.
Potentially.
Article 553 of the Turkish Commercial Code provides a liability framework for founders, board members, managers and liquidators who breach duties arising from law or the company’s constitutional documents and thereby cause damage.
Therefore, withholding information may be only one aspect of a larger liability dispute if management misconduct has caused measurable financial loss.
Depending on the company and circumstances, an independent accounting review can be highly valuable.
The review may focus on:
The objective should be financial reconstruction, not simply finding evidence to support a predetermined accusation.
A useful investigation should identify:
| Transaction | Amount | Recipient | Documentation | Approval | Concern |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Supplier payment | TRY 1.2M | Supplier A | Complete | Authorized | Low |
| Consultancy | TRY 2.5M | Company B | Incomplete | Manager | Review |
| Cash withdrawal | TRY 800K | Cash | None | Manager | High |
| Related-party loan | TRY 4M | Company C | Partial | Disputed | High |
This helps separate ordinary business activity from transactions requiring investigation.
Financial opacity can justify investigation.
It does not automatically prove:
Foreign investors should avoid using criminal allegations merely as leverage in a shareholder dispute.
First reconstruct the transactions.
If financial records reveal evidence potentially indicating criminal conduct, the investor should preserve the original evidence and assess the appropriate legal response.
Do not:
Corporate, civil and criminal remedies may need to be coordinated carefully.
If the issue is no longer merely refusal to provide records and there is concrete evidence that assets are being transferred or dissipated, urgent protective measures may need to be examined.
Examples include an imminent:
The evidence supporting urgency is critical.
Map the banking authority immediately.
Identify:
If a valid management change later occurs, banking authorities should be updated promptly through proper corporate procedures.
Create an inventory of corporate access.
This may include:
Do not attempt unauthorized access. Use lawful corporate mechanisms to secure company information.
Majority ownership can provide significant governance power, but it does not mean the shareholder can ignore statutory procedures.
Review:
Corporate resolutions must still be properly adopted.
This is one of the most difficult scenarios.
A Turkish manager who also owns 50% may be able to block certain shareholder decisions.
A 2025 Constitutional Court decision concerning limited companies illustrates the structural difficulty that can arise in two-shareholder companies where statutory voting thresholds prevent one shareholder from unilaterally forcing the other shareholder’s expulsion.
Information rights, management remedies, interim protection and deadlock strategy may therefore need to be pursued separately.
Potentially.
Management status and share ownership are separate.
A business partner can potentially cease being a manager while remaining a shareholder.
This distinction is often important in foreign investor disputes.
That requires a separate legal analysis.
For limited companies, shareholder expulsion is subject to specific statutory requirements. The Constitutional Court’s 2025 decision also examined the statutory structure governing expulsion for just cause and the difficulties presented by two-shareholder companies.
Do not confuse:
access to records
with
manager removal
with
shareholder expulsion.
They are different legal remedies.
A shareholders’ agreement may provide additional rights concerning:
Contractual rights may therefore supplement statutory corporate rights.
Request:
Undisclosed tax liabilities can materially affect company value and foreign shareholder exposure.
Prepare a liability schedule.
Identify:
Hidden company debt may affect both litigation strategy and any proposed shareholder buyout.
A manager who refuses financial disclosure may later propose:
“Buy my shares and we end the dispute.”
Foreign investors should avoid agreeing to a valuation without understanding:
Financial due diligence becomes even more important during a shareholder dispute.
A foreign investor facing financial-record obstruction should:
Not automatically. Turkish company law provides shareholders with information and inspection rights, although the applicable procedure depends on company type and circumstances.
The investor may seek financial information through applicable shareholder rights and corporate procedures. The precise entitlement and method depend on the company structure and requested records.
Confidentiality may be relevant in particular circumstances, but it does not automatically eliminate statutory shareholder information rights.
Potentially. Turkish company law provides judicial mechanisms relating to information and inspection rights in qualifying circumstances.
Potentially, especially where persistent obstruction forms part of serious management misconduct or a broader breach of managerial duties.
Potentially. Article 553 of the Turkish Commercial Code establishes a liability framework where managers and other covered corporate actors breach their duties and cause damage.
A 50/50 structure can create significant deadlock. Information rights, management remedies and shareholder exit mechanisms should be analyzed separately.
Not merely because records have been refused. The financial transactions should first be reconstructed. If evidence indicates possible criminal conduct, appropriate criminal remedies can then be evaluated.
Yes. A transaction-focused review can identify unexplained withdrawals, related-party transactions, hidden liabilities and inconsistencies between bank and accounting records.
Create a precise written record of which financial documents are missing, when they were requested, how the manager responded and which transactions require investigation.
A manager’s refusal to provide financial information should not be handled only through repeated informal requests.
The foreign investor should establish a documented record, identify the applicable statutory and contractual information rights, preserve existing corporate evidence and determine whether the refusal is merely a governance dispute or part of more serious financial misconduct.
Where records reveal unexplained payments, related-party transfers, hidden debt or misuse of company assets, the strategy may need to expand beyond information rights to include manager removal, liability claims, interim protection, financial reconstruction and shareholder-dispute proceedings.
Fırat Fesih Kaya Law Office assists foreign investors and shareholders with access to company records, shareholder information rights, financial transparency disputes, manager misconduct, 50/50 company deadlocks and corporate asset disputes in Turkey.
Lawyer Fırat Fesih Kaya provides legal assistance in obtaining and reviewing corporate financial information, investigating disputed transactions, protecting company assets and pursuing appropriate corporate or judicial remedies where management refuses transparency.
Phone: +90 312 434 22 22
Mobile: +90 532 769 22 22
Email: info@firatfesihkaya.av.tr
Address: Mevlana Boulevard No:221, Yıldırım Tower, Office No:148, 06520 Balgat, Çankaya, Ankara, Turkey
This article is intended for general information and does not constitute legal advice. Information and inspection rights, management remedies and liability depend on the company’s legal form, articles of association, shareholder structure, requested documents and specific circumstances of the dispute.