

Bank Account Used by Another Person for Fraud in Turkey: Can the Owner Be Convicted? — 2026 Guide
A foreign national may discover that their Turkish bank account has been used by a friend, business partner, employee, employer, relative or online acquaintance to receive money connected to an alleged fraud.
The account owner may never have spoken to the victim. They may not have created the fraudulent advertisement, made the telephone call or sent the messages used to deceive the complainant.
Nevertheless, because the alleged fraud proceeds entered an account registered in their name, the account owner may become a suspect in a Turkish criminal investigation.
The critical question is:
Can the owner of the bank account be convicted even if another person actually committed the fraud?
Potentially, depending on the evidence and the account owner’s individual role. But ownership of the receiving bank account should not automatically be treated as proof that the account owner knowingly participated in the fraud.
The investigation should determine who deceived the victim, why the account was provided, who actually controlled it, who moved or withdrew the money, whether the owner received a financial benefit, and—most importantly—what the account owner knew and intended.
This distinction is particularly important in 2026 because Turkish authorities are actively warning about bank-account and IBAN-sharing schemes. Official prosecutorial materials describe how fraudsters obtain other people’s bank accounts to receive criminal proceeds and conceal the identities of the people actually organizing the fraud.
The reason is usually straightforward.
Suppose a victim is deceived through an online marketplace.
The victim sends 150,000 TRY to a Turkish bank account.
When police trace the payment, the account belongs to a foreign national.
The first evidentiary link therefore becomes:
Victim → Foreign Account Owner
Police may understandably investigate the account owner.
But the complete transaction may actually look like:
Fraudster → Victim → Foreign Account Owner’s Bank Account → Third Person → Cash or Cryptocurrency
Determining criminal responsibility requires examination of the entire chain.
The fact that the account belongs to the accused is relevant.
It can establish where the money went.
It does not necessarily establish:
Those questions can be decisive.
Depending on the evidence, criminal responsibility may extend beyond the person who personally communicated with and deceived the victim.
Turkish criminal law recognizes different forms of participation in criminal conduct. Therefore, the investigation may examine whether the account owner knowingly participated in the execution of the scheme or intentionally assisted another person’s offence.
But there is a fundamental difference between:
knowingly providing an account to facilitate fraud
and
having an account used by another person without knowing its criminal purpose.
The defense should focus on evidence capable of distinguishing these situations.
Simply telling the police:
“My friend used my account.”
does not automatically resolve the investigation.
Police and prosecutors are likely to ask:
The explanation should therefore be supported by objective evidence wherever possible.
Imagine two different cases.
A foreigner discovers unauthorized transactions after receiving security notifications from the bank.
The foreigner immediately:
That presents one factual situation.
Another person says:
“Let me use your bank account for payments. You will receive 10% of everything that comes in.”
The account owner provides:
The account receives payments from multiple unrelated people.
The owner keeps commissions.
That presents a substantially different evidentiary situation.
The prosecution should establish the criminal responsibility of the particular defendant rather than merely identifying the registered bank-account holder.
The Constitutional Court’s description of the presumption of innocence requires a person facing criminal accusations to be treated as innocent until guilt is established through the judicial process.
Accordingly, the defense should ask:
What evidence demonstrates that the account owner knew the money came from fraud?
That question can become central.
This should be identified precisely.
The fraudulent communication may have occurred through:
Investigators should determine which person controlled the account or telephone number used to communicate with the victim.
If the bank-account owner had no communication with the victim, that fact can be important, although it does not necessarily end the inquiry into possible participation or assistance.
This can be a particularly important evidentiary question.
Suppose the victim receives a WhatsApp message:
“Send 75,000 TRY to this IBAN.”
The IBAN belongs to the foreign suspect.
But who actually sent that message?
Investigators may need to examine:
IBAN ownership does not necessarily prove authorship of the message containing the IBAN.
Account ownership and account operation are different factual questions.
Potential evidence may include:
If another person had access to the account, objective technical evidence may help determine who actually conducted the disputed transactions.
This can increase criminal exposure.
Investigators will likely ask why the owner voluntarily provided:
Official Turkish authorities strongly warn against giving third parties access to personal bank accounts, cards or digital banking credentials because such accounts are frequently used to receive or transfer fraud proceeds.
However, an official preventive warning should not be treated as a substitute for proving the particular criminal offence alleged against an individual defendant.
Commission payments can become significant evidence.
Suppose the account owner receives 5% of every payment passing through the account.
Investigators may ask:
Official 2026 prosecutorial materials specifically warn about schemes offering commissions or easy income in return for bank-account access.
A commission does not automatically answer every element of the charged offence, but it can substantially affect the evidentiary assessment.
Absence of personal financial benefit may support the defense in some factual settings, but it does not automatically eliminate every form of possible criminal responsibility.
Investigators may still examine whether the owner knowingly made the account available to facilitate the offence.
Therefore:
No commission ≠ automatic acquittal.
But equally:
Account ownership ≠ automatic conviction.
The complete evidence matters.
This is particularly important in cases involving foreigners, students and job seekers.
The account owner may have been told:
“We are an international company and need a local payment representative.”
or:
“My account is temporarily frozen. Let my customer pay you.”
or:
“You only need to receive the payment and forward it.”
The account owner may later discover that the money came from fraud victims.
Official 2026 materials specifically warn that young people and others may be recruited through promises of income and persuaded to provide bank accounts that are later used to transfer criminal proceeds.
If the owner was deceived, preserve the evidence showing how the arrangement began.
Potentially important evidence includes:
The question is not merely what the account owner says today.
The stronger question may be:
What did the communications show the account owner was being told at the time?
If the owner did not voluntarily provide access, preserve evidence of unauthorized access immediately.
This may include:
The owner should also preserve evidence of when the bank was notified.
A contemporaneous hacking report can be substantially more persuasive than an unsupported claim raised only after police contact.
A seized phone may become important.
Investigators may examine:
But possession or ownership of a device does not automatically prove who performed every action on it.
The investigation should consider actual device access and the surrounding evidence.
Suppose the victim transfers money at 13:00.
At 13:20 the money is withdrawn from an ATM.
The account owner says:
“I did not withdraw it. The person using my account had my card.”
ATM CCTV may become highly important.
The defense should identify:
Because surveillance recordings can eventually be overwritten, preservation may need to be requested promptly.
This creates an additional evidentiary link.
Police may ask:
If the owner claims that the cash was handed to someone else, the defense should identify objective evidence supporting that explanation.
Create a precise timeline.
For example:
14:02 — 80,000 TRY received
14:05 — WhatsApp instruction received
14:08 — 78,000 TRY transferred to Account B
14:09 — 2,000 TRY remained in account
Investigators will likely examine both the outgoing transaction and the communication surrounding it.
Fraud schemes frequently use multiple accounts to make the money trail more difficult to follow.
A March 2026 prosecution announcement concerning alleged banking fraud described suspects moving victims’ funds through different accounts and stated that investigators evaluated victim statements, bank movements, communications records and digital evidence together.
Accordingly, investigators may examine the entire chain rather than only the first receiving account.
Cryptocurrency can add another layer of evidence.
Investigators may examine:
The defense should still distinguish between:
financial movement
and
proof of who knowingly controlled and directed that movement.
A wallet address by itself does not necessarily identify a human user.
Potentially.
Depending on the method and facts, technology- or banking-related fraud may be investigated under the aggravated-fraud provisions of the Turkish Criminal Code.
Current 2026 enforcement illustrates that prosecutors may use Article 158 in organized digital banking fraud investigations and evaluate banking, communications and digital evidence together.
The account owner’s precise role must nevertheless be determined individually.
Potentially, depending on the evidence.
A person does not necessarily need to be the individual who personally spoke to the victim for participation questions to arise.
The legal analysis may examine whether the account owner knowingly facilitated the offence and the nature of that participation.
Important evidence can include:
The legal characterization depends on the proven facts.
Potentially.
Official Turkish warnings expressly connect third-party account use with both fraud and laundering risks.
Particular scrutiny may arise where funds are:
Whether a separate offence is established depends on its own statutory elements and the evidence concerning the account holder.
Official Ministry of Trade guidance also points to Article 15 of Law No. 5549 concerning transactions carried out in one’s own name but on behalf of another without the required written notification to the financial institution.
Therefore, even where the evidence does not establish that the account owner personally deceived a fraud victim, allowing another person to conduct financial transactions through the account can create separate legal issues that should be examined.
A modern bank-account fraud investigation may involve:
No single category should automatically be assumed to answer every question.
Bank statements can establish that:
money entered Account A and later went to Account B.
But a bank statement alone may not establish why the owner believed the money had arrived.
That may require examining:
Financial evidence and evidence of state of mind should therefore be analyzed together.
The complainant may produce screenshots showing an account name, profile photograph or conversation.
The defense should examine:
A screenshot showing the account owner’s name does not automatically prove the account owner authored every communication.
IP evidence can connect digital activity with a technical connection.
But issues may include:
The prosecution should avoid collapsing:
IP address → subscriber → actual user
into a single assumption.
In a February 24, 2026 aggravated-fraud decision, the Court of Cassation overturned a conviction because further investigation was required concerning banking information, disputed documents, signature evidence and the underlying commercial relationship.
The Court concluded that the defendant’s legal position should be determined only after the relevant facts were investigated sufficiently to establish the truth without unresolved doubt.
Although the factual circumstances differed from a bank-account lending case, the evidentiary principle is important:
Criminal responsibility should be determined from a sufficiently investigated factual record rather than from an incomplete inference.
Then evidence supporting lack of knowledge becomes particularly important.
Potential evidence may include:
The defense should build a chronology from objective evidence.
This can make the case more difficult.
Warning signs may include:
The prosecution may rely on such circumstances when arguing knowledge or intentional participation.
The defense should therefore address the actual facts rather than relying only on the formal ownership of the account.
Multiple transactions can materially change the evidentiary picture.
Investigators may compare:
Repeated activity may make the account-control and knowledge questions especially important.
Potentially.
If an account is restricted, determine:
A bank-account restriction is an investigative or protective issue and is not itself proof of guilt.
Do not delete evidence and do not invent explanations.
Obtain:
Then reconstruct the transaction chronologically.
If another person used the account, do not contact them for the purpose of creating a common false explanation.
Do not ask them to:
Existing evidence should be preserved.
The account owner’s phone may contain evidence showing:
Destroying that information can seriously damage the defense.
When a foreigner discovers that another person used their Turkish bank account for alleged fraud:
A defense should examine:
Bank-account and IBAN misuse remains a significant focus of Turkish enforcement activity in 2026.
Official prosecutorial awareness campaigns explain that fraudsters may persuade individuals to provide bank accounts, cards or account-access information so that fraud proceeds can be transferred through accounts that conceal the identities of the organizers. Authorities particularly warn against commission-based and “temporary account” arrangements.
Recent 2026 fraud investigations also show prosecutors examining victim statements, bank movements, communications and digital evidence together when determining the roles of suspects.
At the same time, criminal liability must be individualized. The constitutional presumption of innocence remains applicable until guilt is established through the judicial process.
Accordingly, a defensible analysis should follow the complete evidentiary chain:
Account ownership → reason access was provided → victim communication → receipt of money → actual account control → withdrawal or transfer → financial benefit → knowledge → intent → individual participation.
The name on the bank account is important.
It should not be the end of the investigation.
Potentially, depending on your individual participation, knowledge, intent and the evidence. Account ownership alone does not answer all of those questions.
That can be important. Investigators should identify who actually carried out the deceptive communications. However, lack of direct victim contact does not automatically exclude every possible form of criminal participation.
Preserve every message showing what your friend told you. Evidence concerning your knowledge at the time of the transactions can be critical.
A commission can increase investigative scrutiny, particularly when combined with repeated suspicious transfers. Official 2026 warnings specifically identify paid account-use arrangements as a serious criminal risk.
Preserve evidence showing who had the card, when they had it and why. ATM CCTV and banking records may help determine who performed particular transactions.
Yes. Lack of personal benefit can be relevant but does not automatically prevent an investigation into whether the account was knowingly provided to facilitate the offence.
Immediately preserve security notifications, password-reset information, unauthorized login alerts and proof of your report to the bank.
Potentially. The appropriate response depends on the authority, legal basis, scope and type of restriction. A freeze is not itself a criminal conviction.
No. Those communications may be crucial to establishing what you knew, why the account was provided and who actually directed the transactions.
The central question is usually not merely whose name appears on the account, but whether lawful and reliable evidence proves that the account owner knowingly and intentionally participated in or assisted the criminal conduct alleged.
When another person uses a foreigner’s Turkish bank account to receive alleged fraud proceeds, the investigation can quickly expand into bank records, ATM CCTV, WhatsApp conversations, mobile banking data, seized phones, IP records and cryptocurrency transactions.
The defense should therefore move beyond the simple fact of account ownership.
The key questions are:
Who deceived the victim? Who gave the victim the IBAN? Who actually controlled the account? Who transferred or withdrew the money? What did the account owner know? Did the owner receive a benefit?
Fırat Fesih Kaya Law Office provides criminal-law assistance to foreign nationals, foreign students, employees, executives, investors and foreign-owned companies whose Turkish bank accounts have allegedly been used by third parties in fraud schemes.
Lawyer Fırat Fesih Kaya assists foreign clients with aggravated-fraud investigations, bank-account and IBAN allegations, frozen accounts, police and prosecutor statements, ATM evidence, WhatsApp communications, seized phones, cryptocurrency transactions and disputes concerning actual account control, knowledge and criminal intent.
Early legal assistance can be particularly important because banking records, CCTV, account-security information and digital communications may need to be identified and preserved promptly.
Phone: +90 312 434 22 22
Mobile: +90 532 769 22 22
Email: info@firatfesihkaya.av.tr
Address: Mevlana Boulevard No:221, Yıldırım Tower No:148, 06520 Balgat, Çankaya, Ankara, Turkey
This publication is provided for general informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice. Criminal liability depends on the offence alleged, the account owner’s knowledge and intent, the extent of account access given to another person, the movement of funds and the evidence collected in the individual investigation.