

A foreign buyer loses money through a fake Turkish real estate website. Learn how to preserve digital evidence, trace bank transfers, pursue criminal proceedings, freeze fraud proceeds and seek civil recovery.
A foreign buyer searching for property in Turkey may encounter a professional-looking website advertising apartments, villas, commercial properties, land or investment projects. The website may contain convincing photographs, Turkish company information, supposed title deed copies, employee profiles, testimonials, office addresses and even documents bearing official-looking stamps.
The buyer communicates with a supposed real estate consultant, negotiates the purchase price and transfers a reservation fee, deposit or substantial part of the purchase price.
Then the website disappears.
The telephone numbers stop working. The supposed agent becomes unreachable. The buyer discovers that the property belongs to someone else, the advertised project has been copied from a genuine developer, the company identity has been misused or the website itself was created solely to collect payments from foreign investors.
A fake real estate website can therefore create several legal problems simultaneously: online fraud, identity impersonation, fraudulent bank transfers, falsified documents, digital evidence preservation and civil recovery of the investor’s money.
For the victim, the first objective should not simply be identifying whether the website is fake. The immediate priorities are preserving the website evidence, identifying the payment trail and preventing the fraud proceeds from disappearing.
The website may be entirely fabricated.
But sophisticated fraud often uses genuine material stolen from legitimate businesses.
The fraudster may copy:
property photographs,
project plans,
developer brochures,
real estate agency logos,
company names,
employee photographs,
title deed documents,
valuation reports,
maps,
contact information,
and investment descriptions.
The resulting website can look substantially more credible than a simple social-media scam.
A particularly dangerous scheme involves copying the identity of an existing business.
The fraudulent website may use a domain name differing from the genuine company’s domain by only one letter.
It may also reproduce the genuine company’s:
logo,
address,
project portfolio,
employee names,
and corporate information.
The foreign investor may therefore believe that they have independently verified the company when they have actually been communicating through an impersonation website.
Modern website templates allow sophisticated-looking sites to be created quickly.
Features such as:
SSL certificates,
professional design,
live chat,
customer reviews,
maps,
corporate photographs,
or multilingual pages
do not independently establish that the website operator owns the advertised property or even represents a genuine business.
The legal identity behind the website must be verified separately.
Where an electronic-commerce business falls within the applicable registration framework, ETBİS information can be relevant to verification. The Ministry of Trade currently provides a registered-site inquiry function.
However, the official ETBİS system expressly warns that registration and the presence of an ETBİS QR code only indicate compliance with relevant registration obligations; they do not guarantee that a business or website is safe or that it will not engage in unlawful activity.
A fraudster may also simply copy a genuine company’s ETBİS information or QR image.
Therefore, the information displayed on the website should be independently compared with official records.
The legal structure of the website matters.
The Ministry of Trade distinguishes websites through which contracts or orders are concluded from certain websites that merely publish advertisements and allow users to contact sellers through telephone or other direct communication methods.
Accordingly, absence from ETBİS should not automatically be treated as conclusive proof that a real estate advertisement website is fraudulent.
The verification process must examine the site’s actual business model.
Before transferring money, a foreign buyer should identify the legal entity supposedly operating the website.
Check whether the claimed:
company name,
business identity,
registered address,
representatives,
telephone numbers,
and bank-account holder
are consistent with one another.
Do not use only the verification information supplied by the suspicious website itself.
Suppose the website claims to belong to a well-known developer or real estate company.
Do not verify it by calling the telephone number displayed on that same website.
Instead, independently locate the genuine business and ask whether:
the domain belongs to it,
the salesperson works for it,
the advertised property belongs to its portfolio,
and the bank account receiving payment is authorized.
This simple separation between the suspicious source and the verification source can prevent substantial losses.
A fraudulent domain may differ from the genuine one in subtle ways.
For example, the fraudster may use:
an additional letter,
a missing letter,
a hyphen,
a different domain extension,
or a visually similar character.
Foreign buyers should therefore compare the full domain name rather than relying on the website logo.
If a business claims to have operated for many years but its website appears to have been created very recently, further investigation is appropriate.
Domain-registration information may sometimes assist in reconstructing:
when the domain was registered,
which registrar was used,
and other technical details available through lawful sources.
The absence of publicly visible registrant information does not necessarily prove fraud because privacy services are common.
Once fraud is suspected, digital evidence should be preserved immediately.
Capture:
the homepage,
property advertisement,
company information,
contact page,
payment instructions,
employee profiles,
terms and conditions,
property photographs,
title deed documents,
bank details,
and all pages relevant to the transaction.
The website may be taken offline as soon as the fraudsters realize that the victim has complained.
Screenshots provide a quick record, but additional information can be valuable.
Preserve where possible:
page addresses,
dates and times,
downloaded documents,
original emails,
PDF files,
advertisements,
electronic contracts,
and communications linking the website to the people requesting payment.
The objective is to reconstruct what the investor actually saw and relied upon.
Do not record only the business name.
Record the full domain.
A fraudster may operate several almost identical websites.
The exact domain can help connect:
hosting records,
registrar information,
email addresses,
advertisements,
and other technical evidence.
If communications occurred by email, do not preserve only screenshots of the message body.
Retain the original emails and attachments where possible.
Technical email information can assist in identifying:
sending infrastructure,
addresses,
routing,
timestamps,
and relationships among communications.
Fake real estate websites frequently move the investor from the website to:
WhatsApp,
Telegram,
SMS,
or another messaging service.
Preserve the complete conversation, including:
telephone numbers,
profile names,
profile photographs,
voice messages,
documents,
bank instructions,
and timestamps.
Do not save only the final payment request.
If the investor received recorded voice messages or video files, retain the originals.
Where the fraudster participated in live video calls, preserve:
call history,
usernames,
telephone numbers,
and related communications.
Do not assume that seeing someone’s face during a video call proves their stated identity.
The apartment may actually exist.
The project may actually exist.
The developer may actually exist.
The fraud occurs because the website operator has no authority to sell it.
This is why verifying only the property itself is insufficient.
The seller’s authority must also be verified.
Determine whether:
the property exists,
the advertised parcel corresponds with the property,
the supposed owner is genuine,
the seller has authority,
and the property is actually being offered for sale.
A copied title deed or property photograph should never substitute for current title verification.
The site may provide a downloadable title deed copy to create confidence.
The document may be:
fabricated,
altered,
outdated,
or genuine but belonging to an unrelated owner.
Current registry verification remains essential.
Fraudulent websites frequently use expressions designed to create official credibility.
Examples may include:
“government approved project,”
“citizenship guaranteed,”
“official investment partner,”
or
“authorized government property.”
Such statements should be independently verified.
A professional-looking government logo does not establish official approval.
Foreign investors seeking citizenship may be attractive targets because fraudsters know that substantial property payments may be expected.
The website may promise:
guaranteed citizenship,
guaranteed valuation,
guaranteed title transfer,
or guaranteed eligibility.
Property ownership, transaction legality and citizenship requirements should be verified separately.
This is one of the most important fraud controls.
Before payment, determine:
the account holder,
bank,
IBAN,
currency,
relationship between the account holder and seller,
and legal reason for payment.
If a website supposedly belongs to Company A but the buyer is instructed to transfer the purchase price to an unrelated individual, the discrepancy requires explanation before any payment is made.
Foreign buyers may be told that payment must be sent to:
an employee,
manager,
accountant,
broker,
relative,
or business partner.
A convenient explanation does not eliminate the legal risk.
The investor should establish whether payment to that person actually satisfies the buyer’s obligation to the genuine seller.
A fraudulent site may request:
Bitcoin,
stablecoins,
or another crypto asset
on the basis that international transfers will supposedly be faster.
Crypto transfers can move rapidly and may be difficult to reverse.
The investor should preserve the wallet address, transaction hash and platform information if fraud occurs.
The first response should proceed on several tracks simultaneously:
preserve the website,
contact the bank,
preserve the financial trail,
secure communications,
verify the real property and business,
and
prepare the criminal and civil recovery strategy.
Do not spend several days arguing with the website operator before taking action.
If money was transferred recently, inform the sending bank that the payment is connected with suspected fraud.
Provide:
amount,
date,
recipient,
IBAN or account information,
transaction reference,
and relevant evidence.
Where the payment originated outside Turkey, preserve the full SWIFT documentation as well.
The fact that the money left the investor’s account does not necessarily mean the financial trail has disappeared.
Banking records can potentially show:
first recipient,
onward transfer,
subsequent accounts,
withdrawals,
payment institutions,
and other movements.
The investigation should follow the funds rather than stop at the first IBAN.
The account holder may be different from the person operating the website.
The investigation should distinguish between:
website operator,
fake salesperson,
account holder,
person controlling online banking,
person withdrawing money,
and ultimate beneficiary.
This can be essential to identifying the entire fraud network.
The current criminal-procedure framework contains an important mechanism for specified fraud investigations involving financial accounts.
For qualifying offences and where the statutory suspicion threshold is met, relevant accounts with banks, payment service providers or crypto-asset service providers may be temporarily suspended under the applicable procedure. The framework also addresses situations where suspected criminal proceeds have already moved onward through the financial system.
This makes early reporting particularly important in online real estate fraud cases.
Temporary suspension is designed to prevent further movement while the suspicious transaction is assessed.
Seizure is a criminal-procedure measure applied to relevant assets under the applicable statutory requirements.
A victim should therefore not assume that telling the bank about the fraud automatically produces a permanent freeze or guarantees repayment.
The appropriate judicial and prosecutorial procedures still matter.
A fake real estate website may be only the visible front end of a larger fraud operation.
The money trail could look like:
Foreign Buyer → Turkish Bank Account A → Account B → Payment Institution → Crypto Platform
Each movement should be reconstructed.
Dates and amounts are particularly important.
A foreign victim may know only:
the website,
telephone number,
fake name,
and bank account.
Criminal investigative procedures can be important for identifying people who are not visible to the victim.
Relevant evidence may include:
financial records,
telecommunications evidence where lawfully obtainable,
platform records,
website-related technical information,
and other digital evidence.
Where deception is carried out through information systems or banking mechanisms, the circumstances may fall within the aggravated fraud framework under the Turkish Criminal Code, depending on the precise method and evidence.
The criminal classification should be based on how the scheme actually operated rather than simply describing every internet-related loss as the same offence.
The fake website may provide:
forged title deeds,
fake powers of attorney,
false company documents,
altered passports,
or fabricated payment receipts.
Where documents have been forged or altered and used, separate criminal-law issues concerning document forgery may arise depending on the legal nature of the document and conduct involved.
If the website or salesperson sends a PDF, image or other file, retain the original file.
Do not rely exclusively on screenshots.
Original files may preserve information relevant to:
creation,
editing,
document structure,
or the connection between files used in different fraud cases.
The complaint should reconstruct the fraud chronologically.
Explain:
how the website was discovered,
which property was advertised,
who communicated with the buyer,
what representations were made,
which documents were provided,
when payment was requested,
where the money was sent,
when suspicion arose,
and what happened afterward.
Attach an organized evidence file.
If the transfer is recent, this should be made clear.
The financial investigation may need to establish urgently:
whether money remains in the recipient account,
where it moved,
whether it entered another bank,
whether it was withdrawn,
or whether it was converted into another form.
Delay can materially reduce recovery options.
Where identifiable criminal proceeds are successfully traced and seized, the current criminal-procedure framework can allow property determined to belong to the victim to be returned under the applicable conditions.
This is one reason tracing the actual proceeds can be more valuable than simply identifying the person who operated the website.
A criminal complaint should not automatically be treated as a complete civil recovery strategy.
Depending on the facts, the foreign buyer may have claims involving:
restitution,
repayment,
damages,
contractual liability,
or other civil remedies.
The correct claim depends on who received the money and the legal relationship between the parties.
Where the buyer transferred money because of intentional deception concerning:
seller identity,
property ownership,
authority,
or the existence of the property transaction,
the validity and consequences of any purported agreement require separate civil-law analysis.
A document labelled “reservation agreement” does not necessarily determine the true legal relationship.
Where a recipient has obtained the investor’s money without a valid legal basis, unjust-enrichment principles may potentially become relevant depending on the facts.
The claim should identify:
who received the benefit,
why the legal basis is absent or failed,
and the amount to be returned.
Fraudulent conduct can create damage beyond the transferred amount.
Depending on causation and proof, claimed losses may include certain additional financial consequences.
However, speculative losses should be distinguished from losses that can be legally and factually established.
If a responsible person has been identified and owns assets, waiting until the final civil judgment can create enforcement risk.
Where the legal conditions are satisfied, interim attachment may be considered to preserve assets against a monetary claim.
This is particularly important where there is evidence that assets may be moved or dissipated.
A criminal seizure is connected with the criminal investigation and relevant suspected proceeds or assets under criminal-procedure rules.
Civil interim attachment is designed to secure a monetary claim under enforcement law.
A serious recovery case may require analysis of both mechanisms.
Suppose the original recipient account is empty.
The case is not necessarily over.
The investigation should ask:
Where did the money go?
Who received it?
Did another participant acquire assets?
Does the account holder own other property?
Are there other identifiable assets against which civil recovery can eventually be enforced?
Asset recovery is broader than simply checking the first bank balance.
This question requires careful analysis.
A hosting provider, marketplace, advertising platform or other intermediary is not automatically liable merely because a fraudster used its services.
Potential responsibility depends on:
the type of intermediary,
its role,
applicable statutory obligations,
knowledge or notification,
actions after notification,
and causal connection with the loss.
The intermediary’s role should therefore be analyzed separately rather than assuming automatic liability.
Turkey’s electronic-commerce framework regulates electronic commerce, service providers and intermediary service providers and imposes various information and operational obligations depending on the business model. The Ministry of Trade’s 2026 electronic-commerce materials confirm that the framework continues to operate under Law No. 6563 and its secondary legislation.
However, whether those rules apply to a particular fake real estate website depends on what the website actually did.
If the fraudulent property was advertised through a legitimate marketplace before the victim was redirected to the fake website, the platform may possess relevant transaction or account records.
The Ministry of Trade notes that, in regulated platform transactions, intermediary service providers have obligations concerning systems for consumer requests and maintenance of certain transaction records.
The precise records available in a real estate fraud investigation will depend on the platform and applicable legal framework.
The fact that the victim is a natural person does not automatically resolve whether a transaction qualifies as a consumer transaction.
A buyer acquiring property for personal use may occupy a different legal position from a company or professional investor purchasing property for commercial purposes.
Consumer-law remedies should therefore be evaluated according to the parties and purpose of the transaction.
Real estate transactions have their own formal requirements, and a website interaction does not automatically create a completed transfer of ownership.
The legal effect of:
reservation agreements,
preliminary agreements,
online payments,
and electronic communications
must be distinguished from the formal title-transfer process.
Fraudsters may include professional-looking contractual language stating that:
payments are non-refundable,
the website bears no responsibility,
foreign buyers assume all risk,
or disputes cannot be brought in Turkey.
Such clauses should not simply be accepted as legally decisive.
The validity, incorporation and legal effect of the terms require examination.
Notify the genuine company after preserving evidence.
The real business may possess information showing that:
the domain is unauthorized,
the salesperson does not work there,
the bank account is unrelated,
and the property listing was copied.
This evidence can strengthen the fraud case.
The disappearance of the site does not automatically eliminate the case.
Preserve whatever remains:
screenshots,
browser history,
emails,
payment records,
domain information,
downloaded files,
and communications.
Technical investigation may still identify information connected with the site.
Preserve both the old and new domains.
Fraud networks may repeatedly reopen under slightly different names.
Similar:
property photographs,
telephone numbers,
bank accounts,
documents,
and website text
can help connect multiple domains.
Contact the card issuer promptly and report the suspected fraudulent transaction.
The availability of any card-based dispute or reversal mechanism depends on the transaction and payment system.
Do not assume that the existence of a card payment eliminates the need for legal action.
Preserve the complete bank record and notify the bank immediately.
The recipient account and subsequent transfers can become central to the criminal financial investigation.
Preserve:
wallet address,
transaction hash,
exchange information,
amount,
asset type,
date,
and communications requesting payment.
Where the funds interact with identifiable crypto-asset service providers, relevant criminal-procedure measures may potentially become important under the current framework.
Keep the complete international payment file.
This may include:
SWIFT confirmation,
correspondent bank information,
recipient bank,
IBAN,
currency,
value date,
and transaction reference.
Cross-border transfers can add complexity, but they also create a documentary trail.
Potential additional losses require individual assessment.
The investor should preserve documentation for:
travel,
translation,
professional fees,
bank charges,
and other expenses directly connected with the fraudulent transaction.
Whether each category is recoverable depends on the legal basis, causation and proof.
Multiple victims can materially change the evidentiary picture.
Repeated:
advertisements,
bank accounts,
telephone numbers,
property documents,
and payment patterns
may demonstrate an organized scheme rather than an isolated dispute.
Victims should preserve their individual evidence carefully.
Once substantial evidence indicates fraud, repeated promises such as:
“Your refund will arrive Friday,”
“The bank has delayed it,”
“The owner is travelling,”
or
“We need one more payment”
should not be allowed to replace urgent legal action.
Time may be the fraudster’s greatest advantage.
After losing money, the foreign buyer may be contacted by someone claiming:
“We found your funds.”
“We work with the authorities.”
“We can unlock the frozen account.”
“Pay 5% and your money will be released.”
This may be another scam.
The identity and authority of any recovery professional should be independently verified.
The foreign buyer should prioritize:
contacting the bank,
preserving the website,
saving all communications,
preserving the original payment records,
identifying the recipient account,
verifying the genuine property and business,
and
preparing the criminal complaint.
The purpose is to protect both the financial trail and the digital evidence before either disappears.
The next priority is tracing the funds.
Determine whether:
the money remains in the first account,
it was transferred onward,
it entered a payment institution,
it was withdrawn,
or it moved into a crypto-service environment.
Where the legal conditions for rapid account measures are present, delay can be particularly damaging.
Prepare three coordinated files.
Digital Evidence File: website, domain, emails, messages, documents and online profiles.
Financial File: bank transfers, SWIFT records, recipient accounts, onward-transfer information and payment instructions.
Property File: advertisement, title deed copy, real owner information, genuine developer information and proof that the supposed seller lacked authority.
These files allow the civil and criminal strategies to develop from the same factual chronology.
A useful diagram may show:
Fake Website → Fake Agent → Recipient Account Holder → Second Account → Ultimate Beneficiary
Add:
telephone numbers,
email addresses,
domains,
companies,
bank accounts,
and documents
to each participant.
This can reveal relationships that are not obvious when evidence is reviewed separately.
A foreign buyer defrauded through a fake Turkish real estate website should treat the case as both a digital fraud investigation and an asset-recovery case.
The first priority is evidence preservation. The website may disappear, domain information can change and online profiles can be deleted. Preserve the exact domain, complete pages, property advertisements, downloadable documents, original emails, messaging conversations and every representation that induced payment.
Second, secure the financial trail. Notify the sending bank immediately, preserve the complete payment documentation and identify the first recipient account. The investigation should follow onward transfers rather than ending when the first account is found empty.
Third, initiate the criminal strategy quickly. Depending on how the fake website, banking system and deceptive representations were used, aggravated fraud and document-related offences may need to be investigated. Current criminal-procedure rules also provide important mechanisms for rapid intervention involving accounts connected with qualifying fraud proceeds.
Fourth, develop the civil recovery strategy simultaneously. Identify the persons or companies that received or benefited from the money, determine the legal basis for restitution or damages and assess whether provisional protection of identifiable assets is available.
Fifth, investigate intermediary responsibility separately. A domain registrar, hosting provider, advertising platform, payment institution or marketplace is not automatically responsible merely because its service was misused. Liability requires examination of the intermediary’s actual role and applicable statutory duties. Turkey’s current electronic-commerce framework imposes information and operational obligations on covered service and intermediary providers, but the legal consequences depend on the specific business model and conduct.
Finally, do not allow a disappearing website to end the investigation. The financial trail, original emails, bank records, platform records and technical domain information may remain available even after the public-facing website has been removed.
Lawyer Fırat Fesih Kaya can review the fake website, payment chain, property documentation, communications and identities used in the transaction to determine which criminal complaints, financial-tracing measures, civil recovery claims and asset-preservation remedies should be pursued.
Preserve the exact domain, website pages, property advertisements, company information, emails, messages, payment instructions and documents. Then compare the claimed business, property, seller and bank account with independently verified records.
No. The official ETBİS system itself states that registration or an ETBİS QR code does not guarantee that a business or website is safe or will not engage in unlawful activity.
Contact the sending bank immediately, preserve the full transfer record and notify it of suspected fraud. Preserve the website and communications and pursue urgent investigation of the recipient account and any onward transfers.
Potentially, where the applicable criminal-procedure requirements are satisfied. The availability of account suspension or seizure depends on the suspected offence, financial trail and statutory conditions.
The investigation should follow the money. An empty first account may simply mean that the proceeds were transferred to another bank, payment institution, withdrawn or moved elsewhere.
Potentially. The civil claim depends on who received or benefited from the funds and the legal basis of the transaction. Restitution, damages and other civil remedies may need to be considered.
Not automatically. The intermediary’s role, legal obligations, knowledge, response to notifications and connection with the loss must be analyzed individually.
Preserve the fake website first, then independently contact the genuine company. Confirmation that the domain, salesperson or bank account does not belong to the genuine company can become important evidence.
Yes, depending on the procedures required. A foreign victim does not necessarily need to remain physically in Turkey throughout the entire investigation or civil case, and representation may be arranged through an appropriately drafted power of attorney.
Preserve the exact website and domain, original advertisements, emails, WhatsApp or other messages, title deed and property documents, contracts, telephone numbers, identities used by the fraudsters, complete bank or SWIFT records, recipient account information, crypto transaction data where relevant and evidence from the genuine property owner, developer or business showing that the website or seller was unauthorized.
Fake real estate websites can disappear quickly, but the evidence and money trail may remain traceable. The strongest response combines immediate preservation of digital evidence, rapid investigation of bank transfers, criminal proceedings against the participants and a separate civil strategy aimed at recovering the investor’s financial loss.
Foreign buyers should act particularly quickly where the transfer has only recently occurred. Waiting for repeated refund promises can allow funds to move through several accounts and online evidence to disappear.
Fırat Fesih Kaya Law Office assists foreign buyers and investors with fake real estate websites, online property fraud, impersonated real estate companies, fraudulent bank transfers, digital evidence preservation, criminal complaints, financial tracing, asset-protection measures and civil recovery proceedings. Lawyer Fırat Fesih Kaya can examine the digital and financial evidence to determine how the fraud network can be identified, how the money can be traced and which civil and criminal remedies should be pursued.
Phone: +90 312 434 22 22
WhatsApp: +90 532 769 22 22
Email: info@firatfesihkaya.av.tr