

Is your vessel, shipping company, owner or operator facing a sanctions investigation in Turkey? Learn about vessel detention, cargo scrutiny, asset freezing, criminal liability, beneficial ownership, charterer risks, payments and defense strategies in 2026.
A maritime sanctions investigation in Turkey can rapidly become a major legal and commercial crisis for a foreign shipowner, vessel operator, charterer or shipping company. A vessel arriving at a Turkish port may encounter questions concerning its cargo, charterer, beneficial owner, payment chain, previous ports of call, ship-to-ship transfers, counterparties or links to sanctioned persons and entities. What initially appears to be an administrative compliance inquiry can potentially develop into financial intelligence analysis, asset-freezing measures, customs proceedings or a criminal investigation.
The risk is particularly significant because sanctions-related shipping cases rarely concern only the registered owner appearing on the vessel’s documents. Authorities may investigate the ultimate beneficial owner, technical manager, commercial operator, charterer, cargo owner, consignee, shipper, bunker supplier, insurer, bank accounts and payment intermediaries connected with the voyage.
Turkey’s domestic framework includes measures implementing relevant United Nations Security Council sanctions through legislation concerning terrorism financing and proliferation financing. Turkish rules provide mechanisms for freezing assets and restricting dealings with designated persons and entities. Turkey also maintains domestic asset-freezing mechanisms, while foreign-state requests can potentially result in freezing decisions under the applicable statutory procedure.
For foreign shipping companies, the most important principle is therefore simple: a sanctions investigation should never be treated merely as a port documentation problem. The company should immediately determine what transaction is being investigated, which person or entity triggered the concern, what evidence exists regarding ownership and control, and whether the vessel, cargo or payment chain is exposed to Turkish criminal, financial or administrative measures.
A foreign vessel may attract scrutiny for many different reasons.
The vessel itself does not necessarily need to appear on a sanctions list.
Authorities or financial institutions may become concerned because of the parties behind the transaction.
A vessel’s owner, beneficial owner, charterer, cargo interests, consignee, bank, insurer or commercial counterparty may create sanctions-related concerns.
This distinction is extremely important.
A ship may enter Turkey with apparently ordinary registry documentation while the investigation actually concerns the company controlling the vessel.
Alternatively, the concern may relate entirely to the cargo.
The defense strategy therefore begins by identifying the real target of the inquiry.
Shipping companies frequently use single-purpose vessel-owning companies.
The registered owner may therefore be a company whose principal asset is one vessel.
Authorities examining sanctions exposure may look beyond that company.
They may investigate who ultimately owns or controls it.
Complex ownership structures can attract increased scrutiny.
For example:
Vessel → Single-Purpose Company → Holding Company → Intermediate Holding Company → Trust or Investment Structure → Ultimate Beneficial Owner.
The existence of a complicated structure is not itself evidence of wrongdoing.
However, the owner should be able to explain and document it.
A company may not be directly owned by a designated person yet questions may arise concerning actual control.
Investigators may therefore examine voting rights, management powers, financing arrangements and economic benefits.
Nominee structures can receive particular attention.
Foreign shipowners should avoid assuming that Turkey simply applies every foreign sanctions regime automatically.
The legal basis for any measure must be identified.
Turkey has its own domestic legal framework and implements relevant United Nations Security Council measures through Turkish law.
Turkey’s legislation on prevention of terrorism financing provides mechanisms for implementing specified United Nations Security Council asset-freezing decisions.
It also contains domestic procedures concerning asset freezing.
Sanctions investigations connected with shipping may therefore extend into financial and criminal-law territory.
The legal framework concerning financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is particularly relevant to international trade and shipping.
Prohibited dealings connected with designated persons, entities and activities can create serious consequences.
Shipping companies transporting industrial, technological or potentially dual-use cargo should therefore treat counterparty and cargo screening seriously.
A Turkish sanctions investigation can become particularly serious if a person or organization connected with the transaction is subject to an asset-freezing decision.
The implications can extend beyond conventional bank accounts.
The statutory concept of assets is broad and can potentially affect different forms of property and economic value.
Turkey’s legal framework also provides a procedure under which foreign governments may request asset freezing.
Such requests are evaluated under Turkish statutory procedures rather than automatically taking effect merely because a foreign government has made the request.
This distinction is important for foreign shipowners facing cross-border investigations.
Financial intelligence can become extremely important in shipping investigations.
Payment trails often reveal relationships that are not apparent from the vessel’s registry documents.
Investigators may examine:
Freight Payments → Hire Payments → Bunker Payments → Cargo Payments → Agency Fees → Insurance Payments → Management Fees → Intercompany Transfers → Beneficial Owner Distributions.
A vessel transaction therefore creates a substantial financial-document trail.
The Turkish financial-compliance environment has increasingly emphasized targeted financial sanctions.
Risk-management and monitoring requirements applicable within the anti-money-laundering compliance framework expressly encompass risks involving violation, non-implementation and circumvention of asset-freezing decisions under the relevant terrorism-financing and proliferation-financing legislation.
For foreign shipping companies, this means that sanctions exposure can emerge through banks and other regulated institutions even before authorities directly contact the shipowner.
A shipowner may first discover the problem when a Turkish or correspondent bank refuses to process a payment.
The payment might involve:
freight, charter hire, bunker costs, port expenses, agency fees or sale proceeds.
A blocked payment does not automatically establish criminal liability.
But it should trigger immediate investigation into the counterparty and transaction.
One of the greatest commercial concerns is whether the vessel will be prevented from sailing.
The answer depends on the legal basis of the measure.
A sanctions concern does not create an unlimited power to hold a vessel indefinitely without legal grounds.
The owner should establish:
Which authority ordered the measure? What decision exists? Is the vessel formally detained or merely awaiting clearance? Is the measure directed against the vessel, cargo or a person connected with them?
These distinctions determine the appropriate remedy.
Sometimes the vessel is not formally detained.
Instead, departure procedures are not completed while documents are examined.
From a commercial perspective, the effect can still be severe.
The owner should nevertheless distinguish administrative delay from a formal judicial or administrative seizure.
If a criminal investigation develops, judicial authorities may become involved.
The procedural basis, scope and proportionality of any seizure should then be examined under Turkish criminal procedure.
The cargo may be the principal subject of the investigation even where the vessel itself is not suspected of wrongdoing.
The shipowner should separate its legal position from that of the cargo owner.
This becomes particularly important where continued detention of the vessel causes substantial losses.
Cargo is one of the most significant maritime sanctions risks.
A seemingly ordinary bill of lading description may not reveal the entire compliance issue.
The concern may involve origin, destination, end user or product classification.
Investigators may examine where the goods were actually produced or loaded.
Documentation inconsistencies can attract attention.
A change in documentation does not itself prove sanctions evasion, but unexplained inconsistencies can create serious problems.
The declared destination may also receive scrutiny.
Authorities may investigate whether goods were actually intended for another jurisdiction or end user.
For certain sensitive products, the ultimate recipient can be more important than the immediate consignee.
Foreign operators should preserve documents establishing the commercial chain where enhanced due diligence was performed.
Cargo capable of civilian and military application creates increased risk.
Shipowners are not necessarily technical experts in every cargo carried.
Nevertheless, red flags should not simply be ignored.
An investigation may focus on whether documents were deliberately altered to conceal origin, destination, ownership or nature of the cargo.
Relevant documents can include:
Bill of Lading → Commercial Invoice → Certificate of Origin → Packing List → Customs Declaration → Cargo Manifest → Charterparty → Sales Contract.
Inconsistencies should be explained using contemporaneous evidence.
The bill of lading can become central evidence.
Investigators may compare the bill with customs records, port documents and commercial invoices.
The owner should preserve all versions of shipping documents.
Switch bills of lading can have legitimate commercial uses.
However, they may attract enhanced scrutiny where the transaction already presents sanctions concerns.
The commercial reason for issuing the replacement document should be documented.
If the stated origin differs from evidence obtained during investigation, authorities may examine whether the discrepancy was accidental or deliberate.
The shipowner’s knowledge becomes crucial.
Ship-to-ship transfers can receive heightened attention in sanctions-sensitive trades.
They are not inherently unlawful.
Nevertheless, investigators may examine whether an STS transfer was used to obscure cargo origin, destination or commercial counterparties.
The operator should preserve:
location, date, participating vessels, cargo quantities, counterparties, instructions, operational records and relevant charter communications.
A complete documentary trail can be extremely important.
AIS history can become relevant in sanctions investigations.
Investigators may compare the vessel’s declared voyage with available tracking information.
An AIS transmission gap does not automatically prove unlawful conduct.
Technical problems, coverage limitations and legitimate operational circumstances can occur.
However, unexplained gaps in high-risk circumstances can attract scrutiny.
An allegation that AIS was intentionally disabled to conceal activity is significantly more serious.
The defense should preserve bridge records, technical logs, maintenance information and communications capable of explaining the event.
The vessel’s historical trading pattern can form part of the investigation.
Authorities may examine whether it repeatedly called at jurisdictions associated with heightened sanctions risk.
Previous lawful trading activity should be distinguished from prohibited transactions.
Frequent changes of flag can attract attention.
But flag changes occur for many legitimate commercial reasons.
The owner should maintain documentation explaining registration changes and ownership history.
Commercial vessels may change names following sale or restructuring.
Again, this is not inherently suspicious.
However, repeated name, flag and ownership changes over a short period can increase compliance scrutiny.
The IMO number generally provides continuity despite changes in vessel name or flag.
Investigators can therefore reconstruct historical vessel identity even after multiple changes.
A shipowner may have no problematic ownership connection but still become exposed through a charterer.
The charterer may select cargoes, ports and commercial counterparties.
This does not automatically transfer criminal responsibility to the owner.
But the contractual and factual relationship must be examined.
Under a time charter, the charterer may exercise substantial commercial control over employment of the vessel.
The owner should preserve charter instructions concerning disputed voyages.
In voyage-charter arrangements, the investigation may focus on cargo interests, shipper, consignee and payment arrangements.
The owner should identify exactly what information was available when the fixture was accepted.
A bareboat structure can significantly alter operational control.
The authorities may investigate which company actually controlled vessel operations during the relevant period.
Modern charterparties frequently contain sanctions provisions.
These may require parties to warrant that they are not sanctioned persons and prohibit employment exposing the vessel or owner to sanctions.
The exact clause can become important during a dispute.
The owner should not wait until the vessel reaches port before examining the order.
Where a genuine sanctions concern exists, contractual rights concerning refusal of orders should be assessed promptly.
Owners must also avoid assuming that any commercially uncomfortable voyage can automatically be refused.
If the order is lawful under the applicable contractual framework, wrongful refusal can create charterparty liability.
Sanctions analysis must therefore be specific rather than speculative.
Bunker transactions can create unexpected exposure.
The vessel may purchase fuel through several intermediaries.
The contractual supplier and physical supplier may be different companies.
A bunker invoice can involve brokers, traders and banks across multiple jurisdictions.
If one participant is designated, payments may be blocked.
Owners should therefore conduct risk-based screening appropriate to the transaction.
A sanctions investigation can also affect insurance.
Insurers may examine whether providing cover or paying a claim would expose them to prohibited dealings.
The owner should notify relevant insurers according to policy requirements where appropriate.
Shipping is particularly exposed to sanctions screening because transactions often involve USD or EUR payments moving through multiple banks.
A transaction involving Turkey can therefore encounter both Turkish legal requirements and foreign financial institutions’ internal compliance policies.
This distinction is essential.
A foreign bank may refuse a payment because of its own risk policy.
That does not automatically mean the underlying transaction constitutes a crime in Turkey.
The legal basis must be identified separately.
Foreign shipowners operating internationally may simultaneously face exposure to multiple sanctions systems because of nationality, banking channels, insurance arrangements, contractual provisions or transaction structure.
However, a foreign sanctions designation should not automatically be described as directly creating Turkish criminal liability.
The relevant Turkish legal basis must be established.
Even where a foreign sanctions regime does not directly create Turkish criminal liability, it can still have enormous commercial consequences.
Banks may refuse payments.
Insurers may withdraw support.
Charterers may terminate fixtures.
Ports or counterparties may decline business.
The distinction between legal prohibition and commercial sanctions exposure is therefore important.
The existence of a sanctions-related transaction does not automatically mean the shipowner committed a criminal offense.
Criminal responsibility generally requires examination of the specific statutory offense and the person’s conduct and mental element.
Investigators may ask:
Did the owner know who controlled the counterparty?
Did the operator know the true cargo origin?
Were warnings received?
Were documents inconsistent?
Did management deliberately ignore obvious red flags?
These questions can become central to the case.
The fact that a person is a director does not automatically make that person criminally responsible for every transaction performed by the company.
Investigators must examine the director’s actual conduct and involvement.
Nevertheless, directors who personally approved or participated in disputed transactions may face individual scrutiny.
The master can also become involved in the investigation.
Authorities may question the captain concerning cargo documents, AIS activity, STS operations, ports of call and voyage instructions.
The master should distinguish between facts personally known and commercial matters handled by shore management.
Crew members may be interviewed as witnesses or, depending on the circumstances, suspects.
Statements should not be coordinated or fabricated.
Preservation of genuine contemporaneous records is far more valuable than attempting to create a uniform narrative after the event.
Turkish criminal law generally structures criminal responsibility around natural persons, while legal entities can face specific security measures or administrative consequences where legislation provides for them.
Foreign companies should therefore analyze individual and corporate exposure separately.
Asset freezing can be one of the most disruptive consequences of sanctions-related proceedings.
Bank accounts and other economic assets may become inaccessible where a valid freezing decision applies.
Whether a particular vessel is affected depends on ownership, control and the legal scope of the relevant decision.
The corporate structure should therefore be analyzed carefully.
Cargo belonging to or controlled by a designated party can present separate issues from vessel ownership.
The shipowner should establish its own rights and obligations concerning custody of the cargo.
A foreign company may maintain Turkish accounts for agency, port or operational purposes.
If accounts become restricted, the legal basis should be obtained and reviewed.
An informal bank compliance hold and a formal governmental asset-freezing measure are legally different situations.
Authorities may request corporate documents extending several layers above the vessel-owning company.
The owner should be prepared to provide coherent corporate documentation.
Share registers, incorporation documents and corporate filings can help demonstrate ownership.
Where actual control differs from simple percentage ownership, shareholder agreements may become important.
Trust or nominee arrangements can require additional documentation identifying beneficiaries and controlling persons.
In a broader financial investigation, authorities may examine how the vessel was acquired or financed.
The owner should preserve loan agreements, equity contribution records and purchase documentation.
A ship purchased from a person who later becomes sanctioned can create complex questions.
The relevant dates are critical.
Investigators should distinguish between a lawful historical acquisition and a transaction occurring after applicable restrictions became effective.
Sanctions investigations should always include a chronology.
The question is not merely whether a party appears on a list today.
The relevant inquiry may be whether the party was designated when the transaction occurred and what legal restrictions applied at that time.
The authorities may investigate whether a supposed vessel sale genuinely transferred control or merely changed the registered owner.
Purchase-price payments, management arrangements and post-sale operations can become relevant.
A transfer shortly before designation may attract scrutiny if authorities suspect that ownership was moved only on paper.
The defense should preserve evidence of genuine commercial negotiation, valuation, payment and transfer of control.
Investigations may focus on whether multiple legitimate-looking transactions were deliberately structured to evade applicable restrictions.
Potential indicators can include unusual intermediaries, unexplained payment routes, false documentation, shell companies and concealed beneficial ownership.
No single indicator necessarily establishes wrongdoing.
The complete transaction must be examined.
Sanctions-sensitive cargo can simultaneously create customs issues.
Authorities may examine tariff classification, origin, declaration accuracy and import or export restrictions.
The shipping company should separate the sanctions analysis from any customs allegation while coordinating the overall defense.
Where authorities lawfully request relevant documentation, records concerning the voyage may become evidence.
The owner should immediately preserve copies of everything provided.
Emails, charter instructions, messaging applications and electronic navigation information may also become relevant.
No employee should delete potentially relevant data after learning of an investigation.
A litigation or investigation hold should be considered immediately.
Relevant communications may involve commercial, operations, compliance, finance and management departments.
Shipping operations frequently rely on messaging applications.
Instructions concerning cargo, STS transfers, payments and voyage changes may therefore exist outside formal email systems.
These records should be preserved where relevant and lawful.
Companies should never manufacture backdated compliance records.
If due diligence was incomplete, the defense should address that reality rather than create false evidence.
Fabricated documentation can transform a manageable compliance issue into a far more serious criminal problem.
A focused internal investigation can be crucial.
The company should determine:
Who approved the fixture? Who screened the counterparty? What information was available? Who instructed the voyage? Who knew the beneficial owner? Were red flags escalated? What documents exist?
This chronology should be prepared quickly.
If the company performed screening before the voyage, preserve the evidence.
Historical screening results can be especially important because lists change over time.
A screenshot taken today does not necessarily establish what appeared on a sanctions list months earlier.
The company’s written sanctions policy can also become relevant.
But having a policy is not enough.
The investigation may examine whether it was actually followed.
A risk-based file can include corporate identity, beneficial ownership information, sanctions screening and commercial background.
Higher-risk transactions may justify enhanced checks.
The shipowner may not always have a direct relationship with the ultimate cargo owner.
Nevertheless, unusual circumstances may require additional questions.
The appropriate level of due diligence depends on the transaction and contractual position.
Potential red flags can include unexplained ownership changes, inconsistent cargo documents, unusual payment routes, counterparties unwilling to disclose beneficial ownership, suspicious STS instructions and commercial structures without an obvious economic explanation.
A red flag does not prove illegality.
It means further investigation may be appropriate.
The company should immediately identify the authority involved and obtain the legal basis for any detention, seizure, payment restriction or information request.
Relevant documents should be preserved.
The vessel’s master should notify shore management.
The company should identify the transaction under investigation.
A complete ownership and transaction map should be prepared:
Registered Owner → Beneficial Owner → Operator → Manager → Charterer → Shipper → Cargo Owner → Consignee → Banks → Insurers → Payment Recipients.
Each participant should be screened against the legally relevant restrictions.
The company should prepare a detailed chronology.
This should include fixture date, cargo nomination, loading, payments, designation dates, port calls, STS operations, AIS events and communications with counterparties.
Potential criminal, administrative and commercial exposure should then be analyzed separately.
A foreign shipowner entered into a charterparty six months before the charterer became designated.
The vessel subsequently arrives in Turkey.
The investigation must distinguish transactions occurring before designation from later conduct.
Dates and contractual performance become critical.
A vessel carries cargo whose beneficial owner is allegedly a designated entity.
The registered shipowner has no ownership connection with the cargo.
The owner should establish what it knew, what due diligence was performed and what contractual relationship existed with the cargo interests.
Authorities identify a twelve-hour AIS gap near an STS location.
The operator states that the equipment malfunctioned.
The defense should preserve technical logs, bridge records and maintenance evidence rather than relying solely on an oral explanation.
A tanker participates in an STS operation before arriving in Turkey.
Authorities suspect that the operation concealed cargo origin.
The owner should reconstruct both vessels’ identities, contractual instructions, cargo documentation, location, quantity and commercial reason for the transfer.
A ship was sold three weeks before its former owner became subject to restrictions.
Authorities question whether the sale was genuine.
The new owner should preserve the MOA, valuation, payment records, financing documentation, delivery documents and evidence demonstrating actual transfer of control.
A Turkish bank holds a freight payment because a counterparty name creates a potential sanctions match.
The shipping company should determine whether this is merely a compliance review, a false-positive name match or a formal legal restriction.
These situations require different responses.
Turkish law provides legal mechanisms for challenging relevant asset-freezing decisions.
The appropriate procedure depends on the legal basis of the particular decision.
The affected person should identify the exact designation and decision rather than filing a generic objection.
Shipping companies frequently operate through entities with similar corporate names.
A sanctions-screening system may therefore generate a false match.
The company should rapidly assemble identifying information demonstrating differences in registration number, ownership, address, nationality and beneficial ownership.
Where a vessel’s continued stay in Turkey is connected with an investigation, the owner should focus on the legal reason preventing departure.
The strategy may involve providing documentation, challenging the relevant measure or seeking appropriate judicial relief depending on the circumstances.
Every day of detention can generate substantial losses.
Potential consequences include charter hire disputes, off-hire, berth charges, crew costs, bunker expenses and lost fixtures.
These losses should be documented from the first day.
The sanctions investigation may create a separate dispute between owner and charterer.
The parties may disagree over responsibility for detention and whether the vessel is off-hire.
The sanctions clause, employment provisions and causation should be examined.
Cargo owners may also assert claims if detention delays delivery.
The owner should preserve defenses under the applicable bill of lading and charterparty arrangements.
Where appropriate, the owner should notify its P&I insurer promptly.
Late notification can complicate coverage and defense coordination.
If Turkish prosecutors investigate company executives, the defense should distinguish corporate responsibility from individual conduct.
A director should not speculate about technical voyage details personally handled by other departments.
Statements should be based on verified facts and documents.
A foreign executive should determine whether they are being questioned as a witness or suspect.
The investigation file and allegations should be examined to the extent procedurally available before a substantive defense is prepared.
A foreign suspect who does not sufficiently understand Turkish should use the procedural rights available concerning interpretation.
Understanding the exact questions and allegations is essential in a complex sanctions case.
Depending on the criminal investigation and judicial decisions, procedural restrictions may potentially affect individuals involved.
Foreign managers should therefore obtain advice before assuming they can simply leave Turkey after giving a statement.
A foreign shipowner facing a sanctions investigation in Turkey should treat the case as a multilayered maritime, financial, criminal and compliance investigation.
The first task is to identify the exact Turkish legal basis. The company should not assume that a restriction imposed by a foreign government automatically has the same legal consequences in Turkey. The relevant United Nations measures, Turkish asset-freezing framework, terrorism-financing legislation, proliferation-financing rules, customs legislation and criminal procedure must be distinguished.
The second task is to reconstruct ownership and control. Investigators may look beyond the registered owner to determine the ultimate beneficial owner and whether a designated person exercises direct or indirect control.
The third task is transaction reconstruction. Every important participant in the voyage should be identified, including the charterer, cargo interests, consignee, bunker suppliers, insurers and banks.
The fourth task is evidence preservation. Historical sanctions-screening records, corporate documents, charterparty instructions, bills of lading, manifests, AIS records, STS documentation, bank payments and internal communications can determine the outcome.
The practical roadmap is therefore: identify the investigating authority → obtain the legal basis of the measure → determine whether the vessel is formally detained → identify any seizure or freezing decision → preserve vessel documents → preserve electronic records → identify the registered owner → establish ultimate beneficial ownership → map control rights → identify the charterer → identify cargo interests → screen counterparties → verify designation dates → preserve historical screening results → reconstruct the voyage → investigate previous ports → review STS transfers → preserve AIS records → verify cargo origin → verify consignee and end user → reconstruct payments → identify banks and intermediaries → review sanctions clauses → notify insurers where appropriate → conduct an internal investigation → preserve employee communications → assess individual director exposure → prepare the master’s position → challenge false-positive matches → seek release of the vessel where legally justified → challenge unlawful or disproportionate measures through the appropriate procedure → defend any criminal investigation → document commercial losses from detention.
Yes. Depending on the facts and applicable Turkish legal framework, authorities may investigate transactions involving vessels, cargoes, owners, operators, charterers or other counterparties.
Not necessarily. The applicable Turkish legal basis must be identified separately. However, foreign sanctions can still create significant banking, insurance and contractual consequences for an internationally operating shipowner.
Yes. Ownership and control can be important where authorities are examining whether a designated person or entity is connected with assets or transactions.
Potentially, where there is a valid legal basis for the relevant measure. The owner should immediately determine which authority imposed the restriction and whether it concerns the vessel, cargo or a connected party.
Yes. The master may possess relevant information concerning voyage history, cargo documentation, AIS operation, STS transfers and instructions received during the voyage.
Potentially, where the statutory requirements for individual criminal responsibility are satisfied. Corporate title alone does not automatically establish personal criminal liability.
No. STS transfers have legitimate commercial purposes. However, they can receive increased scrutiny where authorities suspect that a transfer was used to conceal cargo origin, destination or counterparties.
No. An AIS gap by itself does not establish unlawful conduct. The circumstances, technical evidence and other voyage records must be examined.
The company should establish whether the restriction is an internal bank compliance review, a potential false-positive sanctions match or a formal legal freezing measure. The underlying counterparty and payment chain should then be reviewed.
Corporate ownership records, beneficial-ownership documents, charterparties, bills of lading, cargo manifests, certificates of origin, AIS and voyage records, STS documentation, bank transfers, historical sanctions-screening results, compliance records and internal communications can all be important.
A maritime sanctions investigation can simultaneously threaten the vessel, cargo, bank payments, charterparty, insurance coverage and individual company executives. Foreign shipowners should therefore avoid fragmented responses in which the master, commercial department, bank and management provide inconsistent explanations.
Firat Fesih Kaya Law Office assists foreign shipowners, vessel operators, charterers and international maritime companies facing sanctions-related investigations and vessel disputes in Turkey. Firat Fesih Kaya can assist with evaluating the Turkish legal basis of an investigation, protecting foreign owners and company executives, challenging relevant measures where legal grounds exist, coordinating documentary evidence and developing a defense strategy concerning vessels, cargoes, payments and beneficial ownership.
Phone: +90 312 434 22 22
Mobile Phone: +90 532 769 22 22
Email: info@firatfesihkaya.av.tr
Address: Mevlana Boulevard No: 221, Yildirim Tower, Balgat, Cankaya / Ankara, Turkey