

Internal Fraud in a Turkish Subsidiary: Foreign Parent Company Legal Guide 2026
Foreign parent company discovers fraud in its Turkish subsidiary? Learn how to preserve evidence, investigate directors and employees, trace company money, file a criminal complaint, protect assets and manage corporate liability in Turkey in 2026.
Discovering internal fraud inside a Turkish subsidiary can create an immediate crisis for a foreign parent company. The problem may involve an employee stealing company money, a director transferring funds to personal accounts, fictitious suppliers, false invoices, unauthorized related-party transactions, manipulated accounting records, diverted customer payments, hidden commissions, forged corporate documents or company assets transferred to persons connected with local management.
The parent company should avoid treating every accounting irregularity as proven criminal fraud. Turkish criminal liability depends on the actual conduct. Depending on the facts, the investigation may raise issues involving fraud, breach of trust, document forgery, manipulation of electronic records, tax offences or other offences.
Turkish Criminal Code Article 157 defines fraud around deceptive conduct that causes another person to act to their or another person’s detriment while obtaining an unlawful benefit. Article 158 contains aggravated forms, including specified circumstances involving commercial activity and the use of banking or information systems.
For a foreign parent company, the first objective should usually be:
Preserve evidence → Stop continuing losses → Identify suspicious transactions → Secure corporate systems → Determine individual responsibility → Trace money and assets → Assess criminal characterization → Consider a criminal complaint → Pursue recovery and corporate remedies in parallel.
Internal fraud rarely appears in the accounting system under the label “fraud.”
It may first appear as:
One suspicious transaction does not automatically prove a crime. The company should reconstruct what actually happened.
Once credible evidence of internal fraud emerges, evidence preservation should normally take priority over confrontation.
Immediately consider preserving:
Do not allow potentially relevant evidence to disappear through routine deletion policies.
A foreign parent company may understandably want to call the local manager immediately and ask:
“Where did the money go?”
Premature confrontation can create problems.
The suspected person may still control:
Before confrontation, determine what evidence can lawfully be preserved and what access should be secured.
Evidence preservation does not mean leaving the suspected scheme operational.
Depending on the facts and corporate authority structure, the company may need to review:
Changes should be documented and implemented lawfully.
Never respond to suspected fraud by “cleaning” the company’s records.
Do not:
The original evidence may be important both for prosecution and for demonstrating that innocent directors or parent-company executives were not involved.
Avoid starting with:
“Our Turkish subsidiary has been defrauded of millions.”
Instead create a transaction schedule.
| Date | Amount | Sender | Recipient | Accounting Description | Approver | Concern |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 08.01.2026 | €75,000 | Subsidiary | Supplier A | Consulting | Manager X | No deliverables |
| 22.02.2026 | €120,000 | Subsidiary | Company B | Equipment | CFO Y | No equipment found |
| 14.04.2026 | €50,000 | Subsidiary | Director | Expense advance | Director | No receipts |
This turns a general accusation into an evidence-based investigation.
Suppose the Turkish subsidiary paid €500,000 to Supplier A.
Do not stop there.
Investigators may need to reconstruct:
Subsidiary → Supplier A → Director’s relative → Director → Cash withdrawal
or:
Subsidiary → Supplier A → Genuine subcontractors → Genuine services
These two scenarios have completely different legal implications.
A company-to-director transfer deserves careful review but is not automatically criminal.
Possible legitimate explanations include:
The company should examine:
Purpose → Authorization → Supporting documents → Accounting treatment → Subsequent use.
A transfer that has no genuine corporate purpose and is diverted for personal benefit presents a different risk profile.
Some internal fraud cases are more accurately analyzed as breach of trust rather than classic fraud.
For example, a director may initially have lawful control over company funds but later allegedly use those entrusted assets contrary to their permitted purpose for personal or third-party benefit.
The distinction matters because criminal characterization depends on how possession or control was obtained and how the property was subsequently used.
Do not use “fraud,” “theft” and “breach of trust” interchangeably without analyzing the underlying transaction.
A common internal-fraud scenario involves payments to a supplier that allegedly exists only to extract money from the subsidiary.
Investigate:
A newly incorporated supplier is not automatically fraudulent.
The question is whether a genuine transaction existed.
Consultancy arrangements can be particularly difficult because there may be no physical goods.
Ask:
A contract and invoice alone do not prove that services were actually performed.
If fictitious or misleading invoices were entered into the subsidiary’s tax and accounting system, the problem may extend beyond internal asset diversion.
Potential consequences can include tax inspection and, depending on the facts and statutory elements, tax-crime exposure.
The foreign parent company should therefore avoid treating suspicious invoices solely as an employment or corporate-governance issue.
Suppose a sales manager tells customers:
“Our company has changed its bank account. Please send payment here.”
The account actually belongs to the manager or another controlled person.
Preserve:
The company should identify every customer who received altered payment instructions.
Where significant cash is missing, reconstruct:
Cash receipt → Cash register → Deposit obligation → Actual deposit → Person responsible.
Do not rely exclusively on the accounting ledger.
Compare it with:
Internal fraud can involve physical assets rather than bank transfers.
Examples include:
Compare:
Accounting inventory → Warehouse records → Physical count → Sales → Delivery documentation.
A stock shortage alone does not establish who took the assets.
A local director may be accused of selling machinery, vehicles or real estate without appropriate authority.
Investigate:
A below-market transaction can be a warning sign, but poor commercial judgment is not automatically a criminal offence.
Payments to a company owned by:
require enhanced review.
Determine whether the subsidiary received genuine value.
A related-party transaction is not inherently criminal. Concealed self-dealing or fictitious transactions present different issues.
Internal fraud may be supported by false:
Preserve the original document wherever possible.
A 2026 Court of Cassation decision concerning a disputed cheque signature emphasized the importance of obtaining genuine comparison signatures and expert examination rather than resolving disputed authorship through incomplete investigation.
The same evidentiary principle can be highly relevant when a foreign shareholder alleges that a corporate signature has been forged.
Fraud may occur through alteration of electronic accounting records.
Potential evidence includes:
A recent 2026 Court of Cassation case illustrates that alleged manipulation of company computer/accounting data may require analysis under computer-system offences rather than simply being relabeled as document forgery or fraud without examining the alleged conduct.
This is why the parent company should investigate the mechanics of the misconduct before choosing a criminal classification.
Suppose an accounting entry was created under:
ADMIN01
Do not automatically conclude that the registered account owner personally created it.
Investigate:
Digital attribution should be evidence-based.
Do not rely only on screenshots.
Where possible, preserve:
Screenshots may be useful, but the underlying electronic material can provide substantially more evidentiary context.
Discovery of fraud in a Turkish subsidiary does not automatically make the foreign parent company’s:
criminally responsible.
Individual conduct must be established.
Relevant questions include:
Who knew?
Who approved?
Who instructed?
Who controlled the transaction?
Who benefited?
Who concealed it?
Corporate hierarchy is not a substitute for individualized criminal evidence.
The parent company’s ownership of the subsidiary does not mean the parent directly owns every asset in the subsidiary’s bank account.
This distinction becomes particularly important when determining:
The parent company should review the Turkish subsidiary’s corporate representation structure immediately.
This can create a serious practical conflict.
Suppose the director suspected of transferring company money is also the person authorized to represent the subsidiary.
The parent company may need to consider corporate measures concerning:
Criminal and corporate strategy should be coordinated.
Often, yes.
But it should be structured carefully.
An internal investigation can determine:
What happened → When → Who participated → Amount lost → Evidence available → Continuing risk.
It should not become an exercise designed to manufacture a predetermined conclusion.
For example:
| Person | Position | Bank Authority | Supplier Authority | Accounting Access | Suspected Conduct |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | General Manager | Yes | Yes | Limited | Approved payments |
| B | CFO | Yes | No | Full | Recorded transactions |
| C | Procurement Manager | No | Yes | No | Selected supplier |
| D | Accountant | No | No | Full | Entered invoices |
Then connect each person to actual evidence.
Where appropriate, conduct individual interviews rather than assembling all potentially involved employees together.
Determine:
Do not coach witnesses.
Relevant evidence may not be located only in Turkey.
Preserve potentially relevant:
This evidence may demonstrate either knowledge or lack of knowledge at parent-company level.
Where evidence reasonably indicates criminal misconduct, a complaint to the competent Turkish authorities may be considered.
The Ministry of Justice explains that criminal investigations are conducted under the responsibility of the public prosecutor, who may collect evidence directly or through police or gendarmerie. Following the investigation, the prosecutor determines whether to pursue prosecution or issue a decision not to prosecute.
The complaint should be factual.
Avoid merely stating:
“Our director stole company money.”
Instead explain:
Transaction → Amount → Date → Authority → Recipient → Evidence → Suspected benefit.
A weak complaint often contains dozens of legal labels without explaining the underlying transactions.
A stronger complaint generally focuses on:
The final legal characterization belongs to the competent authorities and courts.
The Ministry of Justice’s victim-information materials emphasize that fraud involves deceptive conduct resulting in an unlawful benefit and that evidence of the deception is particularly important; otherwise, a dispute may instead be viewed as a civil debt or contractual dispute.
This distinction is especially important in shareholder and corporate disputes.
Not every failed transaction is fraud.
A foreign parent company should preserve evidence it lawfully controls.
Investigators may be able, subject to applicable legal requirements, to obtain evidence that the company cannot independently access, such as records held by other persons or institutions.
The complaint can identify why specific evidence is relevant without pretending the company already knows what it will show.
Internal fraud frequently leaves a financial trail.
Investigators may compare:
Company bank account → Recipient → Subsequent transfers → Cash withdrawal → Final beneficiary.
Bank records can also exonerate suspected individuals where the actual commercial transaction differs from the allegation.
Recent Turkish fraud investigations publicly described by prosecutorial authorities show that investigations may involve seizure of computers, phones and other digital material, alongside bank and communication evidence.
A foreign parent company should therefore preserve relevant digital evidence before employee accounts or devices become unavailable.
A criminal complaint does not automatically return company money.
The Ministry of Justice expressly notes that criminal complaints do not automatically resolve separate civil or enforcement proceedings and that financial losses may also need to be pursued through civil claims.
Accordingly, consider parallel:
Criminal investigation
Corporate proceedings
Civil recovery
Enforcement strategy
Protective measures where legally available.
Potential targets may include:
Do not wait until the end of a criminal trial before considering recovery strategy.
Cross-border transfers do not prevent investigation.
Preserve:
The foreign destination itself does not prove fraud.
Investigators still need to determine the commercial purpose and beneficiary.
Preserve:
Bank transfer → Exchange → Account → Transaction records → Wallet information.
Do not assume that a wallet address automatically identifies a particular individual.
Digital attribution requires additional evidence.
The company may need to suspend or dismiss implicated personnel.
But consider evidence preservation first.
Before access termination, lawfully preserve relevant corporate:
Employment-law decisions and criminal strategy should be coordinated.
Depending on the company’s structure and obligations, internal fraud may require escalation to:
The reporting chain should itself be documented.
Foreign parent companies should also examine whether relevant insurance policies may respond to employee dishonesty, crime, cyber incidents or related losses.
Notification deadlines and policy conditions may matter.
Do not assume criminal proceedings must finish before reviewing insurance.
Internal fraud allegations can create reputational and employment consequences.
Until facts are established, avoid unnecessarily publishing accusations against identified employees or directors.
Internal communications should distinguish:
Suspected misconduct
from
established facts.
Recent 2026 Turkish investigations demonstrate continuing use of coordinated searches, seizures of digital material and asset-related measures in serious fraud investigations. For example, prosecutorial announcements in July 2026 described fraud investigations involving simultaneous searches and seizures of substantial digital material, while other 2026 Ministry of Justice announcements describe measures concerning companies and assets in investigations involving alleged false invoices, fictitious exports and fraud-related conduct.
These examples do not establish what will happen in an individual corporate case. They do show why foreign parent companies should preserve financial, corporate and digital evidence from the beginning rather than treating internal fraud solely as an internal HR problem.
Potentially, yes. The correct complainant, representation authority and direct victim of the alleged offence should be identified based on the subsidiary’s structure and the particular transaction.
No. The transfer should be examined for legitimate explanations such as salary, expenses, remuneration, genuine loan repayment or another lawful corporate purpose. Authorization, documentation and ultimate use matter.
Preserve the banking, corporate and accounting evidence and determine the stated purpose, authorization and subsequent use of the funds. Depending on the facts, different criminal and corporate-law issues may arise.
Potentially. The analysis depends on whether the underlying transaction existed, who created or used the documents, what each person knew and whether the invoices were also used for tax purposes.
Not necessarily. Where there is a risk that evidence or assets may disappear, evidence preservation and access-control measures should be considered first.
Not automatically. Criminal responsibility must be individualized. Ownership, seniority or parent-company board membership alone does not establish participation in misconduct.
Potentially. Backups, system logs, accounting exports, devices and other digital evidence may be relevant. Recovery is not guaranteed, so available evidence should be preserved immediately.
No. Criminal investigation and financial recovery are related but distinct issues. Civil, corporate, enforcement and protective strategies may also be necessary.
The parent company should review shareholder powers, board structure, representation authority, banking authority and available corporate remedies while coordinating them with the criminal investigation.
Preserve the evidence and reconstruct the transactions before conclusions are fixed. The strongest case usually connects money, authority, documents, digital records, recipient and personal benefit into one coherent evidentiary chain.
Internal fraud inside a Turkish subsidiary can rapidly develop into a combination of criminal investigation, shareholder dispute, director-liability claim, employment issue, tax exposure and cross-border asset-recovery problem.
Fırat Fesih Kaya Law Office provides legal assistance to foreign parent companies, foreign investors, shareholders, boards and multinational groups dealing with suspected internal fraud and corporate criminal matters in Turkey.
Lawyer Fırat Fesih Kaya assists foreign clients with internal investigations, criminal complaints, company-fund diversion, director and employee misconduct, false invoices, forged corporate records, suspicious banking transactions, digital evidence, asset tracing and coordination of criminal and corporate recovery strategies.
Early intervention can be particularly important where suspected managers still control bank accounts, accounting systems, corporate records or assets that could be transferred before the parent company completes its investigation.
Phone: +90 312 434 22 22
Mobile: +90 532 769 22 22
Email: info@firatfesihkaya.av.tr
Address: Mevlana Boulevard No:221, Yıldırım Tower No:148, 06520 Balgat, Çankaya, Ankara, Turkey
This publication is for general informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice. Internal fraud cases are highly fact-specific, and the appropriate criminal characterization, corporate measures, employment actions and recovery strategy should be determined from the evidence and current legislation applicable to the individual case.