

Has your foreign company been targeted by a fake bill of lading or maritime fraud in Turkey? Learn how to identify forged shipping documents, file a criminal complaint, stop cargo delivery, preserve evidence, trace assets and recover losses.
A fake bill of lading in Turkey can expose a foreign exporter, importer, shipowner, carrier, financing bank or international trading company to substantial financial losses within a very short period of time. Maritime fraud may involve a completely fabricated bill of lading, alteration of a genuine document, forged carrier signatures, false endorsements, manipulation of cargo quantities, nonexistent containers, fictitious vessels, fraudulent delivery orders or genuine shipping documents obtained and used by unauthorized persons. In more sophisticated schemes, the fraudster may combine a fake bill of lading with forged commercial invoices, packing lists, certificates, banking documents and email correspondence so that the entire transaction appears genuine. The consequences can include payment for nonexistent cargo, unauthorized release of valuable goods, loss of documentary security, duplicate financing, customs problems and criminal investigations involving several countries. Under Turkish criminal law, the characterization of a forged bill of lading is particularly significant because the Turkish Penal Code gives special treatment to documents representing goods: Article 210 provides that where forgery concerns a document representing goods, the rules applicable to forgery of official documents apply. Article 212 further provides that where a forged document is used to commit another offense, separate punishment for forgery and the other offense may arise. (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi) For a foreign company discovering suspected maritime fraud in Turkey, the priority should therefore be to preserve the original documents and electronic evidence, prevent cargo or money from disappearing, identify the persons involved, initiate the appropriate criminal and civil procedures and investigate assets before recovery becomes impossible.
A fake bill of lading does not necessarily mean that the entire document was created from nothing.
Forgery can occur in several ways.
A fraudster may fabricate a document using the name and logo of a real shipping company. Alternatively, a genuine bill may be altered after issuance.
The vessel name, consignee, shipper, cargo description, quantity, container number, loading date, port of loading, destination, freight status or endorsement may be changed.
A genuine signature may also be copied and inserted into a fraudulent document.
Foreign companies sometimes assume that fraud exists only where the document itself is entirely fictitious.
That is incorrect.
A genuine bill containing fraudulent alterations can create equally serious consequences.
For example, a legitimate bill covering 500 metric tons of cargo might be altered to show 5,000 metric tons and then presented to obtain financing.
The underlying shipment exists, but the document used for the financial transaction does not accurately represent it.
International trade relies heavily on documents.
The buyer, seller and financing banks may be located thousands of kilometers from the physical cargo.
A bank may release millions of dollars based largely on documents appearing to establish that goods have been loaded and shipped.
This separation between the cargo and the people financing it creates opportunities for sophisticated maritime fraud.
One common scheme involves creating a bill that appears to have been issued by a well-known shipping company.
The fraudster may reproduce the carrier’s logo, document layout and terminology.
A foreign buyer receiving the document may therefore believe that the cargo has genuinely been loaded.
Before transferring substantial funds, independent verification of the shipment can be extremely important.
A fraudulent bill may identify a vessel that exists but never carried the relevant cargo.
In other cases, the vessel itself may be fictitious.
The document may show a plausible vessel name and voyage number specifically to prevent immediate suspicion.
The vessel information should therefore be independently checked when transaction risk is significant.
Container numbers can also be manipulated.
A fraudster may insert genuine-looking numbers into the bill even though those containers were never associated with the shipment.
Container tracking information and carrier records can become valuable evidence when the fraud is investigated.
Commodity transactions are particularly vulnerable to quantity manipulation.
A bill may claim that thousands of tons of steel, grain, chemicals or other commodities were loaded even though a much smaller quantity was shipped.
The fraudulent document may then be used to obtain payment or financing for goods that never existed.
The cargo description may also be manipulated.
Low-value goods can potentially be described as expensive commodities.
The fraudster then obtains payment based on the represented value while the actual container contains something entirely different.
This type of scheme can involve both maritime fraud and broader commercial fraud.
A particularly serious scenario arises where the bill suggests that valuable goods were loaded but the container is empty or contains worthless material.
The buyer may discover the fraud only after payment has been released.
Immediate preservation of container seals, terminal records, loading evidence and inspection documentation can then become crucial.
Payment mechanisms may depend on proof that goods were actually loaded onboard.
A fraudulent shipped-on-board notation can therefore be used to trigger payment even though the goods were never loaded.
The date, vessel and loading records should be verified directly against independent operational evidence.
The signature of an authorized carrier representative may be copied or fabricated.
The foreign company should determine who was authorized to sign bills for the carrier and whether that person actually issued the disputed document.
Signature comparison can form part of a broader forensic investigation.
A fraudulent bill may similarly use the name of a legitimate Turkish ship agency.
The document may state that it was signed “as agent for the carrier” even though the agent had no involvement in the shipment.
The alleged agent should be contacted promptly and the response preserved as evidence.
Sometimes the document was genuinely produced within a shipping organization but issued by an employee acting without authority.
This creates a more complicated legal dispute.
The investigation should examine the employee’s position, system access, scope of authority and whether internal procedures were bypassed.
A genuine bill can become fraudulent through a forged endorsement.
A person may imitate the signature or corporate stamp of the lawful holder and attempt to transfer the document.
The carrier should verify the endorsement chain before releasing valuable cargo where irregularities are apparent.
Fraudulent shipping documents frequently contain copied company stamps.
A stamp appearing authentic does not establish that the company actually approved the document.
Foreign companies should therefore avoid relying exclusively on visual appearance.
Another dangerous scheme involves multiple purported originals circulating simultaneously.
A seller may pledge one set to a financing bank while another set is used to obtain delivery.
Alternatively, fraudulent duplicates may be created after legitimate originals have already been issued.
The number of originals issued should therefore be verified.
Maritime fraud increasingly involves electronic release procedures.
A fraudster may send an email appearing to originate from the loading-port office and instruct the destination agent to release cargo.
The original bill may never have been surrendered.
The lawful holder subsequently discovers that the cargo has disappeared.
Similar problems can arise where someone falsely changes the shipment status to express release.
The carrier should maintain reliable authorization and audit procedures.
A major cargo release should be traceable to the individual or system instruction that authorized it.
The bill of lading itself may be genuine while the delivery order is fraudulent.
A person can potentially present fabricated documentation to the terminal or another party controlling physical delivery.
The investigation should therefore extend beyond the bill of lading.
A person collecting cargo may produce a forged power of attorney supposedly issued by the consignee.
The carrier or agent should preserve the document and identification information used during collection.
Where fraud is suspected, signature and corporate authorization records may need forensic examination.
A fraudulent bill can be used to obtain financing for nonexistent cargo.
The bank may believe that the document represents goods that can serve as commercial security.
If the borrower defaults and the bank attempts to take control of the cargo, it may discover that no such shipment ever existed.
The same cargo may sometimes be pledged to multiple financiers.
Fraudsters can create duplicate documentary packages and obtain separate financing from different banks.
When the scheme collapses, several institutions may claim rights over the same cargo.
Document chronology becomes crucial.
A fake bill of lading may also be presented under a letter of credit.
Documentary transactions create particularly complex issues because banks generally deal with documents rather than physically inspecting cargo.
Where deliberate falsification is discovered, immediate legal action may be necessary before funds are transferred or withdrawn.
Documents against payment transactions can also be manipulated.
A fraudulent party may attempt to obtain cargo without paying or may provide fabricated documents to obtain money from the buyer.
Banking records should be preserved immediately after the fraud becomes apparent.
The fraudulent party may be the seller.
A supposed exporter may provide a foreign buyer with a bill showing that cargo has been loaded in Turkey even though the shipment never occurred.
The buyer transfers the purchase price and later discovers that no goods are arriving.
The buyer can also manipulate shipping documents.
For example, forged documents may be used to obtain delivery without paying the seller or lawful document holder.
The investigation should therefore avoid assuming who committed the fraud merely from the commercial roles of the parties.
A freight forwarder may be positioned between the shipper and carrier.
A dishonest intermediary may create documents that appear to be carrier-issued bills or manipulate house and master bill information.
The contractual chain should be reconstructed carefully.
International logistics transactions can involve both house bills and master bills.
Foreign companies should determine which entity issued each document and what rights each document actually represents.
A fraudulent party may deliberately exploit confusion between the two.
The criminal-law consequences can be significant.
The Turkish Penal Code distinguishes between forgery involving ordinary private documents and certain specially protected documents. Most importantly for maritime transactions, Article 210 states that when forgery concerns a document representing goods, the provisions governing forgery of official documents apply. Under Article 204, forging, deceptively altering or using a forged official document is punishable by imprisonment within the statutory framework. (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi)
This makes the legal classification of a forged bill of lading particularly important.
The person who physically created the forged document is not necessarily the only person exposed to criminal liability.
Knowingly using a forged document can itself create criminal responsibility.
A director, employee, trader or intermediary who did not manufacture the bill but knowingly presents it to obtain cargo or money can therefore face serious consequences.
A fake bill is frequently only the mechanism used to obtain money or property.
For example, a fraudster creates a forged bill and uses it to convince an overseas buyer to transfer USD 2 million.
The document forgery and fraudulent acquisition of money raise distinct criminal issues. Turkish Penal Code Article 212 specifically provides that when a forged official or private document is used in committing another offense, punishment may be imposed separately for forgery and the other offense. (WIPO)
Knowledge and intent are critical when determining individual criminal responsibility.
An employee who innocently forwards a document believed to be genuine is in a fundamentally different position from a person who knowingly creates or uses a false bill.
Investigators may therefore examine emails, messaging records, financial transfers and the suspect’s involvement in preparing the transaction.
Foreign nationality does not automatically prevent Turkish authorities from investigating maritime fraud connected with Turkey.
Where relevant acts, cargo, victims, perpetrators or consequences have a sufficient connection with Turkey, Turkish criminal jurisdiction may become relevant under the applicable rules.
Cross-border cases can therefore involve simultaneous proceedings in more than one jurisdiction.
Where a company presents fraudulent shipping documents, investigators may examine directors, managers and employees who participated in the transaction.
Being a director does not automatically establish criminal liability.
The investigation should determine who knew about the false document, who authorized its use and who benefited from the transaction.
A foreign company that discovers a fake bill of lading connected with Turkey can consider filing a criminal complaint with the competent Turkish authorities.
The complaint should explain the commercial transaction, identify the fraudulent document, describe why it is believed to be false and show the financial loss or attempted loss.
A disorganized complaint containing hundreds of pages without explaining the fraud clearly can slow the investigation.
A maritime fraud complaint should generally establish a chronological sequence:
Commercial Agreement → Payment Terms → Shipment Arrangement → Bill of Lading Received → Payment Made → Fraud Discovered → Verification With Carrier → Cargo Status → Financial Loss → Suspected Persons → Money Transfers.
This makes the case easier for investigators to understand.
If the company possesses the physical document, it should preserve it carefully.
Do not write notes on it, stamp it or alter it after discovering the fraud.
The original may require forensic examination.
High-quality copies can be used for routine legal work while the original remains protected.
If genuine bills from the same carrier are available, they may assist comparison.
Differences in paper, formatting, signatures, serial numbers, fonts, stamps or security features can become relevant.
However, visual differences alone should not replace formal verification.
One of the strongest early steps can be confirming whether the alleged carrier actually issued the document.
The inquiry should identify the bill number, vessel, voyage, container numbers, shipper and consignee.
The carrier’s response should be preserved.
The claimant should determine whether the named vessel existed and whether it called at the stated loading port on the relevant date.
If the vessel was thousands of kilometers away, this can become powerful evidence of fabrication.
Container tracking records may demonstrate that a container listed in the document was never present at the stated port.
They may also show that the container belonged to another carrier.
These discrepancies can help expose the fraudulent structure.
Terminal records can establish whether the container entered the port, was loaded onboard or was discharged.
Where a fake bill claims that cargo was shipped from a Turkish terminal, operational records can become decisive evidence.
Where physical delivery or collection is involved, CCTV may identify the person who obtained the cargo.
Video retention periods can be short.
Preservation requests should therefore be considered immediately.
Do not delete suspicious emails.
Original email data can contain information about sending infrastructure and communication history that screenshots do not show.
Where business email compromise is suspected, IT personnel should preserve relevant mailbox and security records.
Messaging applications may reveal negotiations, payment instructions and admissions.
The complete conversation should be preserved where possible rather than collecting only isolated messages favorable to one party.
Context can become important during criminal proceedings.
Maritime fraud frequently combines documentary fraud with payment diversion.
A fraudster may compromise an email account and send new bank instructions while simultaneously supplying fake shipping documents.
The buyer believes both messages are genuine and transfers money to the fraudster’s account.
The banking trail should be investigated immediately.
If fraud proceeds remain identifiable in a Turkish bank account, rapid legal intervention can be critical.
Money can be transferred through several accounts or converted into other assets very quickly.
The criminal complaint should therefore identify transaction dates, beneficiary accounts, amounts and available bank documents.
Fraud proceeds may also be converted into cryptocurrency.
Where there is evidence of such transfers, wallet addresses, exchange information and transaction records should be preserved.
Digital asset tracing may become part of the investigation.
Depending on the suspected offenses, evidence and statutory conditions, Turkish criminal procedure may permit protective measures concerning assets.
Foreign victims should provide investigators with concrete information concerning identifiable property rather than merely requesting that “all assets be frozen.”
Bank transfers, property details and corporate connections can make an application substantially more effective.
A criminal complaint is not necessarily a complete debt-recovery strategy.
The foreign company should simultaneously determine whether civil or commercial claims can be pursued against the seller, buyer, carrier, intermediary or other responsible parties.
The criminal and civil dimensions may proceed differently.
Where the foreign company has a monetary claim and the relevant statutory conditions are satisfied, precautionary attachment can become an important recovery mechanism.
This is particularly important where the suspected fraudster owns bank accounts, real estate, vehicles, company shares or receivables in Turkey.
Waiting for the criminal case to conclude can sometimes allow assets to disappear.
Where specific cargo or another identifiable asset remains in Turkey, an appropriate precautionary injunction may need to be considered.
The legal basis depends on the nature of the dispute.
The claimant should show urgency and the risk that later enforcement would become difficult or impossible.
If the fraud concerns unauthorized transfer rather than nonexistent goods, the cargo may still be recoverable.
The foreign company should determine where the goods are physically located.
They may remain at a Turkish port, warehouse, factory or customs-controlled location.
Speed is crucial because commodities can be resold rapidly.
Recovery becomes more complicated when the fraudulent recipient sells the cargo onward.
The legal position of the subsequent purchaser, its knowledge and the nature of the transferred rights must be analyzed.
The claimant may need to shift from physical cargo recovery toward monetary compensation.
Not every fake bill case creates carrier liability.
If criminals independently fabricate a document using a carrier’s logo without any involvement by the carrier, the carrier may itself be a victim of impersonation.
Liability should therefore be based on actual conduct rather than the mere appearance of the carrier’s name.
The situation changes where the fraudulent document was generated through the carrier’s own systems, issued by an authorized employee or accepted despite obvious irregularities.
Internal controls and authorization procedures may then become relevant.
The factual investigation should determine precisely what occurred.
A Turkish ship agent may also have been impersonated.
Alternatively, an agent employee may have participated in unauthorized documentation or cargo release.
The agent’s actual role should therefore be established before liability is alleged.
A terminal generally relies on release instructions from relevant shipping parties.
If cargo was released through fraudulent documentation, the terminal’s verification obligations and actual instructions should be examined.
Physical delivery records can also help identify the fraudsters.
An LOI itself can be forged.
A carrier may believe that a reputable company or bank has provided security for delivery without originals, only to discover later that the document was fabricated.
Any significant LOI should therefore be independently verified before cargo release.
The same risk exists with purported bank guarantees.
Fraudsters can create sophisticated documents appearing to originate from recognized financial institutions.
Independent confirmation can prevent substantial losses.
Foreign companies should not assume that every maritime fraud originates outside their organization.
An employee may collaborate with suppliers, freight forwarders or customers.
Investigators should therefore examine unusual communications, unauthorized system access and unexplained financial relationships where evidence justifies doing so.
Where the loss is substantial, a structured internal investigation can complement legal proceedings.
Access logs, document creation histories, email correspondence, authorization records and financial approvals should be preserved.
Evidence should be collected in a manner that protects its integrity.
A fraudulent transaction can involve several innocent commercial parties.
The carrier may have been impersonated. The ship agent may never have seen the document. The freight forwarder may also have been deceived.
The investigation should distinguish verified facts from suspicions.
Unfounded allegations can create additional legal problems.
International shipping fraud rarely respects national borders.
The seller may be in one country, buyer in another, carrier in a third, bank account in Turkey and cargo somewhere else entirely.
The recovery strategy should therefore identify which jurisdiction controls each part of the dispute.
Proceedings in Turkey do not necessarily prevent action elsewhere.
A foreign company may need criminal investigation in Turkey while pursuing contractual or banking remedies in another jurisdiction.
Evidence gathered in one proceeding can potentially become relevant elsewhere subject to procedural requirements.
The underlying sale contract, charterparty or bill of lading may contain foreign jurisdiction or arbitration clauses.
These clauses should be examined for contractual claims.
However, contractual forum provisions should not automatically be assumed to determine every aspect of a criminal investigation into alleged forgery or fraud.
Cargo insurers, trade credit insurers, cyber insurers or other relevant insurers should be notified promptly where coverage may exist.
Policies frequently contain notification requirements.
The insured should avoid allowing recovery deadlines to expire merely because an insurance claim is under review.
Many modern fake-document schemes begin with compromised email accounts.
A criminal gains access to genuine commercial correspondence, learns the shipment details and intervenes at exactly the right moment.
Because the fraudulent email contains accurate vessel and cargo information, the recipient does not become suspicious.
Cyber evidence should therefore be preserved immediately.
Password changes alone are not enough after suspected compromise.
The company should preserve login records, forwarding rules, suspicious authentication activity and deleted or altered emails.
These records can help determine how the fraud occurred.
Electronic trade documentation can reduce some traditional paper risks but creates new ones.
Fraudsters may create fake verification pages, cloned websites or manipulated QR codes.
Users should verify electronic documents through the genuine issuing system rather than a link supplied by the counterparty itself.
Modern document-generation technology makes visual verification increasingly unreliable.
Logos, signatures, stamps, layouts and business correspondence can be reproduced convincingly.
Foreign companies should therefore move from “does this document look genuine?” to “can this document be independently authenticated?”
That distinction is becoming increasingly important in maritime transactions.
Serious warning signs can include inconsistencies between the vessel and loading date, unusual formatting, unexplained changes in bank details, container numbers that cannot be verified, incorrect carrier contact information, pressure for immediate payment, mismatched signatures and refusal to allow direct verification with the carrier.
One irregularity may have an innocent explanation.
Several irregularities appearing together should trigger enhanced verification.
For high-value shipments, the company should independently confirm critical transportation facts rather than relying solely on documents provided by the seller.
Verification procedures should be proportionate to the transaction value and risk.
Payment control and shipping-document verification should ideally be separated internally.
The first objective is preservation.
Secure the original documents, emails, invoices, contracts, bank transfer records and communications. Contact the relevant carrier or agent to verify the bill. Determine whether the cargo exists and where it is located. Notify the bank immediately if funds were recently transferred. Identify Turkish accounts or assets connected with the transaction.
Legal action should then be coordinated quickly.
During the first 24 hours, the company should preserve all physical and electronic evidence, contact its bank, confirm whether payment can still be stopped, verify the bill directly with the alleged issuer and determine the physical status of the cargo.
No suspicious counterparty should be warned unnecessarily before urgent asset-preservation options have been assessed.
The transaction chronology should be prepared.
The company should identify every person involved, including directors, employees, intermediaries, bank account holders, freight forwarders and agents.
Potential Turkish assets and bank accounts should be mapped.
A criminal complaint and urgent civil recovery strategy can then be prepared.
By this stage, the foreign company should determine whether criminal proceedings, precautionary attachment, injunctions, cargo recovery measures or commercial litigation should be initiated.
Insurance notifications should be completed where relevant.
Evidence preservation requests should also be considered for third parties holding records that might otherwise be deleted.
The investigation should establish:
Sale Contract → Seller → Buyer → Payment Terms → Bill Issuer → Bill Number → Vessel → Voyage → Container Numbers → Loading Port → Loading Date → Cargo Description → Original Documents → Endorsements → Carrier Verification → Payment Transfer → Recipient Bank Account → Cargo Location → Persons Involved → Financial Loss.
The objective is to connect the false document directly to the commercial loss.
A foreign company purchases USD 1.5 million of commodities supposedly loaded at a Turkish port.
The seller sends a bill of lading showing a recognized vessel and carrier.
After payment, the buyer contacts the carrier and learns that the bill number does not exist and the vessel never carried the cargo.
The buyer should immediately investigate the payment account, preserve the forged document and consider criminal and asset-recovery measures in Turkey.
A real shipment contains 200 tons of cargo.
The seller alters the bill to show 2,000 tons and obtains financing based on the larger quantity.
The financing institution discovers the discrepancy when the borrower defaults.
The original carrier records, terminal loading information and document history can become central evidence.
A legitimate original bill is stolen or copied.
The fraudster creates a false endorsement and uses it to obtain delivery.
The lawful holder later presents its documents and discovers that the cargo has disappeared.
The investigation should focus on the endorsement, delivery authorization and identity of the person collecting the goods.
A destination agent in Turkey receives an email appearing to confirm that the originals were surrendered overseas.
The cargo is released.
The message later proves fraudulent.
Email headers, system access records, release logs and the agent’s verification procedures should be preserved immediately.
A trading company uses different sets of purported bills to obtain financing from several institutions for the same commodity shipment.
When the transaction collapses, each lender claims rights to the goods.
The investigation must establish the authenticity and chronology of every document and identify where the financing proceeds were transferred.
A foreign company facing a fake bill of lading should treat the matter simultaneously as a criminal, commercial, documentary and asset-recovery emergency. The first step is to secure the disputed document and verify it directly with the alleged carrier or issuing agent. Vessel movements, container numbers, terminal records and loading information should then be checked independently. The company should preserve contracts, invoices, payment instructions, emails, messaging records and bank transfers and establish exactly when each document was received. If money was transferred recently, the banking response should begin immediately. If cargo exists, its physical location should be determined before it can be moved or sold. The persons who created, transmitted, endorsed and used the document should be distinguished because criminal responsibility depends on individual conduct and knowledge. Where Turkish criminal jurisdiction is available, a detailed criminal complaint can seek investigation of the forgery and related fraud. Because bills of lading may fall within the special Turkish Penal Code protection applicable to documents representing goods, the forgery analysis can be particularly serious. (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi) At the same time, criminal proceedings should not replace civil recovery planning. Bank accounts, real estate, company shares, receivables and other assets connected with the suspected wrongdoers should be investigated. Precautionary attachment or other provisional protection should be considered where statutory requirements are satisfied. The practical roadmap is therefore: preserve the fake bill → secure the original documents → verify the issuer → verify the vessel → verify container numbers → obtain terminal records → verify loading → preserve email evidence → preserve payment records → contact the bank → trace transferred funds → identify the account holder → locate the cargo → identify the persons who created and used the document → preserve digital evidence → file the appropriate criminal complaint → assess asset seizure possibilities → investigate civil defendants → identify Turkish assets → seek precautionary attachment where available → seek cargo protection where appropriate → notify insurers → pursue contractual and tort claims → coordinate foreign proceedings → recover the cargo, money or compensation.
Potentially, yes. Turkish criminal law contains specific document-forgery provisions, and Article 210 applies the official-document forgery rules where the forged document is a document representing goods. (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi)
Potentially, yes, where the legal elements are satisfied and the person knowingly used the forged document. Knowledge is therefore an important issue in determining individual criminal liability.
Yes. Where a forged document is used in committing another offense, Article 212 of the Turkish Penal Code provides for separate punishment for forgery and the other offense where their respective elements are established. (WIPO)
Potentially, yes, where the alleged conduct falls within Turkish criminal jurisdiction. Foreign corporate status does not by itself prevent a victim from seeking protection through Turkish criminal proceedings.
Preserve the disputed document and all related electronic evidence, verify the bill directly with the alleged issuer and determine whether money or cargo can still be secured.
Potentially. The chances of recovery depend heavily on speed, the location of the funds and available evidence. Immediate banking and legal action is particularly important because funds may be transferred onward rapidly.
No. A carrier may itself have been impersonated. Liability depends on the carrier’s actual involvement, contractual obligations and conduct.
Potentially. Criminal protective measures and civil precautionary measures operate under different legal requirements. The appropriate mechanism depends on the offense, evidence, claim and assets involved.
Potentially, especially where the cargo exists, remains identifiable and is still located in Turkey. Urgent action becomes important before the goods are transferred, processed or resold.
The disputed bill, genuine comparison documents, carrier verification, vessel and container records, terminal information, sale contracts, invoices, banking records, emails, messaging communications and evidence identifying the persons who created or used the document are generally among the most important materials.
Foreign exporters, importers, financing institutions, shipowners, carriers, commodity traders and international companies facing fake bills of lading or maritime fraud in Turkey may require urgent assistance with criminal complaints, forged shipping documents, fraudulent cargo releases, bank transfer fraud, asset tracing, precautionary attachment, cargo recovery and commercial compensation claims.
Firat Fesih Kaya Law Office assists foreign companies and international maritime businesses in complex maritime fraud disputes involving Turkey. Firat Fesih Kaya can assist with investigating disputed bills of lading, preserving evidence, identifying responsible parties, initiating criminal proceedings, tracing Turkish assets and pursuing available civil and commercial recovery measures.
Phone: +90 312 434 22 22
Mobile Phone: +90 532 769 22 22
Email: info@firatfesihkaya.av.tr
Address: Mevlana Boulevard No: 221, Yildirim Tower, Balgat, Cankaya / Ankara, Turkey