

Learn how third-party ownership restrictions work in football, FIFA Article 18ter, player economic rights, transfer risks, club compliance, and Turkish football law in 2026.
Third-party ownership, commonly known as TPO, is one of the most sensitive compliance issues in modern football. Before FIFA’s global ban, clubs, investors, agencies, and private funds could sometimes acquire a percentage of a player’s future transfer value. This model created serious concerns about sporting integrity, player freedom, transfer transparency, and conflicts of interest.
Today, FIFA strictly prohibits third-party ownership of players’ economic rights. Under Article 18ter of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, clubs and players may not enter into agreements giving a third party the right to participate in compensation connected to a future transfer.
For Turkish clubs, foreign investors, agents, football academies, and professional players, understanding TPO restrictions is essential. A non-compliant structure may result in FIFA investigations, transfer sanctions, fines, registration issues, and disputes before CAS.
Third-party ownership refers to a structure where a person or entity outside the player’s current and future clubs holds an economic interest in the player’s future transfer value.
In practice, this could involve:
A private investor financing a player transfer in return for a percentage of a future transfer fee.
An agency company acquiring part of a player’s economic rights.
A fund receiving payment if the player is later sold to another club.
A commercial partner gaining control over transfer-related financial benefits.
FIFA banned this model because it may allow external parties to influence sporting decisions, transfer strategy, player movement, and club independence. FIFA explains that Articles 18bis and 18ter were adopted to protect football integrity, the transfer system, and contractual stability.
Article 18ter prohibits clubs and players from entering into agreements where a third party is entitled to participate, fully or partially, in compensation payable for a future transfer.
This means a third party cannot legally receive a share of the transfer fee simply because it owns part of the player’s economic rights.
The rule applies broadly and covers arrangements that may appear indirect, disguised, or commercially structured as investment agreements.
The key point is simple: a player’s future transfer value cannot be owned by an external third party.
FIFA’s prohibition is based on several policy concerns.
Football clubs must make sporting decisions independently.
If an investor owns part of a player’s transfer value, that investor may pressure the club to sell the player at a particular time or to a particular destination.
TPO can negatively affect player autonomy.
A player’s career should not be controlled by investors seeking financial return from future transfers.
Hidden ownership structures can make transfer payments difficult to trace.
This creates risks involving tax compliance, money laundering controls, accounting obligations, and financial fair play reviews.
Clubs should not be controlled by external investors through transfer-related economic rights.
FIFA’s rules seek to prevent third parties from influencing employment, registration, and transfer decisions.
Third-party ownership and third-party influence are related but different concepts.
This concerns economic rights.
It involves a third party receiving a financial interest in a player’s future transfer compensation.
This concerns control or influence.
Under FIFA Article 18bis, clubs must not enter into contracts that allow another party to influence employment or transfer-related decisions.
A contract may violate FIFA rules even if no influence is actually exercised. The existence of a contractual right to influence may be enough to create regulatory risk.
For FIFA purposes, a third party generally means a party other than the two clubs involved in a transfer, or a previous club with which the player was registered.
Examples may include:
Private investors.
Investment funds.
Sponsorship companies.
Agents or agency companies.
Player management entities.
Commercial partners.
Family companies.
Unrelated corporate vehicles.
This definition is intentionally broad to prevent disguised ownership arrangements.
Yes, sell-on clauses between football clubs are generally allowed when properly structured.
For example, a selling club may agree that it will receive 20% of a future transfer fee if the player is later sold by the buying club.
This is different from prohibited TPO because the selling club is a football club connected to the player’s registration history, not an unrelated third-party investor.
However, the clause must be drafted carefully. If the structure gives an unrelated entity transfer-related economic rights, it may create TPO risk.
Yes, player bonuses can be lawful if they are structured as employment compensation.
Examples include:
Signing bonuses.
Loyalty bonuses.
Performance bonuses.
Appearance bonuses.
Goal bonuses.
Promotion bonuses.
Championship bonuses.
However, a player bonus linked to future transfer compensation must be reviewed carefully. The legal assessment depends on the wording, payment trigger, beneficiary, and commercial purpose.
Agent commissions are not automatically prohibited.
Licensed football agents may receive commission for legitimate representation services, subject to FIFA agent regulations and national association rules.
However, agent commission must not be disguised third-party ownership.
An agent cannot use a representation agreement to obtain prohibited economic rights in the player’s future transfer value.
Turkish clubs must be especially careful when dealing with international investors, private funding arrangements, player financing models, or complex transfer structures.
Risky arrangements may include:
Investor-funded player acquisitions.
Loan agreements linked to future player sale proceeds.
Agency financing tied to transfer value.
Sponsorship contracts containing transfer-related repayment clauses.
Side letters with hidden economic rights.
Corporate vehicles created to hold player-related financial interests.
If FIFA determines that a structure violates Article 18ter, the club may face serious disciplinary consequences.
Potential consequences include:
FIFA disciplinary investigations.
Financial penalties.
Transfer bans.
Registration restrictions.
Contractual invalidity.
Disputes before FIFA bodies.
CAS arbitration.
Reputational damage.
Loss of investor confidence.
Additional scrutiny in future transfers.
For clubs competing internationally, even one non-compliant transfer structure may create long-term regulatory problems.
Foreign investors may be interested in Turkish football because of player development potential, relatively lower acquisition costs, and international transfer opportunities.
However, investors cannot legally acquire economic rights in players as investment assets.
Instead, lawful investment structures may include:
Equity investment in a club.
Sponsorship agreements.
Commercial partnerships.
Academy development agreements.
Loan financing unrelated to player economic rights.
Infrastructure investment.
Scouting service contracts.
Each structure must be reviewed carefully to ensure that repayment or profit rights are not linked unlawfully to future player transfers.
Football academies must also avoid prohibited ownership structures.
An academy cannot sell a percentage of a young player’s future transfer value to an external investor if the arrangement creates prohibited third-party economic rights.
Lawful alternatives may include:
Training compensation.
Solidarity contribution.
Education service agreements.
Scouting agreements.
Club-to-club development cooperation.
However, youth player structures must also comply with FIFA rules on minors, registration, and player protection.
Loan transfers can create TPO-related risks if the loaning club, borrowing club, investor, or intermediary receives improper influence or transfer-related rights.
A compliant loan agreement should clearly address:
Loan period.
Salary responsibility.
Option to buy.
Performance obligations.
Registration duties.
Insurance matters.
Return conditions.
Any future transfer-related clause must be checked against FIFA Articles 18bis and 18ter.
Buyout clauses and release clauses are generally not prohibited by themselves.
A player and club may agree on contractual conditions for early termination or transfer release.
However, a buyout structure becomes risky if an external third party receives a percentage of the buyout amount or controls whether the clause is activated.
The key issue is not the existence of the buyout clause, but whether a third party has economic rights or influence connected to the player’s transfer.
CAS has repeatedly dealt with disputes concerning FIFA’s third-party ownership framework.
The general approach has been to support FIFA’s regulatory objective of protecting integrity, transparency, and contractual stability in the transfer system.
Challenges to the TPO ban have generally been difficult because FIFA’s position is that the rule serves legitimate governance purposes in professional football.
Clubs, players, and agents should review the following before signing transfer-related documents:
Does any external party receive money from a future transfer fee?
Does any investor have a right to approve or block a transfer?
Is repayment of financing linked to a player’s transfer value?
Does an agent agreement contain transfer-value participation?
Are there side letters outside the main transfer contract?
Does a sponsorship agreement refer to a specific player’s future transfer?
Does a loan agreement give excessive control to another party?
Are all payments disclosed in official transfer documentation?
Are TMS entries consistent with the written agreements?
Has the contract been reviewed under FIFA Articles 18bis and 18ter?
Turkish clubs should implement internal compliance procedures before every transfer.
Recommended steps include:
Legal review of all transfer documents.
Review of side agreements.
Verification of agent authority.
Clear separation between financing and player economic rights.
Transparent accounting records.
Careful TMS submissions.
Board-level approval for high-risk transfers.
Written compliance opinions for investor-funded transactions.
Players should carefully review any contract that refers to:
Future transfer value.
Image rights linked to transfers.
Agent commissions.
Investment participation.
Career control provisions.
Assignment of rights.
Termination compensation.
A player should not sign any document that gives an investor financial ownership over future transfer compensation.
Investors interested in Turkish football should avoid structures based on direct or indirect ownership of player economic rights.
Safer alternatives may include:
Club equity investment.
Revenue-sharing from lawful commercial activities.
Sponsorship revenue.
Facility development returns.
Academy service income.
Scouting consultancy fees.
Brand partnerships.
Any investment return connected to a specific player’s future transfer should be treated as high risk.
In 2026, football regulators continue to focus on transfer transparency, financial disclosure, and player protection.
Expected developments include:
Stronger monitoring of transfer documentation.
Closer review of investor-backed club financing.
More scrutiny of agent-related payment structures.
Increased use of digital compliance systems.
Greater emphasis on beneficial ownership transparency.
More disputes involving hidden side agreements.
Turkish clubs operating internationally should expect FIFA to continue taking a strict approach to third-party ownership.
No. FIFA prohibits third-party ownership of players’ economic rights under Article 18ter of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players.
No. An external investor cannot lawfully own a percentage of compensation payable in relation to a future transfer.
Yes. Properly drafted sell-on clauses between football clubs are generally allowed.
Yes, agents may receive lawful commissions for legitimate representation services, but they cannot disguise third-party ownership through commission structures.
This is highly risky and may violate FIFA rules if the sponsor receives transfer-related economic rights.
They may use lawful financing structures, but repayment must not be based on ownership of a player’s future transfer value.
Article 18bis concerns third-party influence over club decisions. Article 18ter concerns third-party ownership of players’ economic rights.
Yes. FIFA may impose disciplinary sanctions, including financial penalties and transfer-related restrictions.
Yes. Football investment structures must be reviewed carefully to avoid TPO, TMS, tax, corporate, and regulatory risks.
Yes. Depending on the case, FIFA disciplinary decisions may be appealed before CAS.
Need legal assistance with third-party ownership restrictions, football investment structures, FIFA compliance, transfer agreements, agent contracts, or player economic rights issues in Turkey?
Fırat Fesih Kaya Law Firm provides legal representation to football players, coaches, agents, clubs, academies, investors, and sports industry stakeholders in domestic and international sports law matters. Our services include FIFA compliance review, transfer agreement drafting, investor structure assessment, TPO risk analysis, agent contract review, disciplinary proceedings, and CAS arbitration support.
For tailored legal advice regarding your football transfer or sports law matter, feel free to contact us.
Phone: +90 532 261 00 77
Email: info@firatfesihkaya.av.tr
Website: www.firatfesihkaya.av.tr