

Can foreign shareholders sue a Turkish company director for misusing company assets? Learn about director liability, unauthorized payments, related-party transactions, company losses, evidence, compensation and emergency remedies in Turkey.
Yes. A foreign shareholder may potentially pursue legal remedies where a director or manager of a Turkish company misuses company assets, breaches management duties or causes financial loss.
However, one of the most important questions is:
Who legally suffered the loss — the company or the foreign shareholder personally?
If a director transfers TRY 10 million belonging to the company for an unauthorized personal purpose, the immediate financial loss will ordinarily be suffered by the company. The shareholder may also suffer economically because the value of their investment decreases, but this does not automatically convert the entire company loss into the shareholder’s personal claim.
Turkish company law therefore requires careful distinction between company damage, direct shareholder damage and the procedure through which compensation is sought.
No. Foreign nationality does not, by itself, prevent a shareholder from relying on Turkish corporate-law remedies.
The analysis normally depends on:
Article 553 of the Turkish Commercial Code establishes the core liability framework for founders, board members, managers and liquidators.
Where these persons breach obligations arising from legislation or the company’s constitutional documents, liability for resulting damage may arise under the statutory conditions.
This makes Article 553 particularly important in disputes involving allegations that directors have improperly used corporate property or funds.
Potential examples include:
Not every questionable business decision automatically creates liability.
The transaction must be investigated in context.
Assume:
Company bank balance: TRY 25 million
Director transfers to personal account: TRY 4 million
Payment description: Loan repayment
The foreign shareholder should request evidence showing:
If no underlying loan can be established, the payment may require further legal action.
Related-party transactions deserve particular scrutiny.
Suppose the director owns another business and causes the jointly owned Turkish company to pay that business TRY 8 million for “management services.”
The investigation should determine:
A related-party transaction is not automatically unlawful.
The problem arises where corporate assets are transferred without legitimate commercial justification or contrary to the director’s duties.
Consider:
Market value: TRY 30 million
Sale price: TRY 12 million
Buyer: Company controlled by director’s relative
The foreign shareholder should investigate:
A substantial value difference combined with a related-party relationship can justify careful examination.
Potentially.
Examples might include company payment of:
The first step is to determine whether the payment had a legitimate corporate purpose or was properly authorized remuneration or reimbursement.
A high salary is not automatically unlawful.
Review:
The legal issue becomes stronger where remuneration is unauthorized or appears to be a mechanism for extracting corporate value contrary to applicable duties.
This distinction is critical.
Suppose a director wrongfully causes the company to lose TRY 20 million.
A shareholder owning 40% may experience an economic reduction in investment value.
But it does not automatically follow that the shareholder can simply demand:
TRY 20 million × 40% = TRY 8 million personally.
The legal nature of the damage must first be determined.
Turkish Commercial Code Article 555 is particularly important.
The statutory framework allows both the company and shareholders to seek compensation for damage suffered by the company, while a shareholder pursuing such damage requests that compensation be paid to the company.
This protects the corporate asset pool rather than converting company property directly into the individual shareholder’s property.
Suppose a director improperly transfers TRY 15 million from the company.
The company loses TRY 15 million.
A foreign shareholder bringing an appropriate liability action concerning company damage would ordinarily seek restoration of the loss to the company, rather than payment of the entire amount into the shareholder’s personal account.
This distinction should be reflected correctly in the claim.
Potentially, where the director’s conduct caused a legally recognized loss directly to the shareholder rather than merely reducing company assets.
Direct and indirect loss should therefore be separated carefully.
This distinction affects:
Potentially, yes.
Director liability is not reserved only for controlling shareholders.
A minority investor may have important remedies even where the Turkish partner controls:
The precise procedural route depends on the claim.
This is common in closely held companies.
For example:
Foreign investor: 30%
Turkish shareholder/director: 70%
The director may control both voting and management.
That does not automatically eliminate director duties.
The foreign shareholder should investigate whether majority control is being used to transfer company value personally.
A 50/50 structure can create serious deadlock.
The Turkish director may refuse to:
The foreign investor may therefore need to consider remedies that do not depend solely on cooperation from the other shareholder.
A director-liability claim should be built transaction by transaction.
Important evidence may include:
The objective is to demonstrate exactly what happened to company property.
For each disputed transaction, establish:
Company account → payment → recipient → legal basis → corporate approval → accounting treatment → benefit received by company
This structure is often more effective than broad allegations that a director “stole company money.”
Board members have significant statutory information rights.
Article 392 of the Turkish Commercial Code provides that each board member may request information concerning company business and transactions, ask questions and examine corporate records.
Where a foreign shareholder has appointed a board representative, these rights can become important in investigating suspected asset misuse.
Preserve evidence of every refusal.
Make specific written requests for:
A documented pattern of obstruction may become relevant to the broader dispute.
Yes.
A forensic review may compare:
Bank transactions
with
Accounting records
with
Contracts and invoices
with
Actual commercial activity.
This can reveal transactions that ordinary annual financial statements may not make obvious.
Create a list of payments involving:
For each transaction, identify its genuine economic purpose.
Cash transactions can be particularly difficult to trace.
Identify:
Repeated unexplained withdrawals may require urgent action.
Review whether the director or controlling shareholder owes money to the company.
Examine:
These balances can reveal significant transfers of company value.
Potentially.
Not every unsuccessful transaction constitutes breach of duty.
Business inherently involves risk.
A director-liability claim should therefore distinguish between:
a genuine commercial decision that later produced a loss
and
misuse of corporate assets for unauthorized or personal purposes.
This distinction can be decisive.
Actual responsibility should be investigated.
Article 553 also addresses circumstances involving delegation of duties and authority. The liability analysis therefore requires attention to who held the relevant function, who actually made the decision and whether duties were lawfully delegated.
Do not assume that every director is automatically liable for every employee transaction.
Potentially.
Where multiple directors participated in or approved the relevant conduct, each person’s role should be examined separately.
Create a responsibility matrix:
| Person | Position | Authority | Conduct | Approval | Benefit |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Director A | Chair | Banking | Ordered transfer | Yes | Possible |
| Director B | Board Member | Joint approval | Approved | Yes | None known |
| CFO | Employee | Payment preparation | Prepared | No final authority | None known |
Liability should be individualized.
Potentially, particularly where there is evidence that further assets are about to disappear.
For example:
The relevant interim protective remedies depend on the underlying claim and statutory conditions.
Potentially, where the statutory requirements are satisfied.
The purpose is to preserve the practical possibility of recovery before final judgment.
The applicant generally needs concrete evidence supporting both the claim and the need for provisional protection.
Potentially, depending on company type and circumstances.
If misuse of assets is continuing, simply filing a compensation claim may not be enough.
The investor may also need to examine:
Potentially.
The procedure differs between joint stock and limited liability companies.
Management removal should be considered separately from compensation.
Removing the director can stop future conduct.
It does not automatically recover money already lost.
Depending on what happened, recovery may involve more than a damages claim.
If identifiable company property has been improperly transferred, legal remedies concerning the specific asset or transaction may also need to be examined.
The correct remedy depends on:
Family relationship does not automatically prove wrongdoing.
But it can make the transaction’s commercial basis particularly important.
Ask:
This can significantly affect recovery strategy.
A third party that legitimately supplied goods or services and received payment in good faith is in a different position from an entity created merely to receive diverted company money.
Do not treat every recipient as participating in the director’s alleged misconduct.
Potentially, where the evidence indicates conduct that may constitute a criminal offence.
However:
Director liability under company law and criminal liability are separate questions.
A breach of corporate duty does not automatically establish a crime.
The evidence should be analyzed before criminal allegations are made.
Foreign investors should avoid treating criminal proceedings as a negotiating tactic.
The stronger approach is to document:
If that evidence also supports a criminal-law issue, it can then be evaluated separately.
Yes.
Suppose the company should have earned TRY 40 million but TRY 15 million was improperly transferred as fictitious expenses.
The foreign shareholder may face:
These consequences should be analyzed without double-counting the same damage.
Potentially.
Asset diversion can reduce:
This becomes particularly important where the parties are simultaneously negotiating a shareholder exit.
A director accused of asset misuse may offer to buy the foreign investor’s shares.
Before accepting, investigate:
Otherwise, the investor could sell based on financial statements already affected by the disputed conduct.
Resignation does not necessarily eliminate potential liability for conduct occurring during the relevant management period.
Create a timeline showing:
Appointment date
Disputed transactions
Resignation/removal date
This helps connect particular acts to the relevant period of authority.
Obtain the actual resolutions.
Check:
Do not rely on a general statement that “shareholders approved it.”
Preserve originals and available electronic copies.
Potentially relevant evidence may include:
Do not alter documents while attempting to demonstrate that they were manipulated.
Allocation of litigation expenses depends on the proceedings and outcome.
Costs should be considered when selecting between:
Director-liability claims are subject to limitation rules.
The applicable period can depend on the legal basis, knowledge of the damage and responsible person, timing of the conduct and whether the conduct also constitutes an offence subject to a longer limitation period.
Foreign investors should therefore avoid delaying investigation after discovering suspicious transactions.
A foreign shareholder who suspects misuse of company assets should:
Potentially, yes. Foreign nationality does not itself prevent the use of Turkish corporate-law liability mechanisms.
Article 553 of the Turkish Commercial Code establishes a central liability framework for directors and managers who breach statutory or corporate obligations and cause damage.
Potentially. Turkish company law distinguishes damage suffered by the company from direct shareholder damage. Where compensation is sought for company damage through the shareholder mechanism, recovery is generally sought for the company.
Not automatically. The distinction between company damage and direct shareholder damage must be respected.
The payment should be traced and its legal basis, authorization and accounting treatment investigated immediately.
Potentially, especially where they lack genuine commercial justification, proper authorization or corresponding value to the company.
Potentially. Removal and compensation are separate remedies and may sometimes be pursued as part of the same broader shareholder strategy.
Potentially, where the statutory requirements for interim protection are satisfied.
No. A genuine commercial decision that produces a loss should be distinguished from breach of duty or misuse of corporate property.
Preserve the financial evidence and build a transaction-by-transaction record showing what asset left the company, who authorized it, who received it, whether the company received value and what loss resulted.
Suspected misuse of company assets should be treated as more than a personal disagreement between business partners.
The foreign shareholder should determine whether the disputed conduct caused damage directly to the company, directly to the shareholder, or both. That distinction can determine who may pursue the claim and where any compensation should ultimately be paid.
Article 553 of the Turkish Commercial Code establishes the statutory foundation for liability arising from breaches of corporate duties, while Turkish company law also provides mechanisms enabling shareholders to pursue compensation concerning damage caused to the company under the applicable conditions.
A strong case normally requires bank tracing, accounting analysis, corporate-authority review, identification of related parties, calculation of loss and preservation of evidence.
Where asset misuse is continuing, the strategy may also require urgent protective measures, restriction or removal of management authority and action to prevent further transfers.
Fırat Fesih Kaya Law Office assists foreign shareholders, international investors and foreign-owned companies with director liability, misuse of company assets, unauthorized transfers, related-party transactions, shareholder disputes and recovery of corporate losses in Turkey.
Lawyer Fırat Fesih Kaya provides legal assistance in investigating disputed corporate transactions, protecting company assets, pursuing management liability and coordinating corporate, compensation and appropriate protective proceedings.
Phone: +90 312 434 22 22
Mobile: +90 532 769 22 22
Email: info@firatfesihkaya.av.tr
Address: Mevlana Boulevard No:221, Yıldırım Tower, Office No:148, 06520 Balgat, Çankaya, Ankara, Turkey
This article is intended for general information and does not constitute legal advice. Director liability and shareholder remedies depend on the company’s legal form, nature of the alleged misconduct, type of damage, corporate documents, available evidence and specific circumstances of the dispute.