

A kickback scheme is discovered in a Turkish company. Learn about the potential criminal liability of employees, managers and suppliers, evidence, internal investigations, company losses and defense strategies in Turkey.
A kickback scheme discovered within a Turkish company can rapidly develop from an internal compliance problem into a serious criminal investigation. Typical allegations involve an employee or manager secretly receiving money, commissions, gifts or another benefit from a supplier in return for awarding contracts, approving inflated invoices, accepting unnecessary purchases, manipulating tenders or overlooking defective performance. The supplier may also be investigated if it knowingly participated in the arrangement. For foreign-owned companies operating in Turkey, the first days after discovery are particularly important because emails, bank transfers, invoices, procurement records, messaging applications, accounting data and internal approval records may determine who actually participated in the scheme and who merely performed ordinary corporate duties.
A kickback generally involves a concealed benefit provided to a person who has influence over a commercial decision in return for favorable treatment.
For example, a purchasing manager may select a particular supplier in return for receiving part of the contract price personally.
The exact criminal characterization, however, depends on the facts. “Kickback” is a commercial description rather than a single criminal offense that automatically applies to every case.
Depending on how the scheme was structured, allegations may involve fraud, breach of trust, bribery-related conduct, document offenses, manipulation of accounting records, laundering of criminal proceeds or other offenses.
The prosecutor must evaluate the statutory elements of the offense allegedly committed by each individual.
Not every payment between private businesses automatically constitutes bribery under Turkish criminal law.
The status of the recipient, the entities involved and the circumstances of the transaction are important. Certain persons or organizations can fall within specific bribery provisions, while ordinary private-sector conduct may require analysis under different criminal offenses.
For this reason, the facts should be legally classified before the company describes the incident as “bribery.”
Potentially.
Suppose an employee deliberately approves inflated invoices and secretly receives part of the excess payment. Depending on the circumstances, criminal liability may arise from the employee’s conduct toward the employer and from related fraudulent or financial transactions.
The prosecution must still prove the employee’s personal participation and intent.
Potentially, where the manager personally participated, directed the scheme, knowingly approved fraudulent transactions or otherwise satisfied the requirements of a criminal offense.
Managerial title alone does not automatically establish criminal responsibility.
A foreign director should not be assumed criminally liable simply because an employee committed wrongdoing somewhere within the organization.
The investigation should distinguish corporate hierarchy from actual criminal participation.
Questions usually include what the manager knew, what actions they personally took, what documents they approved and whether there is evidence of intentional involvement.
Potentially.
If a supplier knowingly pays a secret commission to influence an employee’s purchasing decision, its representatives may face investigation depending on the legal characterization of the conduct.
The supplier’s knowledge and intention become particularly important.
A legitimate volume discount, rebate or marketing payment should not automatically be characterized as a kickback.
The investigation should determine who received the benefit, whether it was disclosed to the company, whether it was commercially justified and how it was recorded.
Investigators may examine transfers from suppliers, supplier owners or intermediaries to employees and their associated persons.
A payment itself does not necessarily establish criminality. Its date, amount, explanation, relationship to procurement decisions and commercial basis should be examined.
Kickback allegations frequently involve alleged cash payments.
Where there is no direct banking record, prosecutors may rely on messages, witness statements, cash withdrawals, accounting irregularities, surveillance evidence or other circumstantial material.
The defense should analyze whether those facts genuinely establish payment to the accused person.
A supplier may charge substantially more than the genuine market price and return part of the difference secretly to an employee.
Investigators may compare invoices with market prices, competing bids and historical purchasing data.
However, a high price alone does not necessarily prove a kickback.
Payments can be disguised as consulting, marketing, brokerage or commission expenses.
Investigators may ask whether the service actually occurred and whether the fee corresponds to genuine commercial activity.
Purchase requests, tender documents, quotations, supplier evaluations, approval records and purchase orders can reveal how a supplier was selected.
These records can also protect employees who followed ordinary procurement procedures without knowledge of misconduct.
Corporate emails may show negotiations, instructions, efforts to bypass procurement controls or attempts to conceal relationships.
The complete context should be preserved. A single isolated email can sometimes create a misleading impression.
Messages exchanged through mobile applications can become important where legally obtained and properly evaluated.
Investigators may examine communications between employees, suppliers and intermediaries around the dates of disputed purchases and payments.
Investigators may attempt to obtain evidence from other devices, recipients, backups or related digital sources where legally permitted.
Companies should therefore preserve available digital evidence once misconduct is suspected.
An internal investigation should respect applicable privacy, employment and data-protection requirements.
A company seeking evidence should avoid unauthorized investigative methods that could create separate legal problems or compromise the evidentiary value of the material.
General ledgers, supplier accounts, payment records, invoices, purchase orders and expense records should be secured.
A company should prevent routine deletion or destruction of potentially relevant records after discovering suspected misconduct.
Determine whether the company paid inflated prices, purchased unnecessary goods, received defective products or suffered another measurable loss.
A transaction-by-transaction loss analysis can become important in both criminal and civil proceedings.
The discovery of one problematic supplier should not automatically establish wrongdoing by every supplier introduced by the same employee.
Create a supplier matrix showing contracts, invoices, payments, approvals and identified irregularities.
The company should establish a small investigation team and define who has access to evidence.
Uncontrolled questioning of employees can result in witnesses coordinating stories or evidence disappearing.
Where legally appropriate, relevant corporate records should be preserved before the suspected participant is informed of the investigation.
Otherwise, digital or documentary evidence may be lost.
An employer’s internal conclusion that an employee violated company policy does not automatically establish criminal guilt.
Criminal liability must be assessed under the applicable evidentiary and substantive criminal-law standards.
This requires case-specific assessment.
Before filing, the company should understand the suspected conduct, evidence, financial loss and individuals potentially involved.
A poorly prepared accusation can complicate the subsequent investigation.
Foreign-owned businesses should establish a Turkey-specific response team involving local management, legal counsel, finance and compliance personnel.
Headquarters should avoid making assumptions based solely on criminal-law concepts from another jurisdiction.
A foreign manager may be invited or summoned to provide information concerning corporate procedures or particular transactions.
Before giving a statement, the manager should understand whether they are being heard as a witness, complainant or suspect and what transaction is under investigation.
Where the individual does not sufficiently understand Turkish, interpretation rights should be addressed.
The person should review the content carefully before signing any police, prosecutor or other criminal-procedure record.
A manager’s signature on a purchase order or payment approval may show participation in the corporate process but does not automatically establish knowledge of a secret kickback.
The investigation must examine what information was available to the manager when approval was given.
Internal authorization matrices, job descriptions and procurement policies may show which employee had responsibility for supplier selection, price verification and payment approval.
These records can help distinguish operational responsibility from criminal participation.
Investigators and companies may examine whether a supplier had undisclosed connections with employees.
Shareholders, directors, contact information, addresses and payment arrangements may reveal hidden relationships.
A suspected kickback does not have to be transferred directly to the employee.
Payments allegedly made to relatives, consultants or controlled entities may attract scrutiny if evidence connects them to the procurement decision.
The relationship must still be proven rather than assumed.
Where funds allegedly moved through foreign accounts or digital assets, financial tracing can become more complicated.
The prosecution must still establish the connection between the transaction and alleged criminal conduct.
In serious financial-crime investigations, prosecutors may seek protective measures against assets where statutory requirements are satisfied.
Companies and individuals affected by such measures should examine the precise legal basis and available objection procedures promptly.
Police or prosecutors may seek computers, phones, documents or other evidence during an investigation.
Foreign companies should have a protocol for responding to lawful searches while protecting privileged and unrelated corporate material through available legal procedures.
When investigators seek broad digital datasets, companies should identify relevant custodians, dates and systems.
Preserving the integrity of data is essential.
A dismissed employee may accuse managers or suppliers of participating in the scheme.
Such allegations should be compared with bank records, communications, procurement documents and other objective evidence.
A statement should not be analyzed in isolation.
A changed statement does not automatically terminate the investigation.
Authorities can compare earlier and later accounts and evaluate them together with objective evidence.
An employee or manager who denies involvement should reconstruct the disputed transactions chronologically.
Emails, authorization records, travel records, banking information and procurement documents may help establish what actually occurred.
The employer may potentially pursue compensation against responsible employees, managers, suppliers or other parties depending on the facts and contractual relationships.
Criminal and civil strategies should therefore be coordinated.
Suspected misconduct may also create employment-law consequences.
The company should not assume that the existence of a criminal investigation automatically determines the employment-law outcome.
Anti-corruption warranties, audit rights, termination clauses, indemnification provisions and compliance obligations can become highly relevant.
The company should also determine whether payments can lawfully be suspended or contracts terminated.
Once an investigation is anticipated, deleting emails, altering accounting entries or destroying records can create serious additional risks.
A documented evidence-preservation process should be implemented.
Prematurely describing named employees or suppliers publicly as criminals can create additional disputes.
Internal communications should remain controlled and factual.
For each suspicious transaction, record the supplier selection, quotations, approval, invoice, payment, delivery and alleged kickback.
Then connect each allegation with the evidence that supports or contradicts it.
Large companies may have dozens of signatures associated with a purchase.
Criminal responsibility should be individualized. Being copied on an email, processing an invoice or signing a routine approval does not by itself establish intentional participation in a kickback scheme.
When a kickback scheme is discovered in Turkey, the company should immediately preserve digital and accounting evidence, restrict access to relevant records, identify suspicious transactions, review bank and procurement data, determine the roles of employees and suppliers, calculate potential company losses, coordinate internal and criminal-investigation strategy, protect the rights of foreign managers who may be questioned and avoid unsupported accusations before the evidence has been evaluated.
Potentially, depending on the structure of the transaction, recipient, conduct and applicable criminal offense. The legal characterization must be determined from the specific facts.
Yes, potentially, where evidence suggests that supplier representatives knowingly participated in the alleged scheme.
No. The applicable criminal characterization depends on the status of the parties and the specific conduct.
Managerial position alone does not automatically establish criminal liability. Personal participation, knowledge and intent must be evaluated.
Yes. Their evidentiary significance depends on the recipient, purpose, timing and connection with the alleged transactions.
Digital communications can become relevant evidence where obtained and used in accordance with applicable criminal-procedure rules.
Employment measures should be evaluated separately under applicable labor law and the available evidence. A criminal allegation alone does not resolve every employment-law question.
Potentially. Depending on the evidence and relationships involved, civil, contractual and criminal-procedure mechanisms may be relevant to recovery.
The manager should determine their procedural status, understand the allegations or transactions involved, arrange interpretation where necessary and obtain legal assistance before giving a substantive statement.
Preserve the evidence before confronting suspected participants. Bank records, procurement files, emails, accounting data and approval records should be secured so that the company can distinguish actual participants from employees or managers who merely performed ordinary corporate functions.
Kickback allegations can lead to employee investigations, supplier disputes, searches and seizures, financial tracing, asset measures, criminal complaints, compensation claims and investigations involving foreign directors or managers. Fırat Fesih Kaya Law Office assists foreign companies, investors, executives and individuals facing corporate fraud and criminal investigations in Turkey. Lawyer Fırat Fesih Kaya provides legal assistance in coordinating internal investigations, preserving and evaluating evidence, representing foreign managers during police and prosecutor proceedings, challenging protective measures and developing criminal and financial recovery strategies.
Phone: +90 312 434 22 22
Mobile: +90 532 769 22 22
Email: info@firatfesihkaya.av.tr
Address: Mevlana Boulevard No:221, Yıldırım Tower, Office No:148, 06520 Balgat, Çankaya, Ankara, Turkey