

If an accountant commits fraud in a foreign-owned company in Turkey, can directors also face criminal charges? Learn how knowledge, intent, authorization, financial records and management involvement affect criminal liability.
When an accountant working for a foreign-owned company in Turkey is accused of fraud, embezzlement, falsifying documents, manipulating company accounts or diverting company funds, investigators may examine not only the accountant but also the company’s directors and senior managers. This can be particularly concerning for foreign directors who were not involved in daily accounting operations but had signing authority, approved payments or supervised the finance department. However, a director does not automatically become criminally liable merely because an accountant committed an offense within the company. Criminal responsibility generally requires an individualized assessment of the director’s own conduct, knowledge, intent and participation.
Potentially, but liability is not automatic. Investigators must distinguish between the person who actually carried out the fraudulent acts and managers who merely held corporate positions.
The central questions are whether the director knew about the conduct, authorized it, participated in it, intentionally assisted it or otherwise engaged in conduct capable of establishing personal criminal responsibility.
A foreign director’s title alone should not be treated as proof that the director participated in every financial transaction conducted by company employees.
Large companies frequently delegate accounting, payroll, tax, banking and payment functions to specialized employees.
The investigation should therefore determine who actually performed and controlled the disputed transactions.
Possible allegations include unauthorized transfers of company money, fictitious invoices, false accounting records, manipulation of customer payments, forged signatures, fraudulent expense claims, diversion of company assets or use of company accounts to conceal unlawful transactions.
The exact alleged offense determines what prosecutors must prove.
One of the first defense steps is to create a clear factual separation between the accountant’s actions and management decisions.
Identify who created the transaction, who entered it into the accounting system, who approved it, who benefited financially and who possessed the relevant passwords or banking authority.
Knowledge can become a central issue. A director who genuinely had no knowledge of an accountant’s concealed fraudulent activity presents a materially different case from a director who received reports describing the transactions and nevertheless approved them.
The evidence should therefore establish what information actually reached the director.
Investigators may examine signatures, electronic approvals, payment instructions and corporate resolutions.
An approval should be analyzed in context. A director may have authorized an ordinary commercial payment without knowing that underlying invoices or accounting records had been falsified.
In companies with multiple levels of financial control, a director may approve a payment based on documents prepared by accounting personnel.
The prosecution must still establish the director’s personal criminal responsibility rather than infer fraudulent intent solely from a signature.
If company payments require two signatures or multiple electronic approvals, obtain the complete authorization chain.
This can show which employee initiated the transaction and what information was available to each approver.
Bank statements, SWIFT records, payment instructions and online banking logs may establish where the money went and who controlled the receiving account.
These records can be particularly important where the accountant secretly redirected company funds.
Modern accounting systems may record user accounts, dates, modifications and transaction histories.
Preserve these records immediately. They can help identify who created or altered suspicious entries.
Companies should issue an internal preservation instruction as soon as fraud is discovered.
Relevant emails, accounting records, server logs, payment approvals and access records should be preserved lawfully.
Correspondence can demonstrate whether the accountant informed directors about a transaction or concealed its true nature.
Messages may therefore support either the prosecution or the defense depending on their content.
Obtain signature circulars, board resolutions, internal authorization rules, job descriptions and banking mandates.
These documents can establish the actual division of responsibility within the company.
Investigators should determine who possessed passwords, tokens, mobile approvals and banking credentials.
If the accountant could initiate transactions independently, this fact may be highly relevant.
Companies should avoid shared financial-system credentials. If several employees used the same account, identifying the person responsible for a particular transaction becomes more difficult.
Technical logs and surrounding evidence may then become necessary.
Prosecutors may examine whether money was transferred to the director, the director’s relatives, related companies or accounts controlled by the director.
Absence of personal benefit does not automatically eliminate every form of criminal liability, but it can be important to understanding the transaction.
A financial flow chart can be one of the most effective tools in a complex fraud investigation.
It should identify the source of funds, intermediate accounts, final recipients and relationships between the parties.
The allegedly forged document should be preserved in its original form. Depending on the circumstances, forensic examination may be necessary.
Previous genuine signatures can be relevant comparison material.
Where approvals were electronic, determine which device, account, authentication mechanism or network information was associated with the transaction.
The mere appearance of a director’s name in a software system does not necessarily establish who physically performed the action.
An allegation of inadequate corporate supervision should not automatically be converted into intentional participation in fraud.
Criminal liability depends on the elements of the specific alleged offense and the director’s own conduct. Corporate governance failures and intentional criminal participation are distinct issues.
Many fraud offenses require intentional conduct. Poor management, inadequate internal controls or failure to discover an employee’s deception does not automatically establish fraudulent intent.
The mental element required by the particular offense must be analyzed carefully.
The factual assessment becomes more difficult where management repeatedly received specific warnings concerning suspicious payments, fictitious suppliers or unexplained transfers.
Investigators may examine what the director knew, when the information was received and what action followed.
Preserve internal audit findings and compliance reports.
If an audit identified the accountant’s misconduct and management immediately investigated it, those records may help establish the chronology.
Document when the investigation started, who conducted it, what evidence was preserved and what corrective actions were taken.
Do not alter historical records during the internal investigation.
Whether and how to make a criminal complaint should be assessed according to the evidence and circumstances.
A company claiming to be the victim of internal fraud should prepare a coherent evidentiary file rather than submit unsupported allegations.
Where an accountant secretly steals company money, the foreign-owned company itself may have suffered the financial loss.
The distinction between corporate victimization and managerial participation should be made clearly during the investigation.
Yes, depending on the investigation and the director’s alleged connection with the events.
A foreign director who receives a police or prosecutor summons should determine whether they are being called as a suspect, witness or another procedural participant before giving a substantive statement.
A director who does not sufficiently understand Turkish should ensure that interpretation is provided where required during criminal proceedings.
The director should not sign a statement that they cannot understand accurately.
The record should accurately reflect the director’s answers.
Errors concerning corporate authority, payment approval, dates or financial terminology can materially affect a complex white-collar investigation.
Fraud investigations can involve thousands of accounting entries, bank transactions and corporate records.
The defense should be prepared around documents and transaction chronology rather than relying only on a short oral explanation.
If a foreign director does not remember a historical transaction, guessing can create contradictions with accounting records later.
Where appropriate, the director should distinguish personal recollection from information that requires verification from company records.
Where legally and procedurally possible, the defense should identify the disputed transactions and relevant documentation before attempting to explain complex historical accounting events.
Police or prosecutors may seek financial or digital evidence depending on the investigation.
The company should preserve a record of materials taken and maintain lawful copies of essential business records where permitted.
Devices used for payment approvals, emails and accounting systems can become important evidence.
Digital evidence should be examined with attention to user attribution, dates, metadata and integrity.
A short message such as “approved” may have multiple commercial meanings.
The complete conversation and underlying transaction should be examined before inferring criminal intent from an isolated message.
Deleting emails or messages after learning of an investigation can create serious evidentiary complications.
A preservation policy should be implemented promptly.
Do not retrospectively create board resolutions, payment approvals or internal policies and present them as historical documents.
Any explanatory document prepared after discovery of the fraud should be identified accurately as a later-created analysis.
A forensic accountant can reconstruct suspicious transactions, identify unauthorized payments and distinguish legitimate commercial transactions from fraudulent ones.
This can be particularly valuable where prosecutors initially treat several managers as suspects.
Where accounting software or banking systems contain technical logs, expert analysis may help determine which account, device or user performed the disputed action.
Signing authority alone does not necessarily establish participation.
Investigators should identify which director actually approved the transaction and what information was available at the time.
The foreign director should document the company’s actual management structure.
Employment contracts, organizational charts, delegations and correspondence may demonstrate that daily financial operations were handled locally.
If the director was abroad when key transactions occurred, travel and location records may help reconstruct the facts.
Physical absence alone does not automatically exclude involvement, particularly where electronic approval was possible, but it can be relevant.
An accountant accused of fraud may claim that management instructed or approved the conduct.
Such allegations should be tested against objective evidence including banking records, emails, messages, corporate authority and financial benefit.
Where another suspect seeks to reduce personal responsibility by blaming a director, motive and consistency should be examined carefully.
Objective financial and digital evidence becomes particularly important.
Depending on the alleged offense and investigation, financial measures may potentially affect company or personal assets.
Any freezing or seizure measure should be examined according to its legal basis, scope and continuing necessity.
Potential asset measures depend on the offense, evidence and applicable criminal procedure.
A director should not assume that corporate allegations automatically justify measures against all personal property.
Judicial-control measures may potentially include restrictions affecting travel depending on the circumstances.
Foreign directors facing such measures should evaluate the legal basis and available objection mechanisms promptly.
Serious financial investigations can involve detention or requests for arrest where statutory requirements are considered satisfied.
The seriousness of the allegation alone should not replace an individualized assessment of the applicable procedural requirements.
This is the central principle for directors facing allegations arising from employee misconduct.
The investigation should establish what the individual director personally did, knew, intended or assisted. Corporate position alone should not substitute for proof of the elements of the alleged offense.
The file should include the director’s job description, corporate authority, delegation structure, banking permissions, relevant correspondence, travel records where applicable, approval procedures and evidence identifying who actually controlled the disputed transactions.
Do not defend a complex fraud case using only a general statement that “the accountant was responsible.”
Create a transaction-by-transaction matrix identifying date, amount, recipient, initiator, supporting invoice, approver, bank account and alleged irregularity.
If the accountant caused financial loss, the company may need to evaluate criminal complaint, restitution and civil recovery strategies.
Asset preservation may become important if misappropriated funds can still be traced.
Depending on the company’s policies, employee dishonesty, crime or other relevant coverage may potentially be available.
Notice requirements should be checked promptly.
Companies should review payment approval, supplier onboarding, segregation of duties, banking access and accounting-system permissions.
Correcting weaknesses is commercially important, but later improvements should not be presented as proof that historical management committed a crime.
When an accountant’s fraud leads to a Turkish criminal investigation, foreign directors should immediately determine their procedural status, identify the specific transactions under investigation, preserve financial and digital evidence, secure accounting-system logs, map banking authority, document the corporate delegation structure, avoid altering records, analyze any personal financial connection with the transactions and prepare an individualized defense before giving detailed explanations.
No. The director’s own conduct, knowledge, intent and alleged participation must be assessed individually.
Not automatically. Investigators should determine what the director knew about the transaction and whether the approval was connected with intentional criminal conduct.
The original document and genuine comparison signatures should be preserved, and forensic examination may become relevant.
The allegation should be compared with objective evidence such as bank records, emails, accounting logs, messages and financial flows.
No. Management or compliance failures should not automatically be equated with intentional participation in a fraud offense. The elements of the specific alleged crime must be established.
Potentially. User logs, timestamps and technical records can provide important evidence, although attribution should be analyzed carefully.
A foreign suspect who cannot adequately understand the proceedings should ensure that the applicable interpretation rights are respected.
Potentially, depending on the alleged offense, evidence and legal basis of the requested measure. The scope and necessity of the measure may require separate legal examination.
A properly structured internal investigation can help preserve evidence and identify the actual transaction flow, particularly where fraud involves multiple employees or accounts.
The defense should reconstruct the actual decision-making and financial chain with objective evidence. Corporate title alone does not explain who created a false invoice, initiated a transfer, controlled an account, received the money or acted with criminal intent.
Financial crime investigations involving foreign-owned companies can expose directors to police and prosecutor statements, digital evidence examination, bank-account analysis, asset measures, travel restrictions and allegations arising from employee misconduct. Fırat Fesih Kaya Law Office assists foreign company directors, investors and international businesses facing criminal investigations in Turkey. Lawyer Fırat Fesih Kaya provides legal assistance in analyzing director-specific criminal liability, preparing statements and defense evidence, reviewing banking and accounting records, challenging seizure and judicial-control measures and coordinating corporate responses to internal fraud investigations.
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+90 312 434 22 22
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+90 532 769 22 22
Email:
info@firatfesihkaya.av.tr
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Mevlana Boulevard No:221, Yıldırım Tower, Office No:148, 06520 Balgat, Çankaya, Ankara, Turkey