

A foreign shareholder in a Turkish company is pressured to sell shares below market value. Learn about valuation, shareholder rights, invalid resolutions, abuse of majority power, injunctions, compensation claims and emergency legal remedies in Turkey.
A foreign shareholder in a Turkish company may sometimes face pressure from majority shareholders, directors, business partners or other investors to sell shares substantially below their real economic value. The pressure may take different forms: exclusion from management, withholding financial information, preventing dividend distributions, diluting the shareholder’s position, transferring valuable company assets, creating artificial company liabilities or threatening corporate actions unless the shareholder accepts a discounted sale. Turkish law does not generally require a shareholder to surrender shares merely because another shareholder wants to acquire them. Company shares also constitute economically protected property interests, and Turkish constitutional jurisprudence recognizes the proprietary nature of shareholdings.
The legal strategy depends heavily on whether the company is a joint-stock company or limited liability company, the percentage held by the foreign investor, the articles of association, any shareholders’ agreement and the precise conduct being used to force the sale.
Ordinarily, another shareholder cannot simply determine an artificially low price and compel a foreign shareholder to transfer ownership merely because the majority wants the shares.
However, particular statutory mechanisms, corporate transactions, contractual arrangements or court proceedings can create situations in which shares may be purchased, transferred or valued under specific rules.
The first question should therefore be whether the alleged compulsory sale has an actual legal or contractual basis.
A shareholder facing intense negotiations should avoid signing a share-transfer agreement, release, settlement or resignation without understanding the consequences.
Once the transaction has closed and payment has been accepted, recovering the shares can become substantially more complicated.
One of the most important steps is determining what the shares are actually worth.
A company’s registered capital rarely represents the real economic value of its shares. Depending on the business, valuation may require examination of assets, liabilities, cash flow, profitability, intellectual property, real estate, subsidiaries, contracts, customer relationships and future earnings.
A majority shareholder may argue that shares should be sold according to nominal capital or balance-sheet equity.
That approach may substantially undervalue a profitable operating company.
A proper valuation should reflect the characteristics of the company and the legal context in which valuation is required.
Before accepting a buyout proposal, determine whether the company owns valuable assets that are not properly reflected in the proposed price.
These may include:
real estate;
trademarks and patents;
licenses;
valuable contractual rights;
subsidiary shares;
receivables;
cash;
investment assets;
or property held through related companies.
Valuation should not be artificially inflated either.
Tax liabilities, litigation, bank debt, guarantees, employee liabilities and other obligations may affect the company’s real value.
The objective should be a defensible economic valuation rather than simply the highest possible number.
A particularly important warning sign is the transfer of valuable company assets to another company controlled by the majority shareholder shortly before a low-price share purchase proposal.
Review related-party transactions carefully.
A controlling shareholder may operate several businesses and shift revenue, customers, employees, contracts or assets among them.
Where such transactions damage the company or minority shareholder, they may raise corporate-law and liability issues beyond the share-price dispute itself.
Turkish company law contains protections addressing unlawful use of corporate control in company groups. Constitutional Court materials discussing Article 202 of the Turkish Commercial Code note that unlawful exercise of control causing loss to a dependent company can generate compensation mechanisms and, in appropriate circumstances, mechanisms involving purchase of shareholders’ shares or other suitable remedies.
Whether these provisions apply requires examination of the actual control relationship and transaction.
Foreign investors frequently hold shares pursuant to a shareholders’ agreement containing detailed exit provisions.
Check carefully for:
put options;
call options;
drag-along rights;
tag-along rights;
deadlock provisions;
valuation formulas;
good-leaver and bad-leaver provisions;
reserved matters;
pre-emption rights;
right-of-first-refusal provisions;
and dispute-resolution clauses.
The contractual valuation mechanism may be central to the dispute.
Do not assume that the shareholders’ agreement and articles of association contain identical rights.
Both documents should be analyzed, together with mandatory provisions of Turkish corporate law.
Sometimes the alleged “forced sale” is actually based on a contractual call option.
The shareholder should examine whether the triggering event occurred, whether the option was exercised within the required period and whether the proposed valuation follows the agreed formula.
A foreign shareholder who is also an executive may be told that termination of employment automatically requires sale of the shares at nominal value.
Whether that position is enforceable depends on the corporate documents, contractual arrangements and circumstances surrounding termination.
The employment dispute and shareholder dispute should therefore be analyzed together.
Holding a majority of voting rights does not mean that every decision is automatically lawful.
General meeting and board decisions remain subject to applicable statutory, procedural and corporate requirements.
If the pressure campaign includes questionable general meeting resolutions, obtain the resolutions and meeting minutes immediately.
Applicable challenge periods can be strict, so corporate decisions should be reviewed as soon as they are adopted.
Where appropriate, objections made during shareholder meetings should be properly documented.
This can become important where later remedies depend on how the shareholder responded to a particular corporate action.
A shareholder cannot evaluate a buyout proposal intelligently without understanding the company’s financial condition.
Where legally available, shareholder information and inspection rights can therefore become an important part of the defense strategy.
Relevant information may include financial statements, management reports, related-party transactions, significant contracts, bank liabilities and corporate resolutions.
The precise information rights depend on the type of company and circumstances.
A shareholder may be told:
“Sell your shares cheaply or you will never receive another dividend.”
Repeated withholding of distributions while controlling shareholders extract value through salaries, related-party payments or other mechanisms deserves careful legal and financial examination.
Where majority shareholders are also directors or managers, investigate whether disproportionate salaries, bonuses, consulting fees or related-party payments are reducing company profits.
Such payments may directly affect both dividend rights and company valuation.
Another pressure mechanism can involve increasing capital in circumstances where the minority shareholder cannot participate.
A capital increase is not automatically unlawful merely because it dilutes an existing shareholder. However, the purpose, procedure, subscription rights and surrounding circumstances should be reviewed where dilution appears designed primarily to force an exit.
Keep emails, messages, meeting invitations, shareholder proposals, valuation reports, draft agreements and corporate correspondence.
Oral threats should be documented contemporaneously where legally appropriate.
Significant shareholder disputes should be documented through formal corporate and legal channels.
Informal communications may be useful evidence, but they should not replace formal notices where rights and deadlines are involved.
If there is an immediate risk that assets will be transferred, corporate control will be irreversibly altered or disputed transactions will be completed, interim judicial protection may need to be considered.
The appropriate measure depends on the underlying claim and urgency.
If company assets are being rapidly sold to related parties, waiting until completion of the share-price negotiations can be dangerous.
Preserve registry, banking, accounting and contractual evidence as quickly as legally possible.
A shareholder who is also a director or manager may be asked to resign as a condition of negotiations.
Resignation can alter access to company information and practical leverage.
The consequences should be analyzed before signing.
Share-purchase documents frequently contain provisions releasing the buyer, company, directors and affiliates from existing claims.
A shareholder who believes company value has been diverted should carefully investigate potential claims before accepting a comprehensive waiver.
Corporate shares have economic value and fall within the sphere of property protection recognized by Turkish constitutional jurisprudence.
This does not mean that every commercial disagreement becomes a constitutional case, but it reinforces the legal significance of ownership interests in shares.
Where the investment is in a Turkish limited liability company, exit and removal mechanisms differ from those applicable to joint-stock companies.
The articles of association and Turkish Commercial Code provisions should therefore be reviewed specifically for the company type.
A particularly important recent development concerns two-shareholder limited companies. In a decision announced on 17 March 2026, the Constitutional Court addressed rules that effectively prevented one shareholder in certain two-shareholder limited companies from initiating the statutory mechanism for removal of the other shareholder because the necessary general meeting majority could not be achieved. The Court found the relevant rules unconstitutional insofar as they applied to two-shareholder limited companies.
This development can be highly relevant where a foreign investor is involved in a 50/50 or otherwise deadlocked two-shareholder limited company.
A shareholder may be told that because the company cannot make decisions, the only solution is to sell at whatever price the other shareholder offers.
That is not necessarily correct.
Deadlock provisions in the articles, shareholders’ agreement and statutory remedies should be examined before accepting a discounted sale.
Turkish corporate law contains mechanisms under which serious shareholder conflicts may ultimately lead to judicial remedies involving dissolution or other appropriate solutions depending on company type and circumstances.
The economic consequences should be evaluated before using dissolution litigation merely as negotiating pressure.
If litigation requires determination of the real value of shares, financial expert examination may become important.
Accounting records should therefore be preserved before disputed transactions materially alter the company’s financial position.
Depending on the company, valuation may involve:
discounted cash flow;
comparable-company analysis;
transaction multiples;
net asset value;
adjusted book value;
or another accepted methodology.
No single method is automatically correct for every company.
A buyer may attempt to apply a substantial minority discount simply because the shareholder lacks control.
Whether such a discount is appropriate depends heavily on the valuation context, contractual provisions and legal mechanism requiring valuation.
It should not be accepted automatically.
A shareholder should not accept the argument that being foreign makes corporate rights weaker.
The applicable rights arise from Turkish company law, corporate documents, contractual arrangements and other relevant legislation.
International shareholders’ agreements frequently contain arbitration clauses.
Before filing proceedings in a Turkish court, determine whether the dispute must be submitted to arbitration and whether emergency or interim relief can be sought.
A shareholder dispute can involve several parallel issues:
corporate resolutions;
share valuation;
director liability;
contractual breaches;
information rights;
asset transfers;
and urgent interim protection.
The dispute should therefore be mapped before proceedings are started.
Commissioning an independent valuation can substantially change negotiations.
Instead of arguing that the proposed price “feels too low,” the shareholder can identify specific undervalued assets, normalized earnings and comparable transaction values.
Earlier investment rounds, bank financing, investor presentations and prior share transfers may contain useful evidence concerning historical company value.
Large unexplained differences between recent valuations and the current buyout proposal deserve investigation.
Determine whether another shareholder recently bought or sold shares at a substantially higher valuation.
The circumstances may not be identical, but the transaction can provide relevant evidence.
If directors or controlling shareholders are effectively negotiating against the company or benefiting from related-party transactions, conflicts should be identified and documented.
Where directors or managers breach duties and cause loss to the company or shareholders, liability claims may arise depending on the specific conduct and legal requirements.
A share-sale negotiation should therefore not be viewed in isolation from potential management liability.
Pressure tactics often include extremely short deadlines:
“Sign today or the offer disappears.”
“Transfer the shares this week or we will dilute you.”
“Accept nominal value or you will receive nothing.”
The legal validity of the threatened action should be investigated independently.
Another shareholder is generally free to make a commercially unattractive offer.
The legal problem arises when unlawful corporate conduct, breach of contract, abuse of rights, misleading information or other actionable pressure is used to force acceptance.
That distinction is important.
Litigation is not always the only solution.
Once the foreign shareholder has access to reliable information and a defensible valuation, negotiations can address price, payment security, escrow, representations, tax allocation, releases and post-closing liabilities.
If the buyer proposes installments, the seller should assess appropriate security.
Depending on the transaction, mechanisms may include bank guarantees, escrow arrangements, pledges or other contractual protections.
A foreign shareholder should carefully coordinate the transfer mechanics with payment.
Recovering an unpaid purchase price after ownership has already transferred can create an entirely different dispute.
A foreign shareholder pressured to sell below market value should immediately obtain the articles of association and shareholders’ agreement, preserve corporate and financial records, document threats or pressure, identify recent related-party transactions, obtain an independent valuation, review unlawful resolutions and applicable challenge periods, examine information rights, investigate dilution or asset-stripping risks, consider urgent interim protection and avoid signing transfer or release documents before the legal and financial position is understood.
Not simply because the majority wants to acquire the shares. Any claimed compulsory transfer mechanism must have a valid statutory or contractual basis.
The applicable valuation standard depends on the legal mechanism, company type and contractual arrangements. A proposed nominal or book-value price should not automatically be treated as the legally correct value.
Related-party transfers and transactions that reduce company value should be investigated promptly and may raise separate corporate-law and liability issues.
Potentially, depending on the decision, legal grounds and applicable procedural requirements. Relevant deadlines should be checked immediately.
Capital increases can legitimately dilute shareholders who do not participate, but the legal basis, procedure, subscription rights and purpose should be reviewed where the transaction appears abusive.
Turkish company law provides shareholder information mechanisms, although their scope and procedure depend on the type of company and circumstances.
Potentially, where the requirements for interim judicial protection are satisfied and urgent action is necessary to prevent serious or difficult-to-reverse consequences.
The corporate deadlock and available remedies require special analysis. The Constitutional Court announced an important 2026 decision concerning removal mechanisms in two-shareholder limited companies.
Not automatically. Resignation can affect access to information and the shareholder’s practical position, so its consequences should be assessed first.
Do not negotiate only over the price offered by the majority shareholder. First determine the company’s real economic value and investigate whether corporate actions, related-party transactions, information restrictions or dilution measures are artificially reducing the apparent value of the foreign shareholder’s investment.
Foreign shareholder disputes can involve below-market buyout pressure, minority shareholder rights, company valuation, deadlock, dilution, related-party transactions, asset stripping, invalid corporate resolutions, director liability and urgent injunction proceedings.
Fırat Fesih Kaya Law Office assists foreign investors and international shareholders facing shareholder disputes, forced-exit pressure and corporate-control conflicts in Turkey. Lawyer Fırat Fesih Kaya provides legal assistance in reviewing shareholder agreements and corporate records, protecting minority shareholder rights, coordinating company valuations, challenging disputed corporate actions, seeking interim judicial protection and negotiating or litigating shareholder exits.
Phone: +90 312 434 22 22
Mobile: +90 532 769 22 22
Email: info@firatfesihkaya.av.tr
Address: Mevlana Boulevard No:221, Yıldırım Tower, Office No:148, 06520 Balgat, Çankaya, Ankara, Turkey