

Learn how OFAC, EU, and UK sanctions affect ships calling at Turkish ports in 2026. A practical guide for foreign shipowners on vessel screening, Russian oil, shadow fleet risks, ownership, AIS, STS transfers, insurance, banking, and sanctions compliance.
Turkey’s position between the Black Sea, Mediterranean, Europe, the Caucasus, and the Middle East makes Turkish ports commercially important for international shipping. It also creates a complicated sanctions environment for foreign shipowners, charterers, operators, managers, insurers, cargo interests, and maritime service providers.
A common compliance mistake is assuming that a vessel calling at a Turkish port only needs to consider Turkish sanctions law.
That is not always correct.
Turkey is not a member of the European Union and does not automatically transform every United States, European Union, or United Kingdom sanctions measure into Turkish domestic law. Nevertheless, OFAC, EU, and UK sanctions may still directly or indirectly affect a vessel using a Turkish port because of the nationality of the parties, ownership structures, cargo, financing, insurers, banks, charterers, service providers, contractual provisions, or subsequent voyage.
For international shipping companies, the correct question is therefore not simply whether a voyage is permissible under Turkish law. The broader question is:
Which sanctions regimes apply to the vessel, transaction, cargo, parties, payments, insurance, and services involved?
This distinction is particularly important in 2026 because maritime sanctions targeting Russia’s shadow fleet, energy trade, tankers, port access, maritime services, and sanctions circumvention have continued to expand.
No.
United States sanctions administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, or OFAC, do not become Turkish domestic law merely because a vessel enters a Turkish port.
However, OFAC jurisdiction can still become highly relevant.
Potential U.S. sanctions exposure may arise where a transaction involves U.S. persons, U.S.-incorporated companies, U.S.-controlled entities where applicable, U.S.-origin regulated activity, the U.S. financial system, or other jurisdictional connections recognized under the relevant sanctions program.
Foreign companies must also consider the possibility of secondary-sanctions exposure under programs where U.S. law authorizes consequences for specified conduct by non-U.S. persons.
OFAC’s current Sanctions List Service includes both the SDN List and non-SDN sanctions lists. Importantly for maritime businesses, OFAC confirms that its sanctions data includes maritime vessels and aircraft that have been designated or blocked.
A Turkish port call therefore does not provide a safe harbor from OFAC exposure.
EU sanctions do not generally become Turkish law simply because a vessel is located in Turkey.
However, EU sanctions remain critically important where the transaction involves EU nationals, EU-incorporated entities, EU-controlled commercial arrangements where legally relevant, EU territorial jurisdiction, or services supplied by EU operators.
This can affect shipowners in Turkey because international shipping transactions frequently involve European:
EU sanctions against Russia have become particularly significant for maritime transportation.
The European Commission confirms that measures include restrictions affecting Russian-flagged vessels, specified shadow-fleet vessels, ships involved in suspicious ship-to-ship transfers, and vessels manipulating navigation-tracking systems when transporting relevant Russian oil.
Accordingly, a vessel capable of entering a Turkish port may still be unable to obtain particular services from an EU company.
The same jurisdictional distinction applies to United Kingdom sanctions.
UK sanctions are not automatically Turkish domestic law.
However, they may bind UK persons and entities even when maritime activity takes place outside the United Kingdom, depending on the applicable legislation and jurisdictional connection.
This becomes important because London remains one of the world’s most significant maritime centres.
A Turkish port transaction may involve a UK:
The UK’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation maintains dedicated guidance for the maritime shipping sector. Its guidance covers suspicious shipping practices, country-specific risks and due diligence. Significantly, the guidance was updated on January 28, 2026, when the former OFSI Consolidated List was closed and the UK Sanctions List became the sole source for UK sanctions designations.
Shipping companies still using outdated UK screening processes should therefore update their compliance procedures.
The EU sanctions framework continued to expand substantially in 2026.
On April 23, 2026, the EU adopted its 20th sanctions package against Russia. Among its maritime measures, an additional 46 vessels became subject to port-access and maritime-service restrictions, bringing the number of designated vessels under the relevant shadow-fleet measures to 632.
These measures target vessels connected with activities including shadow-fleet oil transportation, support for Russia’s energy sector, transportation of military equipment, and other activities identified under the sanctions framework.
The 2026 package also introduced enhanced restrictions concerning tanker sales.
EU persons selling or transferring specified oil tankers to third-country purchasers must now take proportionate steps to identify and assess the risk that the vessel will be retransferred to Russia or used in Russia, document that risk assessment, and maintain appropriate controls.
This is especially relevant to Turkish buyers, sellers, brokers, financing institutions, and maritime businesses participating in international vessel-sale transactions involving EU parties.
Foreign shipowners involved in LNG transportation should pay particular attention to the updated EU framework.
The consolidated EU rules provide for additional restrictions affecting maritime navigation goods and technology in connection with specified Russian LNG tankers.
Certain provisions became applicable from April 25, 2026 to LNG tankers registered under the Russian flag, certified by the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping, or owned or managed by relevant Russian persons or entities. Further provisions are scheduled to apply from January 1, 2027.
These developments demonstrate why a sanctions compliance review cannot rely exclusively on the vessel’s flag.
Ownership, management, classification, cargo, and services may each independently create sanctions exposure.
The EU maintains restrictions preventing Russian-flagged vessels from accessing EU ports and locks, subject to specified exemptions.
The rules also address vessels that changed their Russian flag or registration after February 24, 2022 in circumstances covered by the legislation.
This does not automatically mean that the same vessel is prohibited from entering a Turkish port under the same EU regulation.
Turkey is not an EU Member State.
However, a vessel operating between Turkey and the EU must evaluate whether its next EU port call is legally possible.
A ship could therefore legally complete operations in Turkey yet subsequently discover that it cannot enter its nominated EU discharge port.
This can create substantial charterparty consequences.
The so-called shadow fleet has become one of the most significant sanctions-compliance risks in international shipping.
EU measures now target hundreds of vessels considered connected with Russia’s shadow-fleet activities. Listed vessels can be subject to port-access bans and prohibitions affecting a broad range of maritime services.
The restrictions can extend beyond simple entry into an EU port.
EU guidance concerning listed vessels identifies restrictions affecting services such as financing, insurance, brokering, bunkering, ship supplies, crew changes, cargo operations, technical assistance, and certain ship-to-ship transactions.
A Turkish company dealing with such a vessel should therefore determine whether any EU-regulated company participating in the transaction is prohibited from supplying the intended service.
A sanctions review should never rely solely on the current vessel name.
Ships can change:
The IMO number generally remains the most reliable permanent identifier.
This is particularly important when assessing possible attempts to circumvent port-access restrictions through reflagging.
EU authorities expressly identify the IMO number as an important tool for determining whether a vessel previously registered under the Russian flag has changed flag or registration.
A robust screening process should therefore examine both current and historical vessel information.
Screening the vessel itself is not enough.
The compliance review should identify the:
Registered Owner: The company formally recorded as owner.
Beneficial Owner: The person or entity ultimately owning or controlling the shipowning structure.
Technical Manager: The company responsible for technical operations.
Commercial Manager: The entity controlling commercial employment.
Charterer: The company directing the vessel’s commercial voyage under the relevant charter.
Cargo Interests: Shipper, consignee, cargo owner, trader, and ultimate receiver where appropriate.
A sanctions risk may arise even where the vessel itself does not appear on any sanctions list.
Automatic Identification System irregularities have become particularly important in maritime sanctions enforcement.
AIS gaps do not automatically prove unlawful conduct. Equipment failure, navigational safety, and other legitimate circumstances may explain temporary interruptions.
However, deliberate manipulation or unexplained shutdowns can create serious compliance concerns.
EU maritime sanctions specifically address vessels suspected of illegally interfering with or disabling navigation-tracking systems when transporting Russian oil subject to relevant restrictions.
Shipping companies should therefore investigate significant AIS anomalies before entering a high-risk charter or cargo transaction.
Ship-to-ship transfers are legitimate maritime operations.
Nevertheless, they can become a sanctions red flag when combined with suspicious trading patterns.
EU measures specifically address vessels engaged in STS transfers suspected of breaching Russian oil restrictions or the G7 price-cap framework.
Before accepting cargo transferred from another tanker, owners should consider examining:
The objective should be to establish a credible and documented chain of custody.
Russian-origin crude oil and petroleum products remain particularly sensitive.
The EU prohibits specified maritime transportation and related services involving Russian crude oil and petroleum products to third countries unless the transaction falls within the applicable price-cap framework or another relevant exception.
U.S. and UK restrictions may separately apply to persons within their respective jurisdictions.
For a vessel calling at Turkey, sanctions analysis should therefore examine not merely where the cargo is being discharged, but also:
cargo origin, purchase price where relevant, parties, financing, insurance, maritime services, and documentary evidence.
Banks frequently create a practical sanctions-control layer beyond the territorial location of the vessel.
A freight payment may involve a bank subject to U.S., EU, or UK rules.
The same applies to:
A transaction that is legally permissible under Turkish law may therefore encounter frozen, rejected, or delayed payments because an intermediary financial institution applies another sanctions regime.
Payment routes should be reviewed before the voyage rather than after freight becomes inaccessible.
Insurance represents another major sanctions risk.
International P&I Clubs and marine insurers may be subject to UK, EU, U.S., or other sanctions restrictions.
A Turkish port call does not remove those obligations.
Owners should therefore confirm whether insurance remains effective for the intended cargo, voyage, counterparties, and vessel.
The sanctions analysis should also address whether the insurer could legally provide security or pay a claim if a casualty occurred.
A nominally valid insurance certificate has limited practical value if sanctions prevent the insurer from performing its obligations.
Charterparties involving Turkey and sanctions-sensitive trades should contain carefully drafted sanctions provisions.
The contract should address:
The parties should also define which sanctions regimes are contractually relevant.
A vague clause referring simply to “all applicable sanctions” may itself create a dispute over what is actually applicable.
Before a sanctions-sensitive vessel calls at Turkey, foreign shipowners should conduct a risk-based review covering:
Higher-risk transactions should be escalated for legal review before cargo is loaded or the vessel becomes committed to the voyage.
No. A Turkish port call alone does not make OFAC rules Turkish domestic law. However, U.S. jurisdiction or secondary-sanctions exposure may arise depending on the transaction, parties, payments, and applicable sanctions program.
No. Turkey is not an EU Member State. Nevertheless, EU sanctions may directly bind EU persons and companies participating in a transaction involving a Turkish port.
The EU port-access prohibition does not itself make Turkey an EU port. Turkish entry must be assessed under Turkish law and other applicable restrictions. However, the vessel may face serious problems if its subsequent voyage requires EU port access.
From January 28, 2026, the UK Sanctions List became the sole source for UK sanctions designations following closure of the OFSI Consolidated List.
The EU’s 20th sanctions package in April 2026 added 46 vessels, bringing the relevant total to 632 designated vessels.
Yes. IMO-number screening is critical because names, flags, owners, and managers can change.
No. Legitimate explanations may exist. However, unexplained AIS manipulation combined with high-risk cargo, STS transfers, or ownership changes can justify enhanced due diligence.
Potentially, yes, where the service provider is subject to EU sanctions jurisdiction and the vessel or transaction falls within an applicable prohibition. EU restrictions on designated vessels can cover a broad range of maritime services.
Yes. Insurers and P&I Clubs may have independent sanctions obligations based on their jurisdiction and applicable law.
Legal review should be considered before accepting a high-risk voyage involving designated or potentially designated counterparties, Russian-origin oil, shadow-fleet concerns, unusual STS transfers, suspicious AIS activity, opaque beneficial ownership, restricted cargo, or complex international payment structures.
A vessel’s ability to enter a Turkish port does not necessarily mean that every aspect of its voyage is compliant with OFAC, EU, UK, Turkish, or other applicable sanctions regimes.
For international shipowners, sanctions exposure may arise through the vessel, beneficial owner, charterer, cargo, banks, insurers, P&I interests, service providers, cargo origin, STS history, or subsequent port calls.
Fırat Fesih Kaya provides legal assistance to foreign shipowners, operators, managers, charterers, cargo interests, and international shipping companies dealing with maritime sanctions compliance, Turkish port operations, vessel restrictions, cargo disputes, and sanctions-sensitive transactions.
A pre-voyage or pre-arrival legal review can help identify sanctions risks before they result in rejected payments, loss of insurance cover, cargo detention, port-access problems, charterparty disputes, or substantial commercial losses.
For a case-specific assessment concerning a vessel calling at a Turkish port, you may contact our office.
Phone: +90 312 434 22 22
Mobile: +90 532 769 22 22
Email: info@firatfesihkaya.av.tr
Address: Mevlana Boulevard No: 221, Yıldırım Tower No: 148, 06520 Balgat, Çankaya, Ankara, Turkey