

Foreign investor discovers a Turkish company director has established a competing business? Learn about Article 396, non-compete obligations, director liability, customer diversion, recovery of profits, injunctions and minority shareholder protection.
A foreign investor who discovers that a director of a Turkish company has secretly established a competing business may face serious legal and financial risks involving conflicts of interest, customer diversion, misuse of confidential information, loss of corporate opportunities, and the protection of shareholder investments.
Foreign investors frequently establish Turkish companies with local business partners, appoint directors to manage daily operations, and rely on those directors to develop commercial relationships.
However, disputes may arise when a director begins operating a separate business in the same industry.
For example, a foreign shareholder may discover that the managing director of a Turkish manufacturing company has established another company supplying identical products to the same customers.
In another case, the director may secretly become involved in a competing distribution business while continuing to negotiate contracts on behalf of the original company.
More serious situations may involve the transfer of customers, employees, suppliers, intellectual property, confidential pricing information, or commercial opportunities to the competing enterprise.
The foreign investor may discover that sales have declined while the director’s newly established business has begun generating substantial revenue.
These circumstances raise important legal questions.
Can a director establish another company while serving on the board of a Turkish business? Does the director need shareholder approval? Can the original company recover profits earned through competing transactions? Can the director be removed? Can the foreign shareholder request an injunction or compensation?
Article 396 of the Turkish Commercial Code No. 6102 establishes a statutory prohibition against specified competitive activities by joint stock company board members without general assembly authorization.
The provision also grants the company important remedies, including compensation and certain claims concerning transactions conducted in violation of the prohibition.
For limited liability companies, Article 626 establishes separate duties of care, loyalty, and noncompetition for managers.
However, not every investment in another business automatically constitutes prohibited competition.
The legal consequences depend on the director’s corporate position, the competing activities, applicable permissions, and whether the conduct falls within the relevant statutory prohibition.
The distinction between establishing a company, becoming a shareholder, serving as a director, and actively conducting competing transactions is particularly important.
This guide explains how foreign investors can investigate suspected director competition, protect company assets, recover losses, and pursue legal remedies under the 2026 Turkish legal framework.
Potentially, but statutory restrictions may apply.
A director is not automatically prohibited from holding every investment in another company.
However, Article 396 restricts specified competitive activities by joint stock company board members.
The director cannot engage in commercial transactions falling within the company’s business scope on their own behalf or for another person without the required general assembly authorization.
The provision also addresses participation in another company as an unlimited-liability partner.
The foreign investor must examine the director’s actual activities rather than relying solely on the existence of another registered company.
Article 396 establishes important noncompetition obligations for joint stock company board members.
Under Article 396(1), a board member cannot, without general assembly authorization, conduct commercial transactions falling within the company’s business scope on their own behalf or on behalf of another person.
The provision also restricts participation as an unlimited-liability partner in another company operating in the same type of commercial business.
Where the prohibition is violated, the company may seek compensation or exercise specified alternative rights concerning the competing transactions.
However, the statutory conditions must be established.
The existence of a competing company does not automatically determine the appropriate remedy.
For activities falling within Article 396, general assembly authorization is required.
For example, a board member who intends to conduct transactions within the company’s business scope for another business may need authorization.
However, the scope of the authorization matters.
A general assembly resolution permitting specified competitive activities may affect the legal analysis.
The director should not assume that informal approval from the majority shareholder is automatically equivalent to the required corporate authorization.
The relevant resolution and its scope must be examined.
Not automatically.
Article 396 refers to authorization by the general assembly.
A majority shareholder’s private approval does not necessarily satisfy that requirement.
For example, the majority shareholder may verbally permit a director to establish a competing company.
However, the legal effect depends on whether a valid general assembly authorization exists.
The foreign minority shareholder should examine the corporate records.
The existence of informal consent does not automatically establish compliance with Article 396.
Potentially.
Passive ownership of shares in another company must be distinguished from actively conducting competing transactions.
For example, a director may hold a small investment in a publicly traded competitor without participating in its management.
That situation may differ from establishing and operating a competing business.
Article 396 must be interpreted according to its statutory wording and the actual activities involved.
Other loyalty or conflict-of-interest duties may also require consideration.
A foreign shareholder should not assume that every shareholding in another business automatically violates the statutory noncompetition prohibition.
Potentially, but serious legal risks may arise.
Serving in the management of two companies operating in the same market may create conflicts of interest.
The director may participate in commercial transactions falling within the scope of Article 396.
The legal analysis must examine the director’s actual duties and activities.
For example, a person managing sales and customer negotiations for competing businesses may face different legal consequences from a passive investor.
The relevant corporate authorization and loyalty obligations must be examined.
The existence of another company operating in the same industry is an important factual circumstance.
However, the legal consequences depend on the activities actually conducted.
For example, a director may register a new company but not commence commercial operations.
Alternatively, the director may actively transfer customers and contracts to that business.
The second situation may provide stronger evidence of prohibited competition.
The foreign investor should examine incorporation records, commercial transactions, customer relationships, and management activities.
Not necessarily.
The legal analysis concerns whether the activities fall within the relevant company’s business scope and constitute competition under the applicable framework.
For example, two businesses may offer similar services to the same customer group without using identical product descriptions.
However, operating in broadly related industries does not automatically establish prohibited competition.
The actual commercial activities must be compared.
The court may examine the products, services, customers, geographic markets, and transaction records.
Potentially, but the legal consequences depend on the actual arrangement.
For example, a director may allegedly establish a competing company in the name of a spouse or relative.
The company may formally belong to another person while the director allegedly controls its operations.
However, family ownership alone does not establish prohibited competition.
The foreign investor must identify evidence connecting the director to the competing activities.
Relevant evidence may include management decisions, financial transactions, customer communications, and actual control.
Potentially.
A director may participate in a business formally owned by another shareholder or business associate.
However, the legal analysis must focus on the director’s actual conduct.
For example, a director may negotiate contracts for the competing business while remaining responsible for the original company’s commercial operations.
Where the activities fall within Article 396, the company may possess statutory remedies.
However, the relationship between the director and the other shareholder must be established.
Customer diversion may create serious legal consequences.
For example, a director may encourage existing customers to terminate contracts with the original company and purchase the same products from the competing business.
The conduct may violate statutory noncompetition or loyalty obligations.
However, not every customer choosing another supplier establishes unlawful diversion.
The company must examine whether the director used their position, confidential information, or corporate opportunities improperly.
Evidence of deliberate interference may be important.
A director cannot automatically transfer company contracts to another business without the relevant legal authority.
The validity of a contractual transfer depends on the applicable contract and statutory requirements.
For example, a director may allegedly persuade customers to cancel existing agreements and sign new contracts with the competing company.
The company may possess claims where the conduct violates applicable duties or contractual rights.
However, the legal consequences depend on the specific transactions.
Potentially, but the conduct may create liability.
For example, a director may receive a customer inquiry intended for the original company and direct the opportunity to their competing business.
The legal analysis may involve Article 396 and the director’s duty of loyalty.
However, not every commercial opportunity belongs automatically to the company.
The court must examine the director’s duties, the nature of the opportunity, and the surrounding circumstances.
A claim requires a legally sufficient basis.
Unauthorized use of confidential customer information may create legal consequences.
For example, a director may copy customer databases and use them to market products through another company.
The conduct may implicate corporate loyalty duties, trade secret protection, and unfair competition rules.
However, not every customer name or publicly available business contact automatically constitutes protected confidential information.
The company must identify the information and the alleged misuse.
The circumstances must be examined.
Potentially, but unauthorized use may violate applicable duties.
A director may possess access to internal pricing structures, supplier discounts, and customer negotiations.
Using confidential information to benefit a competing company may cause financial harm.
However, the company must establish that the information was protected and improperly used.
The legal analysis may involve corporate duties and unfair competition provisions.
Evidence concerning access, disclosure, and subsequent transactions may be important.
Employees may lawfully change employers under the applicable employment framework.
However, a director’s deliberate recruitment of employees for a competing business may raise legal concerns depending on the circumstances.
For example, the director may use confidential information or induce employees to breach valid contractual obligations.
However, ordinary recruitment is not automatically unlawful.
The company must identify the particular misconduct and applicable legal basis.
A supplier may generally choose its commercial partners subject to existing contractual obligations.
However, a director may breach corporate duties by diverting supply arrangements or confidential purchasing opportunities.
For example, a director may use the original company’s negotiated supplier terms to benefit a competing enterprise.
The legal consequences depend on the transactions and evidence.
The existence of a shared supplier does not automatically establish wrongdoing.
Unauthorized use of company property may create civil and potentially criminal consequences.
For example, a director may use the original company’s machinery, vehicles, or facilities to manufacture goods for another business.
The company may possess claims for recovery or compensation where the statutory requirements are satisfied.
However, the existence of shared resources does not automatically establish misuse if a valid commercial arrangement exists.
The relevant contracts and approvals must be examined.
Such conduct may raise serious corporate liability questions.
For example, a director may allegedly use company bank accounts or corporate credit cards to finance a competing enterprise.
The legal analysis may involve breach of duties, unauthorized payments, and recovery of company funds.
Article 553 may become relevant where a culpable breach causes legally recoverable damage.
However, the claimant must establish the relevant conduct and loss.
Separate criminal law questions may arise where the statutory elements are satisfied.
A dispute may arise where a director attempts to register or use the original company’s brand through another entity.
The legal consequences depend on the trademark rights and relevant conduct.
Law No. 6769 establishes important industrial property protections.
For example, a competing company may attempt to register a confusingly similar trademark.
The original company may possess administrative or judicial remedies where the statutory requirements are satisfied.
The existence of a competing company does not automatically establish trademark infringement.
Unauthorized use of protected software, technical designs, or other intellectual property may create separate legal consequences.
The applicable framework depends on the nature of the protected material.
For example, software may be protected under copyright legislation.
Patents and registered designs may be protected under industrial property legislation.
The company must establish the relevant rights and alleged infringement.
Corporate noncompetition and intellectual property claims may arise simultaneously.
Unauthorized disclosure or use of trade secrets may create serious legal consequences.
The Turkish Commercial Code establishes unfair competition rules under Articles 54–63.
Article 55 identifies specified forms of unfair competition.
Article 62 may become relevant to criminal liability in qualifying unfair competition cases.
However, the company must establish the relevant statutory elements.
Not every piece of business information automatically qualifies as a trade secret.
Yes, where the statutory requirements are satisfied.
Article 396 provides important remedies where a joint stock company board member violates the noncompetition prohibition.
The company may demand compensation.
Alternatively, it may exercise specified rights concerning transactions conducted in breach of the prohibition.
However, the appropriate remedy depends on the nature of the competing activity.
The company must identify the transactions and relevant statutory conditions.
Potentially.
Article 396 permits the company, instead of claiming compensation, to treat qualifying transactions conducted by the director on their own behalf as having been conducted on behalf of the company.
For qualifying transactions conducted for third parties, the company may demand that the benefits arising from those contracts be transferred to it.
However, these remedies concern the statutory transactions and must be exercised under the applicable conditions.
The company cannot automatically demand every profit earned by the competing business without establishing the relevant legal basis.
Yes.
Article 396 permits the company to seek compensation for a qualifying violation.
However, the company must establish the applicable requirements.
The measure of recoverable damage depends on the circumstances.
For example, the company may allege that it lost customers or commercial opportunities.
The claimant must establish legally recoverable loss and causal connection.
The statutory alternative remedies must be distinguished from one another.
Article 396(2) provides that the choice among the statutory remedies belongs to the other members of the board of directors, excluding the member who violated the prohibition.
This is particularly important where the alleged competing director continues serving on the board.
The company must identify the competent decision-makers.
However, corporate deadlock or control by the accused director may complicate enforcement.
The foreign shareholder may need to examine other corporate remedies.
Article 396(3) establishes particularly short periods for exercising the statutory remedies.
The relevant rights expire three months after the other board members learn of the competing transactions or the director’s entry into another company.
In any event, the provision establishes an outer period of one year from the occurrence of the relevant events.
These periods require urgent attention.
The shareholder should distinguish the date of discovery from the date of the underlying conduct.
Article 396(4) preserves the rules concerning directors’ liability, but that does not automatically extend the specific Article 396 remedies.
Not necessarily.
Article 396(3) refers to knowledge of the other board members.
A foreign shareholder’s discovery date may therefore differ from the statutory knowledge date.
For example, the foreign investor may discover the competing business after other board members already knew about it.
The relevant chronology must be established.
The shareholder should examine when the other board members learned of the transactions or the director’s participation.
The answer depends on the remedy pursued.
A compensation claim generally requires proof of legally recoverable damage.
However, Article 396 also establishes alternative remedies concerning qualifying competing transactions.
The requirements for those remedies differ from an ordinary damages claim.
The company should identify the appropriate statutory basis.
The absence of immediately measurable financial loss does not automatically eliminate every Article 396 remedy.
Not automatically.
The statutory rights under Article 396 belong to the company.
A shareholder does not automatically possess a personal right to receive profits earned through competing transactions.
However, the shareholder may have separate rights under the applicable corporate framework.
For example, Article 555 may become relevant where the director’s culpable breach caused damage to the company.
The claimant and recipient of compensation must be identified.
Potentially.
A minority shareholder may face difficulties where the accused director controls the board or enjoys majority shareholder support.
Article 555 permits individual shareholders to pursue qualifying claims concerning damage suffered by the company.
However, compensation for the company’s damage must be paid to the company.
The shareholder should not assume that Article 555 automatically permits personal enforcement of every special remedy under Article 396.
The precise claim, standing, and statutory requirements must be examined.
The shareholder may exercise applicable information rights concerning the original company.
For joint stock companies, Article 437 establishes important information and inspection rights.
However, those rights do not automatically grant unrestricted access to the competing company’s private records.
The shareholder may request relevant information concerning transactions involving the original company.
Where litigation is commenced, judicial evidence procedures may become relevant.
The scope of disclosure depends on the applicable legal framework.
Potentially.
Articles 438–444 regulate the special audit mechanism for joint stock companies.
A special audit may permit examination of specified corporate matters where the statutory requirements are satisfied.
For example, the shareholder may seek investigation of suspicious customer transfers or related-party transactions.
However, the procedure is not automatically available merely because another company has been established.
The relevant information rights, prior request requirements, and statutory thresholds must be examined.
Potentially.
Article 364 regulates removal of joint stock company board members.
The general assembly may remove board members under the applicable statutory framework.
However, the relevant corporate procedure must be followed.
A violation of the noncompetition prohibition may provide an important basis for considering removal.
Nevertheless, removal does not automatically resolve compensation or recovery claims.
Separate proceedings may remain necessary.
Potentially.
The applicable corporate body may take action concerning representation authority under the relevant statutory framework.
Articles 370–373 establish important rules concerning joint stock company representation.
However, the procedure depends on the company’s governance arrangements.
The company should distinguish removal from the board from modification of signing authority.
Trade Registry registration and publication may also be necessary.
Potentially, where the applicable legal basis and procedural requirements are satisfied.
However, a foreign shareholder cannot automatically obtain a court order removing a joint stock company director merely by alleging competition.
The court must examine the specific claim and statutory framework.
Different remedies may be available for limited liability company managers under Article 630.
The company’s legal form is therefore important.
Potentially.
A shareholder or company may seek interim judicial protection where the statutory requirements are satisfied.
For example, the company may seek measures concerning the unauthorized use of confidential information or protected intellectual property.
However, the court must examine the asserted right, urgency, and proportionality.
The existence of a competing company does not automatically justify shutting down its operations.
The requested measure must address a specific legally protected interest.
Potentially.
Where confidential customer information has been unlawfully obtained or used, interim protection may be available.
However, the company must identify the information and establish the relevant legal basis.
The court must consider whether the requested restriction is proportionate.
A company cannot automatically prohibit all contact with customers who are free to choose their suppliers.
The legal analysis must distinguish protected information from ordinary market competition.
Potentially.
Articles 400–405 of the Turkish Code of Civil Procedure No. 6100 establish mechanisms concerning preservation of evidence.
For example, the company may seek preservation of relevant electronic records where there is a legally sufficient risk of loss.
However, evidence preservation is not an unrestricted discovery procedure.
The applicant must identify the evidence and satisfy the statutory requirements.
Unauthorized access to the competing company’s systems may create separate legal risks.
Trade Registry records may provide important evidence concerning incorporation, management, and ownership.
For example, the records may identify the director as a founder, shareholder, or manager of another business.
However, registration alone may not establish that the director engaged in prohibited competitive transactions.
The company should examine actual commercial activities.
Invoices, contracts, customer communications, and financial records may be relevant.
Potentially.
Public professional profiles may contain statements concerning a director’s involvement in another company.
However, the evidentiary value depends on authenticity and context.
For example, a profile may identify the person as founder or managing director.
That information may support an investigation but does not automatically establish prohibited competition.
The company should preserve relevant evidence lawfully.
Potentially.
Emails may contain instructions directing customers to another business.
For example, a director may ask a customer to place future orders through the competing company.
However, the court must examine authenticity, context, and legality of acquisition.
A message alone may not establish the full financial consequences.
The company should preserve original communications where lawfully available.
Potentially.
Messages may contain discussions concerning customer transfers, pricing, or competing activities.
However, authenticity and context must be examined.
A screenshot alone may not conclusively establish every relevant fact.
The company should preserve communications lawfully.
Unauthorized access to private devices or accounts may create separate legal risks.
Potentially.
Articles 54–63 of the Turkish Commercial Code regulate unfair competition.
For example, the misuse of confidential business information or dishonest interference with customer relationships may fall within the relevant statutory framework.
However, ordinary competition is not automatically unlawful.
The claimant must establish the particular conduct and statutory requirements.
The available remedies may include cessation, correction, compensation, and other legally recognized relief.
Article 56 establishes important civil remedies concerning unfair competition.
Depending on the statutory requirements, the claimant may seek determination of unfair competition, prevention of unlawful conduct, removal of its effects, correction of misleading statements, or compensation.
However, the appropriate remedy depends on the conduct and the claimant’s legal position.
The company must establish the relevant statutory elements.
The existence of a competing business alone does not automatically justify an unfair competition claim.
Potentially, where the conduct satisfies the elements of a criminal offense.
For example, unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets, document forgery, fraud, or misuse of entrusted assets may raise criminal law questions.
Article 239 of the Turkish Penal Code regulates specified conduct concerning trade secrets and confidential information.
Article 155 concerns breach of trust.
Articles 157 and 158 concern fraud.
However, establishing a competing company does not automatically constitute a criminal offense.
The prosecution must establish the relevant statutory elements.
The expression “stealing customers” does not itself identify a specific criminal offense.
Customers generally remain free to choose their commercial partners.
However, criminal liability may arise where the director’s conduct satisfies the elements of a recognized offense.
For example, fraud or unlawful disclosure of protected information may create separate legal questions.
The company must distinguish ordinary customer competition from criminal conduct.
A commercial dispute does not automatically justify criminal prosecution.
No.
A criminal complaint concerns suspected criminal conduct.
Article 396 establishes specific corporate remedies concerning prohibited competition.
Filing a criminal complaint does not automatically suspend the three-month and one-year periods under Article 396(3).
A foreign investor should therefore avoid relying exclusively on criminal proceedings while statutory corporate deadlines continue to run.
The appropriate remedies may need to be pursued separately.
The legal consequences depend on when the competing activities occurred and whether any valid post-termination restrictions apply.
Article 396 concerns specified conduct by board members.
Resignation does not automatically eliminate liability for prohibited activities undertaken while serving.
However, the statutory director noncompetition prohibition does not automatically continue indefinitely after resignation.
A separate contractual noncompetition obligation may require examination.
The applicable validity and enforceability requirements must be satisfied.
Potentially.
A former director may be bound by a valid contractual noncompetition obligation.
However, the enforceability of the restriction depends on the legal relationship and applicable statutory framework.
For example, an employment-related noncompetition agreement may be subject to Articles 444–447 of the Turkish Code of Obligations.
Different considerations may apply to other contractual arrangements.
A company cannot automatically impose an unlimited prohibition on all future commercial activities.
The restriction must be examined under the applicable law.
Potentially.
The chronology may be important.
For example, a person may have owned another business before becoming a director.
However, the existence of the earlier business does not automatically eliminate all subsequent noncompetition obligations.
The relevant activities during the director’s term must be examined.
The company should also determine whether valid authorization was granted.
The legal analysis depends on the actual transactions.
Potentially.
A valid general assembly authorization may affect the application of Article 396.
However, the scope and timing of the authorization must be examined.
For example, permission to engage in specified activities may not automatically authorize unrelated conduct.
The foreign shareholder should obtain the relevant general assembly resolution.
The existence of a generic approval clause does not automatically resolve every dispute concerning confidential information or misuse of company assets.
Potentially, where a valid general assembly resolution satisfies the applicable legal requirements.
However, majority voting power does not automatically eliminate mandatory shareholder protections.
A foreign minority shareholder may challenge a resolution where the statutory grounds are established.
For example, a resolution may be disputed if it violates the law, the articles, or the principle of good faith.
The applicable standing and procedural requirements must be examined.
Potentially.
Articles 445 and 446 establish important rules concerning annulment of joint stock company general assembly resolutions.
A shareholder may challenge a resolution that violates the law, articles, or principle of good faith where the statutory requirements are satisfied.
However, the mere fact that the shareholder voted against authorization does not automatically establish annulment grounds.
The relevant legal defect must be identified.
Article 445 generally establishes a three-month period from the resolution date.
Article 626 establishes a separate noncompetition framework for limited liability company managers.
Under Article 626(2), managers cannot engage in activities competing with the company unless the company agreement provides otherwise or all other partners grant written permission.
The company agreement may provide for general assembly approval instead of unanimous written consent.
The relevant authorization must be examined.
A manager cannot automatically rely on majority shareholder support where the applicable statutory requirements demand another form of consent.
Article 626 establishes duties of care and loyalty for limited liability company managers.
The provision requires managers to act with due care and protect the company’s interests in accordance with good faith.
Article 626(2) establishes the noncompetition rule and relevant authorization mechanisms.
Article 626(3) also applies the loyalty obligations established for partners to managers.
The legal consequences depend on the manager’s actual conduct and the applicable company agreement.
The legal position differs from that of a manager.
Article 613 establishes important loyalty and confidentiality obligations for limited liability company partners.
Partners must protect company secrets and refrain from conduct harming company interests under the statutory framework.
The company agreement may impose additional noncompetition obligations.
However, mere ownership of a competing business does not automatically create the same statutory consequences for every partner.
The relevant obligations and permissions must be examined.
Yes, where the statutory requirements are satisfied.
Article 630 permits partners to request judicial removal or restriction of a manager’s management and representation authority for just cause.
A serious breach of care or loyalty duties may constitute just cause.
For example, a manager who deliberately diverts company customers to a competing enterprise may face removal proceedings.
However, the court must examine the evidence.
The existence of another registered company does not automatically establish grounds for removal.
Potentially.
Article 626 establishes important duties of care, loyalty, and noncompetition.
Article 644 makes specified joint stock company liability provisions applicable to limited liability companies.
Article 553 may therefore become relevant to qualifying management liability claims.
However, the claimant must establish the applicable breach, fault, damage, and causal connection.
The company should distinguish a damages claim from other remedies concerning competition or removal.
Not automatically.
A director’s competing activities may reduce the original company’s revenue and value.
However, damage suffered by the company must be distinguished from direct damage suffered by an individual shareholder.
For example, lost customers may primarily cause damage to the company.
The shareholder cannot automatically demand personal compensation equal to the reduction in share value.
Article 555 may provide a relevant mechanism concerning company damage, subject to the statutory requirements.
Article 560 establishes important limitation rules for specified corporate liability claims.
The general framework includes a two-year period from knowledge of the damage and responsible person and a five-year period from the act causing damage.
Where the conduct also constitutes an offense subject to a longer criminal limitation period, that longer period may apply under the statutory conditions.
However, Article 396 establishes much shorter specific periods for its statutory noncompetition remedies.
The company must identify the precise claim.
Yes.
A foreign shareholder may appoint a Turkish lawyer to assist with corporate litigation and related proceedings.
The applicable authorization and procedural requirements must be satisfied.
Where documents are executed abroad, authentication and translation requirements may arise.
The investor’s physical absence from Turkey does not automatically eliminate shareholder rights.
However, short statutory deadlines may create particular risks for investors residing abroad.
Relevant evidence may include Trade Registry records of the competing company, board minutes, general assembly resolutions, shareholder agreements, company financial statements, customer contracts, invoices, supplier correspondence, electronic communications, and records concerning intellectual property.
The investor should identify when the competing company was established and when it began commercial operations.
Where customer diversion is suspected, evidence concerning transferred contracts and lost business opportunities may be important.
Where confidential information was allegedly misused, the company should identify the protected material and the alleged disclosure.
However, evidence should be obtained lawfully.
As of November 2026, the Turkish Commercial Code No. 6102 establishes the principal corporate framework concerning director competition.
Article 369 establishes important duties of care and loyalty for joint stock company board members.
Article 364 governs removal of board members.
Article 395 establishes restrictions concerning transactions between directors and the company.
Article 396 establishes the statutory noncompetition prohibition for joint stock company board members and specifies the company’s remedies.
Article 396(3) establishes the three-month knowledge-based and one-year outer periods for exercising the relevant rights.
Article 437 provides shareholder information and inspection rights.
Articles 438–444 regulate the special audit mechanism.
Articles 445 and 446 establish general assembly annulment remedies and standing.
Article 553 establishes liability for culpable breaches of statutory or articles-based obligations.
Article 555 permits qualifying shareholder claims concerning damage suffered by the company, with compensation paid to the company.
Article 560 establishes limitation rules for specified corporate liability claims.
Articles 54–63 regulate unfair competition.
For limited liability companies, Article 613 establishes loyalty and confidentiality obligations for partners.
Article 626 establishes duties of care, loyalty, and noncompetition for managers.
Article 630 governs judicial removal or restriction of managers for just cause.
Article 644 applies specified joint stock company liability provisions.
The Turkish Code of Obligations No. 6098 may govern relevant contractual obligations, including legally enforceable post-termination restrictions.
Law No. 6769 may become relevant where the competing activities involve trademarks, patents, or other industrial property rights.
The Turkish Penal Code No. 5237 may apply where the conduct satisfies the elements of trade secret disclosure, fraud, breach of trust, or another offense.
The central legal distinction is whether the director merely holds an investment in another company or actively engages in prohibited competitive transactions.
A competing company does not automatically establish liability.
However, unauthorized competition involving customer diversion, misuse of confidential information, or improper appropriation of corporate opportunities may create significant legal consequences.
A foreign investor who discovers that a director has established a competing company should first identify the legal form of the original company.
The investor should determine whether the person is a joint stock company board member, limited liability company manager, ordinary shareholder, employee, or former director.
The next question is whether the competing business conducts activities falling within the relevant statutory prohibition.
The investor should obtain available Trade Registry records and examine the competing company’s actual commercial operations.
Where Article 396 applies, the company should determine whether valid general assembly authorization was granted.
The date on which other board members learned of the competing activities is particularly important.
The statutory three-month and one-year periods should be examined promptly.
The company should then identify the appropriate remedy.
Where the director conducted qualifying competing transactions, Article 396 may permit compensation or specified alternative claims concerning those transactions.
Where the director caused company damage through culpable breaches of duties, Article 553 may provide an additional liability framework.
Where management refuses to act, the foreign shareholder may need to examine standing under Article 555.
Where confidential information or intellectual property is being misused, interim judicial protection and unfair competition remedies may require consideration.
Where the director serves as a limited liability company manager, Article 626 and Article 630 may be particularly important.
Lawyer Fırat Fesih Kaya emphasizes that director competition disputes involving foreign investors require careful distinction between passive investments, prohibited commercial activities, corporate authorization, shareholder standing, recovery of profits, and management liability.
A director’s competing business may affect several legal interests simultaneously.
The corporate issue concerns whether the director violated statutory noncompetition obligations.
The governance issue concerns conflicts of interest and management authority.
The financial issue concerns lost revenue, diverted customers, and recovery of profits.
The shareholder issue concerns protection of minority investors and the ability to pursue company damage claims.
The intellectual property issue concerns confidential information, trademarks, software, and trade secrets.
The procedural issue concerns short statutory deadlines, evidence preservation, and interim judicial protection.
The criminal issue may arise where the conduct satisfies the elements of a recognized offense.
These matters have different legal requirements.
A director is not automatically prohibited from every investment in another business.
However, a director cannot assume that establishing a separate company permits unrestricted competition with the business they are responsible for managing.
A coordinated legal assessment may therefore be necessary to protect the foreign investor’s interests.
1. Can a Turkish company director establish a competing business?
Potentially, but Article 396 restricts specified competitive activities by joint stock company board members without general assembly authorization.
2. Does owning shares in a competing company automatically violate Article 396?
Not necessarily. Passive share ownership must be distinguished from conducting prohibited competitive transactions or participating in another company in a capacity restricted by the statute.
3. Can a company recover profits earned by a competing director?
Potentially. Article 396 provides specified alternative remedies concerning qualifying competing transactions, including claims to benefits arising from transactions conducted for third parties.
4. Can the company claim compensation for lost customers?
Yes, where the statutory requirements are satisfied. The company must establish legally recoverable damage and causal connection.
5. What is the deadline for an Article 396 claim?
The statutory rights expire three months after the other board members learn of the relevant conduct and, in any event, one year from the relevant event.
6. Can the foreign minority shareholder sue if the board refuses to act?
Potentially. Article 555 may permit qualifying shareholder claims concerning damage suffered by the company, but it does not automatically transfer every special Article 396 remedy to the shareholder personally.
7. Can the competing director be removed from the board?
Potentially. Article 364 governs removal of joint stock company board members, subject to the applicable corporate procedure.
8. Can a limited liability company manager operate a competing business?
Article 626 restricts competing activities unless the company agreement provides otherwise or the required partner authorization is obtained.
9. Can the court stop misuse of confidential customer information?
Potentially. Interim judicial protection and unfair competition remedies may be available where the applicable legal requirements are satisfied.
10. Can a foreign investor pursue the dispute while living abroad?
Yes. A foreign investor may appoint a Turkish lawyer to assist with corporate proceedings, subject to applicable authorization and procedural requirements.
Protecting corporate opportunities, customer relationships and shareholder investments requires timely and specialized legal assistance.
Foreign investors who discover that a Turkish company director has established a competing business may face serious risks involving customer diversion, confidential information misuse, related-party transactions, loss of commercial opportunities, unfair competition, and management misconduct.
Working with a lawyer experienced in Turkish commercial law, corporate governance, director liability, unfair competition, and foreign investment protection can help clarify the applicable legal framework and identify appropriate remedies.
Serving clients throughout Turkey and internationally, Fırat Fesih Kaya Law Office provides professional legal support in director noncompetition disputes, recovery of profits from competing transactions, corporate damage claims, minority shareholder protection, director removal proceedings, unfair competition litigation, trade secret protection, interim injunction applications, and related commercial disputes.
Lawyer Fırat Fesih Kaya assists foreign shareholders, international investors, minority partners, company directors, and overseas business owners who face unauthorized director competition or corporate governance disputes in Turkey.
Call Now: +90 312 434 22 22
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Disclaimer: This article is intended for general informational purposes only. To avoid any loss of legal rights, we recommend consulting your lawyer regarding the specific circumstances of your case.