

A foreign manager is accused of copying company trade secrets in Turkey. Learn about criminal investigations, digital evidence, laptops, emails, confidentiality disputes, search and seizure, defense strategies and return of seized devices.
Foreign executives, directors and senior employees working in Turkey can face serious allegations after leaving a company, joining a competitor or becoming involved in a shareholder or employment dispute. A former employer may allege that the foreign manager copied customer lists, pricing information, technical drawings, source files, manufacturing information, business plans, tender documents or other confidential commercial information before departure. Such allegations can lead to a criminal complaint, digital examination of computers and phones, seizure of electronic devices and parallel civil or commercial proceedings. However, finding company documents on a device does not by itself resolve whether a criminal offense occurred. The investigation should examine what information was allegedly taken, whether it legally qualifies for protection, how it was obtained, whether the manager was authorized to access it, what happened to the information afterward and whether the digital evidence reliably proves the allegation.
A dispute may begin after an internal audit, resignation, dismissal, transfer to a competitor or discovery that company files were downloaded shortly before an employee left.
The company may then file a criminal complaint alleging unlawful acquisition, disclosure or use of commercially confidential information.
The exact offense and applicable legal provisions depend on the conduct alleged.
Not every internal company document should automatically be treated as a trade secret.
The investigation may need to examine whether the information was genuinely confidential, commercially valuable because of its secrecy, restricted within the company and protected through reasonable confidentiality measures.
The label “confidential” alone does not necessarily answer these questions.
Companies frequently allege that customer lists constitute protected confidential information.
However, the defense should examine how the information was created, whether it was publicly available, whether the manager personally developed the customer relationships and whether the alleged confidential information contains material beyond publicly accessible contact details.
Internal pricing formulas, discount structures, profit margins and non-public customer-specific prices can potentially raise stronger confidentiality issues.
The investigation should identify exactly which information was allegedly copied rather than referring broadly to “pricing data.”
Engineering drawings, formulas, manufacturing processes, prototypes and technical specifications can create significant exposure where they contain genuinely confidential proprietary information.
Foreign managers involved in manufacturing, energy, technology or industrial companies should treat allegations concerning technical documentation particularly seriously.
Technology-sector investigations may involve source code, repositories, development credentials, internal algorithms or proprietary software.
Digital forensic evidence can become central in determining whether files were copied, transferred or accessed.
This is often one of the first important questions.
A senior manager may have had legitimate access to confidential information as part of their job. Authorized access and unlawful subsequent copying or disclosure are different factual questions.
The prosecution should therefore examine more than the fact that the manager opened the files.
A manager may have accessed hundreds of documents during ordinary employment.
The defense should reconstruct the person’s responsibilities, permissions and normal working practices.
A large download shortly before resignation or dismissal can become important evidence.
However, context matters. The files may have been downloaded for a legitimate project, business trip, backup, presentation or ordinary work requirement.
The timeline should be reconstructed carefully.
Sending corporate documents to a personal email account may be relied upon as evidence.
The defense should examine why the files were transferred, whether company policy permitted the practice, whether remote working routinely required it and whether the files were later used or disclosed.
Digital forensic examinations may identify USB connections, file-copying activity or external storage devices.
A USB connection alone does not necessarily establish which files were copied or how they were subsequently used.
Investigators may examine allegations involving cloud drives, file-sharing platforms or synchronized folders.
The company should distinguish automatic synchronization from deliberate transfer where technically relevant.
Messages between the foreign manager and another employee, customer or competitor may become part of the investigation.
Individual messages should be evaluated in their complete context rather than isolated from surrounding communications.
Where legally authorized, digital devices can become subject to examination during a criminal investigation.
The foreign manager should determine the legal basis of the seizure, identify precisely which devices were taken and preserve copies of relevant seizure documentation.
A personal device may contain both private material and information allegedly relevant to the investigation.
The legal basis and scope of any search, seizure or forensic examination should be reviewed carefully.
Phones may contain messages, emails, cloud applications, photographs and authentication records.
Foreign suspects should obtain legal advice before making decisions concerning device access and statements about digital material.
Deleting messages, wiping devices or destroying records after becoming aware of an investigation can seriously complicate the defense.
Potentially relevant evidence should be preserved.
Forensic analysis is not useful only to the prosecution.
It may establish that files were never opened, never transferred externally, were automatically synchronized, predated the disputed employment period or were deleted without being disclosed.
Creation dates, modification dates, access records, file paths and user information can help reconstruct what actually occurred.
A screenshot showing a file on a computer does not necessarily establish its complete history.
Company systems may record login locations, IP addresses and access times.
The defense should verify whether those records genuinely correspond to the accused manager rather than assuming that an account login conclusively establishes the individual user.
If several employees used the same account, computer or credentials, attributing a particular action to one person may become difficult.
Internal cybersecurity practices can therefore become relevant evidence.
Mistaken attribution is possible in shared systems.
Audit logs, access permissions, device identifiers and employee schedules should be examined before concluding that the foreign manager performed the disputed action.
Where evidence was obtained through a workplace, residence or device search, the defense should examine whether the relevant criminal-procedure requirements were satisfied.
Challenges concerning evidence collection can become important depending on the circumstances.
A foreign manager summoned for questioning should understand the allegations before giving a detailed statement.
The defense should obtain as much information as legally available concerning the complaint and alleged evidence.
A foreign suspect who cannot adequately understand Turkish should request appropriate interpretation during criminal proceedings.
The person should not sign a statement they do not understand.
If an interpreter inaccurately translates technical or commercial terminology, the foreign manager should raise the problem before signing the statement where possible.
Words such as “copy,” “access,” “transfer,” “download” and “disclose” can describe very different technical actions.
A suspect should not guess about technical events they cannot remember.
Digital records can later contradict an inaccurate assumption made during an interview.
Trade-secret complaints sometimes arise alongside dismissal, non-compete, compensation or severance disputes.
The existence of a commercial conflict does not automatically make the criminal allegation false, but the broader dispute may be relevant to evaluating the complaint and evidence.
A foreign manager who is also a shareholder may face criminal allegations during a corporate-control dispute.
The defense should preserve board records, shareholder communications and evidence explaining the manager’s legitimate access to company information.
A former manager may lawfully possess professional experience and general industry knowledge.
The investigation should distinguish personal knowledge and experience from specific protected company information allegedly copied or disclosed.
Evidence showing transmission to a competitor can significantly affect the investigation.
The defense should determine exactly what was transmitted, by whom, when and whether the material was genuinely confidential.
Investigators may compare allegedly copied documents with a competitor’s products, pricing, tenders or business strategy.
Similarity alone should be examined carefully because companies operating in the same industry may independently use similar information or methods.
Complex cases can require computer-forensic, engineering, accounting or industry expertise.
An expert may help determine whether files were copied and whether the allegedly secret information was technically or commercially distinct.
The foreign manager should retain the employment agreement, confidentiality agreement, job description, internal policies, authorization records and relevant correspondence.
These documents can establish what information the person was permitted to access.
The contractual definition of confidential information can be relevant but should not automatically be treated as identical to the requirements of criminal liability.
Contractual breach and criminal responsibility are separate legal questions.
If employees routinely worked from home, emailed documents to themselves or used personal devices with management’s knowledge, preserve evidence of those practices.
This context may become important when evaluating allegedly suspicious file transfers.
Policies concerning USB devices, cloud storage, remote access, personal email and confidential documents can become important.
The defense should determine whether the policies actually existed, were communicated and were consistently enforced.
Detention or other criminal-procedure measures depend on the allegations, evidence and applicable legal conditions.
Foreign nationality alone should not be treated as proof of criminal conduct.
Depending on the criminal investigation and judicial assessment, measures affecting travel may potentially arise.
A foreign executive who travels internationally for business should address any such restriction urgently because it can significantly affect employment and commercial responsibilities.
If a passport or other property is taken during an investigation, the precise legal basis should be identified. Where continued retention is no longer justified, available procedures for return should be evaluated.
Potentially. Once continued physical retention is no longer necessary, a request for return may be considered under the applicable criminal-procedure framework.
The authorities may sometimes preserve forensic copies while the question of returning physical hardware is addressed.
A laptop owned by the employer raises different ownership questions from a personally owned computer.
Prepare purchase records or other ownership evidence where relevant.
Trade-secret cases create an additional problem: the criminal case itself may contain commercially sensitive documents.
Procedural measures concerning access and protection of confidential material should therefore be evaluated carefully.
Where the manager works for an international corporate group, the parent company may hold important evidence concerning authorization, reporting structures and document access.
Cross-border evidence should be preserved before employee accounts are closed or systems are migrated.
Companies and managers should avoid altering potentially relevant electronic evidence while attempting to determine what happened.
Digital evidence should be preserved in a manner that allows its integrity to be demonstrated.
The former employer may also seek injunctions, damages or contractual remedies.
Statements made in one proceeding can affect another, so criminal and commercial defense strategies should be coordinated.
Potential remedies depend on the circumstances and outcome of the investigation.
The manager should first focus on preserving evidence establishing what actually occurred before pursuing claims arising from an allegedly false complaint.
A foreign manager accused of copying trade secrets in Turkey should immediately identify the precise files allegedly taken, preserve all devices and records, avoid deleting data, collect employment and authorization documents, reconstruct the timeline of file access, preserve evidence of normal working practices, examine company policies, review the legality and scope of searches or seizures, obtain appropriate interpretation where necessary and coordinate digital-forensic and legal analysis before providing detailed explanations about disputed electronic activity.
Not automatically. The investigation should consider the nature of the information, authorization to access it, how it was obtained and whether it was unlawfully used or disclosed.
Potentially, depending on their contents, confidentiality and commercial circumstances. Publicly available customer information presents a different issue from genuinely confidential customer databases.
Digital examination requires consideration of the applicable criminal-procedure framework and the scope of the relevant investigative authorization.
No. Potentially relevant electronic evidence should be preserved rather than destroyed or altered.
Yes. Digital forensic analysis may help determine whether files were copied, opened, transferred or automatically synchronized.
No. Employment by a competitor alone does not establish that confidential information was unlawfully obtained or disclosed.
Authorization is highly relevant. The investigation must distinguish legitimate access during employment from any allegedly unlawful subsequent conduct.
Potentially, depending on whether continued physical retention remains necessary and the procedural status of the investigation.
Appropriate interpretation should be requested so that the suspect can understand the allegations and criminal proceedings accurately.
Preserve the digital evidence and reconstruct exactly what happened before giving technical explanations from memory. Trade-secret investigations often turn on detailed electronic evidence concerning access, copying, transfer and disclosure, and those are separate factual questions that should not be confused.
Trade-secret allegations against foreign executives can involve criminal complaints, digital forensic examinations, seized laptops and phones, confidentiality agreements, employment disputes, competitor allegations and international corporate evidence. Fırat Fesih Kaya Law Office assists foreign managers, directors, employees and international companies involved in criminal investigations in Turkey. Lawyer Fırat Fesih Kaya provides legal assistance during police and prosecutor proceedings, digital-evidence disputes, search and seizure procedures, requests for return of property and parallel criminal and commercial disputes involving alleged confidential business information.
Phone: +90 312 434 22 22
Mobile: +90 532 769 22 22
Email: info@firatfesihkaya.av.tr
Address: Mevlana Boulevard No:221, Yıldırım Tower, Office No:148, 06520 Balgat, Çankaya, Ankara, Turkey