

What should a foreigner do when accused of money laundering in Turkey? Learn about TCK Article 282, MASAK investigations, frozen bank accounts, asset seizure, source-of-funds evidence, criminal defence and recovery of legitimate assets.
A foreign national accused of money laundering in Turkey can face a serious criminal and financial investigation involving prosecutors, MASAK, Turkish banks, payment institutions and potentially cryptocurrency platforms.
The most important point is that an unusual international transfer, a suspicious transaction report or even a frozen bank account does not automatically establish the offence of money laundering.
Under Turkish law, the criminal offence is principally regulated by Article 282 of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK). The anti-money-laundering compliance and financial-intelligence framework is principally established by Law No. 5549 on Prevention of Laundering Proceeds of Crime. MASAK’s official materials likewise define the laundering offence by reference to TCK Article 282. (Masak)
A foreigner confronted with such an investigation should therefore avoid treating the case merely as a banking problem. The defence may need to address simultaneously:
the alleged predicate crime, the origin of the money, the purpose of the transactions, the person’s knowledge and intent, the movement of funds, any frozen accounts or seized assets, and the evidence contained in the criminal investigation.
Money laundering is not simply possessing a large amount of unexplained money.
Article 282 TCK concerns property values derived from criminal activity and specified conduct concerning those assets.
The statutory framework focuses particularly on moving qualifying criminal proceeds abroad or subjecting them to transactions for the purpose of concealing their unlawful origin or creating the appearance that they were obtained legitimately. (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi)
This means prosecutors normally need to examine more than the size of the transaction.
They need to investigate the relationship between the assets and an underlying criminal offence and the conduct of the accused concerning those assets.
The concept of a predicate offence is fundamental to money-laundering allegations.
Article 282 applies to assets originating from an offence satisfying the statutory threshold. The provision currently refers to an underlying offence carrying a minimum imprisonment threshold of at least one year. (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi)
Therefore, one of the first defence questions should be:
What alleged crime generated the money that prosecutors say was laundered?
Examples can include fraud, drug trafficking, corruption, smuggling and various other profit-generating crimes where the statutory conditions are satisfied.
The prosecution cannot simply label ordinary legitimate wealth as criminal proceeds without establishing the necessary factual and legal connection.
Yes.
Foreign citizenship does not create immunity from Turkish criminal law where Turkey has jurisdiction over the alleged conduct.
Foreign investors, company directors, employees, cryptocurrency investors, property buyers and international businesspeople may therefore become involved in Turkish financial-crime investigations.
However, the fact that someone is foreign—or regularly transfers money internationally—is not itself evidence of money laundering.
The first task is to understand the investigation before trying to explain it.
The person should determine, as far as procedurally possible:
which prosecutor’s office is investigating,
the investigation file number,
whether they are treated as a suspect,
what predicate offence is alleged,
which transactions are questioned,
whether MASAK has prepared financial analysis,
whether bank accounts have been restricted,
whether other assets have been seized,
and whether any statement or interrogation has been scheduled.
The defence strategy should then be constructed around the actual allegations.
Not necessarily.
If the issue is merely a bank compliance review, source-of-funds documents may help resolve the problem.
But once a criminal money-laundering investigation exists, the situation is fundamentally different.
Statements given to banks, prosecutors, police and other authorities should be consistent with the objective financial evidence.
The person should therefore reconstruct the transaction history before providing detailed explanations.
MASAK is Turkey’s Financial Crimes Investigation Board.
Its responsibilities include financial intelligence and analysis concerning money laundering and related financial crimes.
Under Law No. 5549, banks and other obligated institutions must identify customers and report transactions where information, suspicion or circumstances provide grounds to suspect that assets were illegally obtained or are being used for illegal purposes. (Masak)
MASAK can analyze this financial information and conduct examinations under its statutory framework.
MASAK’s 2025 Annual Report, published in 2026, states that where concrete findings concerning laundering are detected during examinations, matters can be referred to public prosecutors; the report also records coordination with prosecutors and potential asset-seizure requests under Law No. 5549. (HMB)
No.
MASAK analysis can become highly significant evidence, but criminal liability is ultimately determined through the criminal justice process.
The defence should therefore examine the underlying transactions rather than treating a financial-analysis report as automatically conclusive.
A transfer can look unusual when viewed alone but have a completely lawful explanation when examined together with contracts, invoices, tax documents and previous account history.
Banks and other obligated institutions must report suspicious transactions under Article 4 of Law No. 5549.
Importantly, the reporting obligation arises from suspicion or circumstances requiring suspicion, not from proof that a crime has already occurred. (Masak)
The institution is also subject to confidentiality regarding the fact that it made the report. (Masak)
Accordingly:
Suspicious transaction report ≠ proof of money laundering.
This distinction is crucial for foreigners whose problems begin after an international bank transfer.
Cross-border financial activity naturally creates more complicated transaction chains.
A foreigner may receive money in Turkey from:
a foreign company,
property-sale proceeds,
inheritance,
family funds,
investment proceeds,
salary,
dividends,
share-sale proceeds,
cryptocurrency sales,
consultancy payments,
or transfers between their own international accounts.
All of these can be legitimate.
Problems arise when the origin, economic purpose or ultimate beneficiary cannot readily be identified.
A strong defence should create an uninterrupted source-of-funds chain.
Suppose a foreign investor transfers EUR 750,000 into Turkey.
Instead of merely saying, “These are my savings,” the investor may demonstrate:
ownership of a foreign company → sale of company shares → payment under share purchase agreement → money deposited into foreign bank account → SWIFT transfer → Turkish bank account.
That creates an objectively verifiable explanation.
The appropriate evidence depends on the transaction.
International bank statements and SWIFT records can demonstrate the movement of money.
Contracts and invoices can explain commercial payments.
Employment agreements and payroll documents can establish salary.
Property documents and sale agreements can establish real-estate proceeds.
Corporate resolutions and financial statements can demonstrate dividends.
Share purchase agreements can establish investment exits.
Inheritance documents can establish inherited assets.
Crypto exchange histories can help explain cryptocurrency proceeds.
The defence should organize these materials chronologically.
Cryptocurrency does not automatically mean money laundering.
However, crypto transactions can make tracing more complicated.
A foreigner should preserve evidence showing acquisition of the crypto assets, exchange accounts used, transaction histories, conversion into fiat currency and subsequent bank transfers.
Where possible, the defence should demonstrate:
original lawful funds → crypto purchase → investment history → sale → exchange balance → withdrawal → Turkish bank account.
An unexplained deposit described merely as “crypto profits” may create avoidable evidentiary problems.
This can become much more complicated.
Suppose a foreign consultant receives USD 100,000 from a Turkish company for legitimate services.
Months later, the company director is accused of investment fraud.
The mere fact that the consultant received money from that company does not automatically prove participation in laundering.
Investigators may examine whether services were genuinely provided, whether the amount was commercially reasonable, what the consultant knew about the company and whether there was any agreement to disguise the source of criminal proceeds.
Contracts, work product, invoices, emails and tax records can therefore become decisive.
The person’s knowledge and purpose can be central to the criminal analysis.
Article 282 does not criminalize every innocent interaction with property that later turns out to have a criminal origin.
The statutory laundering offence contains specific elements concerning the criminally derived assets and the conduct undertaken in relation to their source. (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi)
The defence should therefore investigate exactly what the foreigner knew when the transaction occurred.
This is a high-risk situation.
For example, someone may say:
“My account isn’t working. Receive USD 50,000 for me and send it to another account.”
If the foreigner repeatedly accepts such transfers, immediately forwards the money and receives commissions, investigators may examine whether the account was deliberately used as an intermediary in a laundering or fraud structure.
Relevant evidence can include messages, payment instructions, commissions, previous transfers and the relationship between the parties.
No.
Relevant communications should be preserved.
Messages may provide important exculpatory evidence.
They might show, for example, that the accused believed the payment represented a legitimate loan, commercial transaction, property purchase or investment.
Deleting communications after learning about an investigation can also make reconstruction of the events significantly harder.
No fabricated or backdated documentation should be created.
If there was a genuine oral arrangement, the actual evidence surrounding that arrangement should be collected.
False invoices, backdated loan agreements or fabricated consultancy contracts can create additional criminal exposure and seriously damage credibility.
The financial history should be reconstructed from genuine evidence.
Potentially, yes.
Money-laundering investigations can involve asset-preservation measures under Turkish criminal procedure and Law No. 5549.
MASAK’s official 2025 Annual Report confirms that laundering examinations can involve coordination with prosecutors and requests concerning seizure of assets. (HMB)
The precise legality of a freeze depends on the statutory mechanism and decision used in the particular investigation.
Yes, under a separate mechanism.
Article 19/A of Law No. 5549 provides for suspicious transactions to be suspended or prevented from proceeding for up to seven business days where assets are suspected of being connected with money laundering or terrorist financing, for purposes including analysis and referral to competent authorities where necessary. (Masak)
This temporary transaction postponement should not be confused with a longer criminal-procedure seizure.
Potentially.
Financial investigations can extend beyond bank accounts where authorities allege that property represents proceeds of crime or assets relevant to confiscation.
This can be especially significant for foreigners who own Turkish apartments, commercial properties or land.
The defence should establish how and when the property was acquired and where the purchase money originated.
Potentially.
A money-laundering investigation can involve broader asset tracing.
If authorities believe that alleged criminal proceeds were converted into vehicles, securities, corporate interests or other assets, those transactions may become relevant.
The defence should therefore prepare an asset acquisition chronology, not merely a bank-account explanation.
Potentially.
Suppose a foreigner has USD 2 million in Turkey.
The investigation concerns USD 150,000 allegedly received from a suspicious company.
If the remaining USD 1.85 million can be independently traced to lawful investment proceeds accumulated before the questioned transaction, the foreigner may seek to demonstrate that those assets are unrelated.
This distinction can be important when challenging the scope and proportionality of asset restrictions.
Potentially, yes.
The first step is identifying who imposed the restriction and under which provision.
An objection or request for release should then focus on the legal basis of the seizure and the evidence concerning the assets.
A useful challenge may address:
the absence of a sufficient link to criminal proceeds,
lawful ownership,
documented source of funds,
procedural deficiencies,
unnecessary continuation,
or disproportionate scope.
Potentially.
An all-or-nothing strategy is not always necessary.
Where legitimate money can be separated from the questioned transaction, the foreigner may seek release or exclusion of those funds depending on the procedural mechanism involved.
Clear bank tracing is critical.
Company transactions may also be examined.
Investigators may review transfers between the foreign shareholder and company, shareholder loans, capital contributions, dividends, director remuneration and related-party transactions.
Corporate accounting should correspond with the explanation provided in the criminal investigation.
Unexplained movement between personal and corporate accounts can create significant problems.
No.
Ownership of a foreign company is not itself money laundering.
Likewise, using international corporate structures does not automatically establish criminal conduct.
The question is whether the companies were used to disguise criminal proceeds or whether they served legitimate commercial, investment or holding purposes.
Corporate formation records, tax filings, audited accounts and actual business operations can become important evidence.
Multiple jurisdictions can increase scrutiny but do not automatically establish laundering.
A legitimate multinational transaction can naturally involve several banks and countries.
The defence should explain the commercial reason for the route.
If EUR 1 million moved from Switzerland to the UAE and then to Turkey, investigators may ask why.
A documented investment structure provides a very different explanation from unexplained circular transfers through shell companies.
Yes, they can be highly important.
Foreign bank statements, contracts, corporate records, tax returns and other documents can help establish lawful origin.
Depending on the proceeding and document, Turkish translation and relevant authentication formalities may be necessary.
Original electronic and paper versions should therefore be preserved.
MASAK’s laundering-examination regulation provides for analysis, evaluation and examination designed to determine whether factual indicators of laundering exist. The framework was amended in December 2024 and remains part of the current AML structure. (Masak)
MASAK’s official 2025 figures show that 31 laundering examination reports involving 137 people resulted in referrals to public prosecutors during that year. (HMB)
This demonstrates why a MASAK-related matter should be taken seriously while also remembering that referral for investigation is not equivalent to conviction.
If officially summoned, the person should comply with applicable criminal procedure, but should understand the allegations and procedural rights.
Financial investigations often involve complex histories.
A person may incorrectly state dates, amounts or counterparties when trying to answer from memory.
Before giving a detailed account, the relevant bank statements, contracts and correspondence should be reviewed so the actual chronology is understood.
Yes.
Foreign nationality does not remove the right to defence in Turkish criminal proceedings.
In a complex money-laundering investigation, counsel can be particularly important because the case may simultaneously involve criminal liability, MASAK analysis, bank-account restrictions, asset seizure and international evidence.
A person who cannot adequately understand Turkish should ensure that applicable interpretation rights are respected.
Understanding the allegations and questions is essential.
A foreign suspect should not sign a statement whose content they do not understand.
Turkish criminal procedure provides suspects and defendants with fundamental defence rights.
The defence strategy should therefore be determined after understanding the allegations rather than assuming that the person must provide an immediate explanation for every transaction without preparation.
At the same time, objectively documented legitimate transactions can often be powerful exculpatory evidence.
Depending on the investigation and applicable judicial procedures, digital evidence can become relevant.
Financial-crime investigations may examine messages, emails and other communications concerning payments.
A foreigner should not attempt to destroy evidence.
Instead, potentially exculpatory digital records should be identified and preserved.
Being abroad does not automatically end a Turkish criminal investigation.
A foreign national who learns of an investigation while outside Turkey should determine their procedural status before making assumptions about returning to Turkey.
Counsel may be able to investigate whether a summons, arrest-related measure, asset restriction or other procedural decision exists.
Yes.
Money laundering is a criminal offence carrying imprisonment and a judicial fine under Article 282 TCK.
The version of Article 282 reproduced in the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s legislative materials provides for imprisonment and a judicial fine and also contains enhanced consequences where the offence is committed in specified professional or organizational circumstances. (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi)
Because penalties and statutory amendments must be assessed according to the law applicable to the alleged offence date, the exact sentencing exposure should be checked case by case.
Article 282 provides an aggravated consequence where laundering is committed within the activities of an organization established to commit crimes. (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi)
This can make investigations involving alleged networks, multiple companies and coordinated bank accounts particularly serious.
The prosecution must nevertheless establish the relevant statutory elements.
Yes.
Article 282 also provides for security measures specific to legal entities in connection with the laundering offence. (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi)
Therefore, a case involving a foreign-controlled Turkish company may create consequences for both the individuals investigated and the legal entity.
Article 282 contains a specific effective-repentance provision concerning assistance provided before prosecution begins.
The statutory provision addresses circumstances in which a person enables the relevant assets to be seized or facilitates seizure by informing competent authorities of their location. (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi)
Whether this provision applies is highly fact-specific and should be assessed carefully before any action is taken.
Yes, where the prosecution cannot prove the statutory elements of the offence.
Potential defence issues may include absence of qualifying criminal proceeds, inability to establish the alleged predicate offence, absence of the required knowledge or purpose, legitimate source of funds, mistaken attribution of transactions or insufficient evidence linking the accused to the laundering operation.
Financial evidence can be as important as witness testimony.
The defence can challenge the factual conclusions drawn from financial evidence.
For example, a report may characterize a transfer as economically unexplained.
The accused may then produce the underlying loan agreement, banking history and repayment records.
The objective should not simply be to say that MASAK is wrong.
It should be to demonstrate why the financial conclusion does not reflect the actual transaction.
Potentially, but a criminal accusation does not automatically mean that every foreigner’s residence permit is immediately cancelled.
Criminal proceedings and immigration proceedings have separate legal frameworks.
If an immigration measure is imposed, it should be assessed independently.
Potential immigration consequences may arise depending on the circumstances, but deportation should not be treated as an automatic consequence of merely being investigated.
An accusation, prosecution and final conviction are legally different stages.
If a deportation decision is issued, the foreigner should separately examine the available immigration-law remedies and applicable deadlines.
Not automatically merely because of the family relationship.
However, investigators may examine transfers to spouses, relatives or related companies if they suspect assets were moved to conceal ownership or origin.
A relative who genuinely owns assets from an independent lawful source should preserve documentation proving that ownership.
Inheritance can provide a straightforward lawful source if properly documented.
Probate documents, inheritance certificates, estate distributions and bank records can demonstrate how the money was acquired.
The complete chain from the estate to the Turkish account should be documented.
Again, documentary tracing is essential.
The defence should establish:
ownership of property → sale agreement → purchase price → bank deposit → international transfer → Turkish account.
Where this chronology predates the alleged criminal activity, it may become particularly significant.
Suppose a foreign businessperson receives USD 1 million from a Turkish company.
The Turkish company later becomes the subject of a major fraud investigation.
The foreigner’s Turkish accounts are restricted and prosecutors investigate whether the USD 1 million represented laundering of fraud proceeds.
The foreigner claims the payment was the purchase price for machinery.
The defence should not stop with that assertion.
It should collect the machinery sale agreement, invoices, customs documents, shipping records, correspondence, accounting entries and evidence showing actual delivery.
If genuine machinery worth USD 1 million was supplied, this evidence can radically alter the interpretation of the transfer.
Consider another case.
A foreign investor transfers EUR 2 million through several international accounts before depositing the funds in Turkey.
MASAK analysis identifies the movement as unusual.
If the investor can demonstrate that the funds originated from a documented business sale and moved between accounts all beneficially owned by the investor for legitimate banking reasons, the financial trail may provide a lawful explanation.
The complexity of the transfer chain is not itself proof of laundering.
A money-laundering investigation can involve hundreds of pages of bank records, but the core defence often comes back to several fundamental questions:
What is the alleged predicate crime?
Which assets allegedly came from that crime?
How did those assets reach the foreigner?
What did the foreigner know?
What transactions did the foreigner perform?
Why were those transactions performed?
Can the accused demonstrate an independent lawful source of funds?
Answering those questions with documentary evidence is generally much more effective than offering broad denials.
As of 2026, Turkey’s AML system continues to combine the substantive criminal offence under Article 282 TCK with the preventive, reporting and financial-intelligence framework under Law No. 5549.
Banks and other obligated institutions have customer-identification and suspicious-transaction-reporting obligations. (Masak)
MASAK can analyze financial information and conduct laundering examinations, while matters involving concrete findings can be referred to prosecutors. MASAK’s latest annual reporting confirms continued referrals and coordination with prosecutors in laundering investigations. (HMB)
For a foreign suspect, the most effective approach is therefore usually:
identify the alleged predicate crime → obtain the investigation details → preserve all financial and digital evidence → reconstruct the complete source of funds → analyze every questioned transaction → challenge unnecessary asset restrictions → present the lawful economic explanation with documentary evidence.
No. MASAK analysis or a suspicious transaction report does not itself establish criminal guilt.
Not automatically. The statutory elements of Article 282 and the person’s conduct, knowledge and purpose must be examined.
Potentially, where the statutory conditions for the applicable protective measure are satisfied.
Potentially. If funds can be independently demonstrated to have a lawful origin and no relevant connection with alleged criminal proceeds, their continued restriction can be challenged depending on the applicable measure.
Bank statements, SWIFT records, contracts, invoices, tax documents, property records, corporate documents, crypto records and communications explaining the transactions can all be important.
The circumstances surrounding your knowledge and conduct can be critical. Preserve communications and other evidence explaining why you believed the transaction was legitimate.
No. Relevant evidence should be preserved.
Substantial legal work may often be handled through Turkish counsel, although the authorities may separately require your statement or presence depending on the investigation.
Potentially, but criminal and immigration proceedings are separate. An investigation does not automatically cancel every foreigner’s residence permit.
Yes. The prosecution must prove the statutory elements of the offence. Demonstrating legitimate source of funds, lack of the required criminal connection or other deficiencies in the prosecution case can be central to the defence.
Money-laundering investigations involving foreigners should be treated as both criminal defence and financial-tracing cases.
A defence strategy should identify the alleged predicate offence, examine the MASAK and banking evidence, trace the origin of the questioned assets, determine whether accounts or other property have been seized and establish the lawful economic explanation for the transactions.
Fırat Fesih Kaya Law Office provides legal assistance to foreign individuals, investors, shareholders and company directors facing money-laundering allegations, MASAK investigations, suspicious bank-transfer investigations, frozen accounts, cryptocurrency-related financial investigations and asset-seizure measures in Turkey.
Where a foreigner has received substantial international transfers or has legitimate assets mixed with transactions under investigation, Fırat Fesih Kaya can assess the transaction history and prepare a defence focused on source of funds, financial tracing, criminal intent and the release of unrelated legitimate assets.
Phone: +90 312 434 22 22
Mobile Phone: +90 532 769 22 22
Email: info@firatfesihkaya.av.tr
Address: Mevlana Boulevard No: 221, Yildirim Tower, Balgat, Cankaya / Ankara, Turkey