

A foreign company discovers employee, manager or partner fraud in Turkey months later. Learn when a criminal complaint may still be filed, how limitation periods work, what evidence should be preserved and how company losses may be recovered.
Foreign companies sometimes discover internal fraud in their Turkish operations only months—or even years—after the suspicious transaction occurred. The problem may emerge during an internal audit, management change, shareholder dispute, accounting review or investigation of unusual bank transfers. A former manager may have transferred company money to related parties, an employee may have created false invoices, a director may have diverted customer payments, or company assets may have been transferred without authorization.
Discovering the conduct months later does not automatically mean that it is too late to pursue criminal proceedings in Turkey. The decisive questions include the potential criminal offense, whether prosecution depends on a complaint, when the company learned of the conduct and offender, the applicable limitation rules, whether the conduct consisted of multiple transactions and whether the relevant evidence can still be preserved.
Sophisticated internal fraud is rarely recorded in the company’s accounts as “fraud.” Suspicious transactions may initially appear as consulting payments, supplier invoices, expense reimbursements, loans, advances, commissions or ordinary transfers.
The problem may only become visible when new management compares bank records with contracts and accounting entries.
Not necessarily.
Turkish criminal procedure does not impose one universal deadline applicable to every form of corporate fraud. The applicable time limits depend on the criminal characterization of the conduct and whether prosecution of that particular offense requires a formal complaint.
The company should therefore avoid assuming that six months, one year or another period automatically ends every criminal remedy.
“Internal fraud” is a commercial description rather than a single criminal offense.
Depending on the facts, conduct may potentially raise issues concerning fraud, aggravated fraud, breach of trust, forgery, misuse of company documents, manipulation of accounting records, unauthorized access to information systems or other offenses.
Correct legal characterization is essential because different offenses may involve different prosecution requirements and limitation consequences.
For offenses whose prosecution depends on a complaint, Turkish criminal law contains specific complaint-period rules. The date on which the legally relevant person or entity learned of both the act and the person responsible can become particularly important.
The precise offense should therefore be determined before calculating any complaint deadline.
These are separate concepts.
A complaint period may apply to certain offenses requiring a complaint, while criminal prosecution is also subject to statutory limitation rules determined according to the offense and applicable penalty framework.
A company should not calculate one period and assume that every other procedural issue has been resolved.
The discovery date can become disputed.
Record when the suspicious activity was first identified, who identified it, what information was available at that time and when the suspected perpetrator became identifiable.
Internal audit reports, emails, board minutes and investigation memoranda can help establish the chronology.
A company may notice an unusual transfer without initially knowing whether it was unauthorized or who was responsible.
Later investigation may reveal access logs, approval records or bank instructions identifying the person involved.
The factual chronology should therefore be documented carefully rather than reduced to a single arbitrary “discovery date.”
This can become important where different managers or corporate bodies learned of the conduct at different times.
The company’s representation structure and the position of the suspected perpetrator should be examined, particularly where senior management itself is implicated.
Internal fraud involving a manager creates additional difficulties because the individual who normally represents the company may be the person under investigation.
Corporate authority to appoint counsel, make decisions and represent the company should therefore be reviewed immediately.
Depending on the company’s legal form and representation structure, corporate resolutions may be required to authorize legal action, appoint representatives or manage conflicts of interest.
Corporate governance and criminal strategy should be coordinated from the beginning.
Bank records are frequently central to internal fraud investigations.
The company should identify transfers, beneficiaries, dates, amounts, payment descriptions and approval mechanisms.
Do not review only the transaction that initially triggered suspicion. Look for recurring patterns.
Prepare a transaction map showing:
company account → recipient → related company or individual → subsequent transfers where identifiable.
This can reveal whether an apparently isolated payment forms part of a broader scheme.
Payments to companies controlled by employees, directors, relatives or business associates deserve particular scrutiny.
Corporate ownership and commercial relationships should be investigated before assuming that a supplier was independent.
General ledgers, journals, invoices, expense records, purchase orders and accounting-system logs should be preserved.
The criminal complaint will generally be stronger if suspicious bank transactions can be compared with the company’s accounting treatment.
An invoice does not prove that the underlying service was genuinely provided.
Where invoices are suspicious, investigate the contract, purchase order, delivery records, emails, work product and payment authorization.
Internal schemes sometimes use shell or related companies.
Verify the supplier’s corporate identity, ownership, address, business activity and relationship with company personnel.
Email correspondence, authorized business messaging and internal approval communications can help demonstrate how a transaction was initiated and approved.
Preserve original electronic data rather than relying only on screenshots.
The company should avoid modifying, deleting or casually exporting potentially important data in ways that destroy metadata.
Where substantial digital evidence exists, forensic preservation may be appropriate.
Accounting software, online banking, ERP systems and corporate platforms may record who created, approved or modified a transaction.
These records can be particularly valuable where several employees deny responsibility.
If relevant physical events occurred recently enough for surveillance recordings to exist, preservation should be requested immediately.
Many systems overwrite old footage automatically.
Internal interviews can provide valuable information, but they should be planned strategically.
Prematurely confronting the suspected employee may lead to deletion of evidence, coordination of explanations or movement of assets.
An unusual transaction is not automatically fraud.
The company should distinguish poor management, contractual disputes, accounting mistakes and unauthorized criminal conduct.
A criminal complaint should be based on identifiable facts and evidence.
Termination or resignation does not prevent investigation of conduct allegedly committed during employment.
Preserve personnel files, job descriptions, authority documents and system-access information.
Leaving office does not automatically eliminate potential criminal responsibility for earlier conduct.
The relevant question is what the person allegedly did, when it occurred and whether the legal elements of an offense can be established.
Company property should be distinguished from a shareholder’s personal property.
A shareholder’s economic interest in a company does not automatically authorize personal use of corporate funds.
The company’s legal form, authority structure and transaction should be analyzed carefully.
A manager may have formal authority to sign for the company while still being required to exercise that authority for legitimate corporate purposes.
The existence of signature authority should therefore not end the investigation into whether a transaction was abusive.
Internal fraud frequently consists of repeated transfers over months or years.
Do not examine only the final payment. Create a chronology of every suspicious transaction.
The criminal characterization and limitation analysis may depend on the structure of the conduct.
Possibly, depending on the facts and legal characterization.
Repeated transactions involving the same method should be analyzed collectively and individually. The company should not assume that the date of the first transaction determines every deadline.
A useful complaint should explain the corporate structure, suspected person’s role, authority, disputed transactions, discovery chronology, financial loss and available evidence.
It should identify relevant bank, accounting and digital records as clearly as possible.
Thousands of pages of bank statements without explanation can obscure the core allegation.
Prepare a chronological transaction table and connect each suspicious payment with supporting documents.
During a criminal investigation, prosecutors and courts may use procedural mechanisms available under Turkish criminal law to obtain relevant evidence where legal conditions are satisfied.
The complaint should identify the accounts, transactions and persons that require investigation as precisely as reasonably possible.
Where suspected proceeds have been transferred to other accounts or converted into assets, tracing can become important.
Speed matters because funds can be transferred repeatedly or moved outside Turkey.
Turkish criminal procedure contains seizure and protective mechanisms that may be relevant where their statutory conditions are satisfied.
Such measures are not automatic merely because a criminal complaint is filed. The factual and legal requirements must be demonstrated.
Not always.
A company needs enough evidence to make a responsible allegation, but waiting months for a perfect forensic report can create risks concerning deadlines, disappearing evidence and movement of assets.
A staged strategy may sometimes be more appropriate.
The company can preserve and organize internal records while prosecutors investigate evidence outside the company’s direct control.
Coordination is important to avoid damaging evidence or creating contradictory explanations.
Criminal proceedings and financial recovery should be considered together but should not be treated as identical.
Depending on the circumstances, the company may also need civil, commercial or enforcement remedies to recover losses.
Where assets are at risk of disappearing, available civil protective measures should be evaluated promptly.
The appropriate remedy depends on the nature of the claim and evidence.
A contractual disagreement or unpaid commercial debt does not automatically constitute fraud.
The criminal complaint should identify conduct satisfying the elements of a criminal offense rather than attempting to convert every commercial dispute into a criminal case.
If the victim is a foreign group with a Turkish subsidiary, determine which legal entity actually suffered the loss.
The parent company’s economic loss and the subsidiary’s direct legal loss may not always be identical.
Foreign companies should ensure that the person instructing Turkish counsel has authority to act for the relevant legal entity.
Corporate documents and representation records may need to be prepared for use in Turkey.
Foreign contracts, audit reports, correspondence and accounting records may require accurate translation.
Technical financial terminology should be translated consistently to prevent misunderstanding.
The fact that a suspect is abroad does not necessarily prevent a Turkish criminal investigation where Turkish jurisdiction exists.
The available procedural mechanisms will depend on the offense, evidence, nationality, location and stage of proceedings.
International transfers can complicate tracing and recovery.
The company should preserve SWIFT information, beneficiary details, intermediary-bank information and foreign account data available in its records.
Companies with crime, fidelity, cyber or other potentially relevant insurance should review notification requirements promptly.
Missing a contractual notification requirement can create a separate coverage dispute.
Internal fraud may also expose failures by accountants, external service providers, payment processors or other parties.
Their potential responsibility should be examined separately from the criminal liability of the suspected perpetrator.
Once one fraudulent transaction is discovered, investigate whether the same person used similar methods elsewhere.
Search for repeated beneficiaries, round-number payments, duplicate invoices, unusual weekend transfers, split payments and transactions just below approval thresholds.
Limit access to sensitive investigation materials.
If senior personnel are implicated, ordinary reporting lines may be inappropriate.
The company should structure communications with its lawyers carefully and distinguish legal investigation materials from ordinary commercial correspondence.
Create a transaction-by-transaction schedule identifying principal loss, dates, recipients and supporting records.
Do not inflate the criminal complaint with speculative losses that cannot be connected to the alleged conduct.
Foreign headquarters may hold important accounting, server or email records.
Begin preservation immediately and coordinate collection so that Turkish counsel can identify which evidence is relevant to the complaint.
Act now.
The company should determine the suspected offenses, calculate any applicable complaint and limitation periods, document when the misconduct and responsible persons were discovered, preserve evidence and evaluate whether urgent asset-protection measures are needed.
Further delay rarely improves the company’s position.
A foreign company discovering internal fraud in Turkey should treat the matter simultaneously as a criminal investigation, evidence-preservation project, asset-recovery problem and corporate-governance issue.
Fırat Fesih Kaya Law Office recommends creating a controlled chronology covering the suspected transactions, persons involved, discovery dates, evidence and financial losses. Lawyer Fırat Fesih Kaya emphasizes that the legal analysis should be completed before assuming that a complaint is time-barred merely because the fraudulent conduct occurred months earlier.
Not necessarily. The answer depends on the suspected offense, whether prosecution requires a complaint, when the legally relevant facts and perpetrator became known, and applicable limitation rules.
No. A six-month complaint period is relevant to offenses whose prosecution depends on a complaint, but not every corporate fraud allegation is governed in exactly the same way. The specific offense must first be identified.
Not necessarily. For complaint-dependent offenses, knowledge of the act and perpetrator can be important. The precise facts should be analyzed individually.
Yes. Resignation or termination does not prevent investigation of alleged criminal conduct committed previously.
Potentially, depending on the person’s authority, conduct, intent and the circumstances of the transactions.
Usually not by themselves. They should be combined with contracts, invoices, accounting records, authorization information and other evidence showing why the transfers were allegedly unlawful.
Potentially. Their lawfulness, authenticity and evidentiary integrity should be preserved carefully.
Potentially. International transfers make tracing more complicated but do not automatically prevent investigation.
Not necessarily. The company should balance the need for a properly supported allegation against procedural deadlines, evidence loss and asset-dissipation risks.
Preserve the evidence, identify every suspicious transaction, determine when the company discovered the conduct and suspected perpetrator, obtain a Turkish criminal-law assessment of the possible offenses and applicable deadlines, and evaluate asset-protection measures before additional funds or evidence disappear.
Internal fraud involving a Turkish subsidiary, employee, director, manager or business partner can require simultaneous action concerning criminal complaints, bank transfers, digital evidence, accounting records, asset tracing, protective measures and financial recovery. Fırat Fesih Kaya Law Office assists foreign companies and international investors investigating suspected internal fraud and unauthorized corporate transactions in Turkey. Lawyer Fırat Fesih Kaya provides legal assistance in preparing criminal complaints, preserving financial and digital evidence, coordinating internal investigations, evaluating urgent asset-protection measures and pursuing recovery strategies against responsible persons.
Phone:
+90 312 434 22 22
Mobile:
+90 532 769 22 22
Email:
info@firatfesihkaya.av.tr
Address:
Mevlana Boulevard No:221, Yıldırım Tower, Office No:148, 06520 Balgat, Çankaya, Ankara, Turkey