

Can a foreigner face criminal charges for giving an IBAN or bank account to another person in Turkey? Learn about fraud, account renting, money laundering, frozen accounts, digital evidence, and defence strategies in 2026.
Yes. Giving an IBAN or allowing another person to use a bank account can lead to a criminal investigation in Turkey if the account is subsequently used for fraud, money laundering, illegal gambling, cybercrime, or another criminal activity. This issue has become particularly important in 2026 because Turkish prosecution offices have issued repeated public warnings concerning bank-account renting, IBAN sharing, mobile banking access, and third-party accounts used to receive criminal proceeds.
However, simply communicating an IBAN for an ordinary lawful payment does not automatically constitute a crime. Millions of legitimate transactions require people and businesses to share IBAN information every day. The criminal-law risk arises from the surrounding circumstances: why the IBAN was given, whether the account was actually placed under another person’s control, what the account holder knew, whether compensation was received, what transactions occurred, and whether the person intentionally assisted criminal conduct.
For a foreign national accused of participating in an IBAN-based fraud scheme, the distinction between merely sharing payment information and knowingly providing an account for criminal use may be decisive.
Not by itself.
Providing an IBAN so that another person can make a legitimate payment is an ordinary banking activity. Examples include receiving:
The legal problem is different where a person gives another individual access to the account itself, bank card, password, mobile banking application, SMS verification codes, or other means of controlling the account.
The risk becomes even greater when the account holder receives money merely for allowing another person to use the account.
In 2026, Turkish prosecution offices publicly warned that accounts and IBANs supplied to others are frequently used for aggravated fraud, money laundering, illegal gambling, and cybercrime.
Fraud organizations commonly attempt to avoid receiving criminal proceeds directly into accounts belonging to the main offenders.
Instead, they may recruit other people by saying:
Akşehir Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office issued a warning on April 6, 2026 concerning increasing IBAN fraud cases and noted that people providing accounts or IBAN information may become initial suspects when fraudulent transfers are traced to those accounts.
This is particularly relevant for foreigners who may be approached through online job offers, investment schemes, cryptocurrency groups, acquaintances, or informal business arrangements.
No.
Criminal responsibility should not automatically follow merely because a victim’s money entered an account belonging to or connected with a foreign national.
Investigators must examine the foreigner’s individual role.
Important questions include:
Knowledge and intent can become central to the defence.
This distinction is extremely important.
If a foreigner sends an IBAN to another person so that the person can transfer a legitimate payment, this is normally an ordinary banking transaction.
The situation becomes substantially more serious if the foreigner provides:
This may allow another person to effectively control the account.
Receiving money specifically in exchange for allowing another person to use the account creates much greater criminal risk.
Official 2026 prosecutorial warnings describe this practice as a serious method through which individuals become involved in fraud and laundering investigations.
The applicable offence depends on the facts.
If the foreigner knowingly participated in deceiving another person in order to obtain financial benefit, fraud allegations may arise.
Fraud involving information systems, banking infrastructure, or circumstances listed in Turkish criminal legislation may result in an investigation for aggravated fraud.
Official prosecutorial warnings concerning account-sharing schemes specifically refer to Articles 157 and 158 of the Turkish Penal Code.
If an account is knowingly used to transfer, disguise, convert, or conceal criminal proceeds, investigators may examine whether money-laundering provisions apply.
The same 2026 prosecutorial guidance expressly identifies Article 282 of the Turkish Penal Code as potentially relevant depending on the circumstances.
Where account holders are part of a coordinated structure involving recruiters, callers, cash collectors, cryptocurrency operators, and other participants, prosecutors may investigate broader allegations concerning organized criminal conduct.
Again, individual liability should depend on the specific person’s knowledge and conduct.
The context of the message becomes crucial.
A message saying:
“Here is my IBAN for the invoice”
may support an entirely different interpretation from:
“Send the money here, I will withdraw it and give you cash.”
The defence should therefore preserve the entire WhatsApp conversation, not merely selected screenshots.
Relevant evidence may include:
Context can fundamentally change the criminal interpretation.
The foreigner should preserve documentation showing the commercial basis of the payment.
Useful evidence may include:
For example, if a payment was received for legitimate consulting services, documentary evidence supporting that commercial relationship may be important.
The personal relationship does not eliminate criminal risk.
Investigators may ask:
A believable explanation should ideally be supported by messages and banking records.
This may become one of the most important defence issues.
The foreigner may have believed the payment concerned:
The defence should look for objective evidence demonstrating why the foreigner believed the transaction was lawful.
Simply saying “I did not know” may be less persuasive than showing communications and records consistent with that explanation.
This creates greater risk.
Investigators may view an unexplained commission as evidence that the account holder understood that they were providing banking access rather than receiving an ordinary payment.
Questions may include:
The existence of commission does not answer every criminal-law question by itself, but it can significantly influence the investigation.
This should be treated cautiously.
Red flags include requests to:
Turkish prosecution authorities have specifically warned that fraudsters persuade individuals to open or surrender accounts and digital credentials in exchange for relatively small amounts of money.
Foreigners may be recruited through supposedly legitimate employment opportunities.
Typical descriptions may include:
The “employee” may be instructed to receive money and transfer most of it elsewhere while retaining a small percentage.
This can create significant criminal exposure if the money originates from victims of fraud.
The foreigner should preserve the original job advertisement, emails, usernames, telephone numbers, employment documents, and payment instructions.
Potentially.
Direct communication with the victim is important evidence, but it is not the only possible basis for an investigation.
Prosecutors may allege that different participants performed different roles.
One person may contact victims while another:
A March 18, 2026 organized fraud case announced by a Turkish prosecution office described an investigation in which banking movements, communication records, victim statements, and digital evidence were evaluated together, including allegations that money was transferred through different accounts to conceal the trail.
Investigators may examine:
The investigation usually attempts to reconstruct who controlled the account and where the money ultimately went.
Potentially, yes.
If disputed funds were withdrawn from an ATM, available video footage may help identify who physically performed the withdrawal.
This can become especially important where the account holder argues that another person possessed the card.
Relevant video should be requested promptly because retention periods may be limited.
This can be highly relevant but does not automatically resolve the investigation.
The foreigner should explain:
Messages confirming that another person had physical control of the card may become important evidence.
The defence should examine technical evidence concerning account access.
Potentially relevant information may include:
This evidence may help distinguish nominal account ownership from actual operational control.
This is a fundamentally different scenario.
Examples include:
The foreigner should immediately preserve evidence showing unauthorized access and notify both the bank and criminal counsel.
Yes.
A bank account associated with suspected fraud or criminal proceeds may become subject to blocking or another investigative measure depending on the legal basis.
Official 2026 warnings concerning account-sharing specifically identify account blocking among the practical consequences individuals may face.
The lawyer should determine:
Potentially.
The likelihood depends on the seriousness of the allegations and evidence.
Factors may include:
Foreign nationality alone should not automatically establish detention grounds.
A criminal lawyer may present evidence showing residence, employment, business activities, family ties, and willingness to cooperate with the investigation.
Yes.
Judicial control measures may include a restriction on leaving Turkey where the statutory conditions are met.
For foreign executives, investors, students, tourists, or employees, a travel restriction can be extremely disruptive.
The defence may challenge the measure or later request its removal.
A criminal investigation may create separate immigration issues depending on the seriousness of the allegation and the foreigner’s circumstances.
Possible consequences may concern:
Criminal and immigration issues should therefore be evaluated together where necessary.
The foreigner should first understand the exact allegation.
They should request:
The suspect should not guess about:
Where the investigation involves many transactions, reviewing bank statements before giving detailed explanations may be important.
That statement may be factually true, but it should not be treated as a complete defence.
Turkish prosecution offices have specifically warned in 2026 about explanations that an individual “only shared the IBAN” after the account became connected with fraudulent transactions.
The stronger defence is usually to establish:
Caution is necessary.
The foreigner should not attempt to:
Such conduct may seriously damage the defence.
Existing communications should instead be preserved.
No.
Do not delete relevant communications.
Messages may establish:
Evidence that initially appears embarrassing may still be essential to understanding the true context.
Investigators will normally examine where the money went.
If the foreigner immediately forwarded the entire amount, the prosecutor may ask whether the person was acting as a financial intermediary.
The defence should establish:
The money trail can become central evidence.
Cryptocurrency does not make the money trail legally irrelevant.
Investigators may examine:
The defence should identify who actually controlled the relevant cryptocurrency account.
Potentially, depending on the facts.
Merely receiving money does not automatically establish money laundering.
However, if investigators believe that the person knowingly helped transfer, disguise, convert, or conceal criminal proceeds, additional allegations may arise.
Article 282 has been expressly identified in 2026 prosecutorial warnings concerning third-party account schemes.
This situation is increasingly relevant.
A foreigner may have been deceived by someone offering:
The foreigner may genuinely not have understood that the account would receive fraud proceeds.
Evidence showing recruitment and deception may therefore become important.
Yes.
Repeated transfers can make it more difficult to argue that an unusual transaction occurred accidentally.
Investigators may look for patterns involving:
Nevertheless, every transaction should still be examined individually.
Foreign business owners should avoid using employees’, friends’, or unrelated third parties’ personal accounts to receive company payments.
Even legitimate transactions can become difficult to explain later if company revenue is routed through personal accounts.
Whenever possible, commercial payments should be supported by:
This reduces both criminal-law and compliance risks.
The foreigner should:
Early preservation of evidence can materially affect the defence.
The defence may focus on several questions:
Knowledge: Did the foreigner know that the transaction was criminal?
Intent: Did the foreigner intentionally facilitate the fraud?
Control: Who actually controlled the bank account?
Benefit: Did the foreigner receive commission or other financial benefit?
Communication: Who spoke to the victims?
Money Flow: Who ultimately received the funds?
Digital Evidence: What do messages, devices, access records, and account logs show?
The strongest strategy normally combines banking, digital, documentary, and witness evidence.
The practical environment changed significantly in 2026 because multiple Turkish prosecution offices launched public-awareness campaigns specifically concerning IBAN sharing, bank-account renting, and accounts supplied to fraudsters. The warnings emphasize that “easy money” arrangements can lead ordinary account holders into serious criminal investigations involving fraud, laundering, and cybercrime.
This does not mean that every person who shares an IBAN automatically commits a criminal offence.
There remains an essential difference between:
lawfully providing an IBAN so someone can make a legitimate payment, and
knowingly surrendering control of an account or assisting the movement of criminal proceeds.
For foreign suspects, establishing the reason for sharing the IBAN, actual control of the account, knowledge of the transaction, communications with others, and ultimate destination of the money will often be decisive.
Not automatically. Providing an IBAN for a legitimate payment is ordinary banking activity. Criminal risk arises when the account is knowingly used to facilitate fraud or other criminal activity.
Yes. Because the account is connected to you, investigators may seek an explanation about the transactions and who controlled the account.
Lack of knowledge may be central to the defence. Communications, contracts, transaction history, and other objective evidence should be preserved.
Yes. Providing passwords, bank cards, PINs, or verification codes may indicate that another person was allowed to control the account and can create substantially greater risk.
Receiving commission for account use can significantly increase suspicion and should be reviewed carefully with criminal counsel.
Potentially. Accounts connected with suspected criminal proceeds may become subject to investigative restrictions depending on the circumstances.
Potentially, if investigators allege that you knowingly assisted the transfer or concealment of criminal proceeds. Article 282 has been specifically identified in official 2026 warnings concerning these schemes.
No. Preserve the messages. They may be important evidence concerning what you knew and why you provided the account information.
Potentially, particularly in serious or organized fraud cases. Detention is not automatic and depends on the legal conditions and evidence.
Do not give an unprepared substantive statement. Preserve all evidence, request an interpreter where necessary, and obtain advice from a criminal lawyer before explaining complicated transactions.
An IBAN appearing in a fraud investigation does not by itself establish that the account holder knowingly participated in the offence. The decisive questions often concern why the IBAN was provided, who controlled the account, whether the foreigner knew the source of the money, whether they received a commission, and where the funds ultimately went.
Fırat Fesih Kaya Law Office provides criminal defence and legal support to foreign nationals, international investors, executives, expatriates, students, tourists, and international businesses facing bank-account and digital-fraud investigations in Turkey.
Lawyer Fırat Fesih Kaya assists foreign clients with IBAN fraud allegations, rented bank accounts, frozen accounts, online banking evidence, WhatsApp communications, money-laundering allegations, prosecutor interviews, detention proceedings, and cross-border financial crime investigations.
Phone: +90 312 434 22 22
Mobile: +90 532 769 22 22
Email: info@firatfesihkaya.av.tr
Address: Mevlana Boulevard No:221, Yıldırım Tower, Office No:148, 06520 Balgat, Çankaya, Ankara, Turkey