

A foreign employee in Turkey is accused of uploading company secrets, personal data or confidential documents to an AI tool. Learn about criminal liability, digital evidence, employer complaints, device examinations and defense strategies.
Artificial intelligence tools are increasingly used by employees to translate documents, summarize contracts, analyze spreadsheets, prepare reports, write software code and process business information. A serious criminal dispute can arise when a foreign employee working in Turkey is accused of entering confidential company information, customer data, trade secrets, personal data, source code, financial records or internal documents into an external AI platform without authorization. An employer may characterize the incident as theft or disclosure of confidential information, unlawful transfer of personal data, unauthorized access to information systems or another criminal offense. However, use of an AI tool does not automatically establish criminal liability. Investigators must determine what information was actually transmitted, who transmitted it, whether the employee was authorized to access the information, what the employee intended, how the AI service processed the information and whether the elements of a specific criminal offense can be established.
The principal risk arises when employees place protected business information into a third-party AI system. The information may leave the employer’s controlled information environment and potentially be processed on external infrastructure.
An employer discovering such activity may initiate an internal investigation and subsequently make a criminal complaint.
This distinction is critical. A company’s internal AI policy may prohibit employees from using public AI services. Breaching that policy can potentially create employment or disciplinary consequences, but breach of an internal policy alone does not automatically prove a criminal offense.
Criminal responsibility requires the elements of an offense recognized under applicable criminal law.
The defense should determine precisely what information allegedly entered the AI system.
Possible categories include customer information, employee records, financial statements, pricing information, commercial contracts, technical drawings, software code, passwords, strategic plans, tender documents, health information or other personal data.
Different information can create different legal issues.
If the material contains genuine commercial, banking or customer secrets, unauthorized disclosure can create substantially greater legal risk.
The investigation should determine whether the information was actually confidential, how the company protected it and whether the employee had authority to use or disclose it.
Uploading documents containing identifiable individuals’ information can potentially raise personal-data issues in addition to confidentiality concerns.
Investigators should identify exactly which data were allegedly transmitted rather than describing an entire document repository as “personal data.”
Documents involving health, biometric or other specially protected information can create heightened legal concerns.
The defense should establish whether such information was actually present in the material submitted to the AI service.
An employee may have been fully authorized to view and use a document for work purposes but not authorized to disclose it externally.
This differs from a situation where the employee allegedly accessed information they were never permitted to obtain.
The distinction can affect the criminal analysis.
A finance employee may legitimately access financial records. An engineer may legitimately possess technical drawings. A lawyer or compliance employee may legitimately review confidential contracts.
The investigation must separately examine whether transmission to the external AI tool exceeded the employee’s authorization.
Intent can be central. An employee who uploads text solely to translate a document presents different facts from someone who deliberately provides confidential information to a competitor.
Investigators should not infer malicious intent merely from the fact that an AI service was used.
A foreign employee may not understand that information entered into an external service can be processed outside the employer’s environment.
That does not necessarily eliminate every form of legal responsibility, but it can be highly relevant to the required mental element of the alleged offense.
The phrase “AI tool” is too broad for a criminal investigation.
The defense should identify the exact application, account, version and service used. Enterprise systems with contractual data protections may operate differently from public consumer services.
Investigators should distinguish allegations from technical evidence.
The employer may know that an employee accessed an AI website but may not initially know what text, documents or data were actually transmitted.
Evidence that an employee visited an AI website does not necessarily establish what information was entered.
Additional technical evidence may be necessary to reconstruct the alleged activity.
Corporate systems may record domains accessed, upload events, data-transfer volumes or security alerts.
The defense should examine what the logs genuinely prove and what conclusions are merely inferred.
Large companies increasingly use systems capable of identifying suspicious uploads or transfers.
An automated security alert should be preserved and technically examined rather than automatically treated as conclusive evidence of a criminal offense.
An employer may submit screenshots from internal monitoring systems. Determine when they were created, who created them, whether the underlying data remain available and whether the screenshot accurately represents the alleged transaction.
If a criminal investigation begins, computers and other digital devices can become important evidence.
The legality of search, seizure and forensic examination should be reviewed carefully.
If the AI application was used through a mobile device, investigators may seek evidence from the phone.
The scope and legal basis of any digital examination should be analyzed separately.
A company-owned laptop presents different factual issues from an employee’s personal device.
Ownership of the device does not by itself determine whether every form of examination is lawful or whether every file on the device is relevant.
The integrity of electronic evidence can become central.
Relevant questions include when the device was obtained, who handled it, how forensic copies were created and whether the underlying evidence remained unchanged.
File metadata, timestamps, browser records and system logs may help determine when a document was opened, copied or uploaded.
These records should be interpreted by qualified experts where necessary.
Evidence showing activity from a particular device does not always prove which person performed the activity.
If multiple employees had access to the computer or account, attribution should be investigated carefully.
Companies sometimes use shared accounts for business tools.
Login records, IP information and device evidence may be necessary before activity can reliably be attributed to a particular employee.
Where the employee denies the activity, investigate whether credentials were shared, stolen or used from another device.
Cybersecurity evidence can become essential in determining responsibility.
A foreign suspect should understand the nature of the allegation and criminal procedure being conducted.
Language difficulties should not result in the employee signing documents they do not understand.
Where the foreign employee cannot adequately understand Turkish, interpretation becomes important during statements and other criminal procedures.
Any inaccurate interpretation affecting the substance of a statement should be documented immediately.
The employee should review the statement carefully before signing it.
Technical terminology involving AI, cloud systems, file transfers and corporate networks can be mistranslated or oversimplified, potentially changing the meaning of the employee’s explanation.
Statements such as “I uploaded the company’s information to AI” can be dangerously imprecise.
The employee should distinguish what was entered, why it was entered, whether the information was anonymized and what they understood about the system.
Before the criminal complaint, the company may have conducted an internal interview.
Preserve emails, interview notes and written statements because differences between the internal investigation and later criminal allegations can become important.
An employer’s cybersecurity or compliance report may be influential but should not automatically be treated as independent forensic proof.
Determine who prepared the report, what data were examined and what assumptions were made.
Obtain the AI-use policy in force on the date of the alleged incident.
Determine whether the employee received it, understood it and received any relevant training.
A company may strengthen its AI policy after discovering an incident.
The investigation should distinguish rules existing when the alleged conduct occurred from policies adopted afterward.
Employment contracts, confidentiality agreements, information-security policies and employee handbooks may help establish what information the employee was permitted to use and how confidentiality obligations were communicated.
An employer may dismiss an employee even while the criminal investigation continues.
An employment-law finding does not automatically determine criminal guilt, and termination does not itself prove that a crime occurred.
The employer may claim financial damage resulting from an alleged data leak.
Any claimed loss should be proven rather than assumed from the existence of the incident.
This can become a central factual question depending on the alleged offense.
The technical operation of the AI service should be examined rather than assuming that every prompt automatically became publicly available.
This question should be answered according to the actual service, account type, contractual terms and settings applicable at the relevant time.
The prosecution and defense should not rely on generalized assumptions about how all AI systems work.
If the company requested deletion or the employee deleted conversations, preserve evidence concerning what happened.
Deletion after an incident can be interpreted in different ways, so chronology and motive should be documented carefully.
Once an investigation is anticipated, employees and companies should avoid destroying relevant records.
Legal counsel should coordinate evidence preservation promptly.
If the employer belongs to an international corporate group, security logs or AI-use records may be maintained abroad.
Cross-border evidence collection and preservation may therefore become important.
A forensic expert can help reconstruct whether a file was uploaded, which account was used, what device initiated the transaction and whether employer conclusions are technically supported.
Complex AI-related criminal cases should not be decided solely through assumptions about technology.
Corporate concern about confidential information does not remove the need to establish the defendant’s personal responsibility.
Evidence should connect the foreign employee to the specific alleged disclosure.
Corporate networks, VPNs and shared infrastructure can cause multiple users to appear under the same external IP address.
IP evidence should therefore be interpreted in its technical context.
If the output reproduces confidential information, it may help establish what information was entered into the system.
However, investigators should verify the source, date and authenticity of the conversation.
Partial screenshots can omit prompts, warnings and surrounding context.
Where possible and legally appropriate, preserve the complete AI conversation and associated account information.
The purpose of use matters but does not automatically resolve the legal issue.
The defense should examine whether confidential or personal information was transmitted, whether authorization existed and whether the employee understood applicable restrictions.
Effective anonymization can materially change the factual analysis.
However, simply removing a person’s name may not be sufficient if the individual or company remains identifiable from the remaining information.
Information genuinely available to the public may present a different confidentiality analysis.
The employee should preserve evidence showing where and when the information became publicly accessible.
Obtain the actual upload records.
An allegation that “the entire database was leaked” should be tested against forensic evidence establishing the actual files or text transmitted.
Depending on the seriousness and procedural development of the criminal investigation, judicial-control measures may potentially affect a foreign suspect’s ability to travel.
Any restriction should be reviewed immediately because foreign employees may need to travel internationally for work or residence purposes.
A criminal investigation can create immigration concerns for foreign nationals, but the existence of an allegation should not automatically be treated as equivalent to a final criminal conviction.
Criminal-defense and immigration strategy should therefore be coordinated where necessary.
A foreign employee accused of leaking confidential information through AI should preserve the relevant devices and accounts, avoid deleting data, obtain the employer’s exact allegation, identify the AI service and account used, preserve the complete conversation where available, obtain applicable company policies, review confidentiality obligations, request the underlying cybersecurity evidence, reconstruct device and account activity, identify potential shared access, preserve evidence of authorization and business purpose, and obtain legal assistance before providing detailed statements concerning complex technical facts.
No. The criminal issue depends on what the employee actually did, what information was involved and whether the elements of a specific offense are established.
Potentially. The analysis depends on the nature of the information, the employee’s authority, the manner of disclosure and the applicable criminal provisions.
Yes. Personal-data issues may arise separately from trade-secret or confidentiality allegations.
Not necessarily. Browser history may establish access to a service without proving exactly what information was transmitted.
Corporate investigations and criminal searches raise different legal issues. The ownership of the computer, workplace policies, scope of monitoring and criminal-procedure requirements should be examined.
Attribution becomes important. Device activity alone may not establish which individual performed a particular action.
An internal report can become evidence, but its methodology, underlying records and conclusions can be challenged during the criminal process.
Purpose is relevant, but the content transmitted and applicable authorization still need to be examined.
Where the suspect cannot adequately understand Turkish, interpretation rights are an important part of ensuring that the person understands the criminal procedure and statement.
Preserve the digital evidence and determine exactly what data were allegedly transmitted, through which account, from which device and for what purpose. AI-related criminal allegations should be reconstructed from technical evidence rather than assumptions about how artificial intelligence systems operate.
Criminal allegations involving AI tools can combine trade secrets, personal data, digital evidence, corporate cybersecurity investigations, computer examinations, employment disputes and immigration consequences for foreign nationals. Fırat Fesih Kaya Law Office assists foreign employees, executives and international companies facing criminal investigations concerning alleged confidential-data disclosure and unauthorized use of digital systems in Turkey. Lawyer Fırat Fesih Kaya provides legal assistance during police and prosecutor statements, digital-evidence disputes, search and seizure procedures, forensic examinations, employer complaints and related criminal proceedings.
Phone: +90 312 434 22 22
Mobile: +90 532 769 22 22
Email: info@firatfesihkaya.av.tr
Address: Mevlana Boulevard No:221, Yıldırım Tower, Office No:148, 06520 Balgat, Çankaya, Ankara, Turkey